Speculative attacks on debts and optimum currency area: a welfare analysis

Traditionally the issue of an optimum currency area is based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by McKinnon [13], Kenen [12] and mainly Mundell [14], who is concerned with the benefits of lowering transaction costs vis-à- vis adjustments to asymmetrical shocks. Recently, this theme has been reappraised with new aspects included in the analysis, such as: incomplete markets, credibility of monetary policy and seigniorage, among others. For instance, Neumeyer [15] develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and shows that a monetary union is desirable when the welfare gains of eliminating the exchange rate volatility are greater than the cost of reducing the number of currencies to hedge against risks. In this paper, we also resort to a general equilibrium model to evaluate financial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country heavily dependent on foreign capital that may suffer a speculative attack on its public debt. The welfare analysis uses as reference the self-fulfilling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6], [7] and [8]), which is employed here to represent dollarization. Under this regime, the national government has no control over its monetary policy, the total public debt is denominated in dollars and it is in the hands of international bankers. To describe a country that is a member of a currency union, we modify the original Cole-Kehoe model by including public debt denominated in common currency, only purchased by national consumers. According to this rule, the member countries regain some influence over the monetary policy decision, which is, however, dependent on majority voting. We show that for specific levels of dollar debt, to create inflation tax on common-currency debt in order to avoid an external default is more desirable than to suspend its payment, which is the only choice available for a dollarized economy when foreign creditors decide not to renew their loans.

Common currency and economic integration in Mercosur

A América Latina tem uma longa história de tentativas de alcançar uma integração regional, embora seu sucesso tenha sido modesto. Este trabalho procura mostrar que isso essencialmente ocorre não tanto pelas práticas protecionistas nos vários países, mas devido à falta de uma moeda comum, ou, pelo menos, de uma taxa de câmbio rigorosamente administrada. Os autores analisaram o critério da área ótima de moeda que mostra ser prudente aumentar a integração econômica antes de tentar implementar a coordenação das taxas de câmbio. Entretanto, nós mostramos que no Mercosul já existem as condições mínimas para começar a trabalhar nessa direção. A diminuição da instabilidade cambial pode encorajar a entrada de investimentos e o comércio nas economias latino-americanas. Os autores também desenvolveram um exercício simplificado para entender como poderia ser viável alcançar estabilidade da taxa de câmbio em nos dois maiores países da região (Brasil e Argentina) e avançar na adoção de uma moeda comum.

Speculative attacks on debts, dollarization and optimum currency areas

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the financial aspects of dollarization and optimum currency areas. Based on the model of self-fulfilling debt crisis developed by Cole and Kehoe [4], it is possible to evaluate the comparative welfare of economies, which either keep their local currency and an independent monetary policy, join a monetary union or adopt dollarization. In the two former monetary regimes, governments can issue debt denominated, respectively, in local and common currencies, which is completely purchased by national consumers. Given this ability, governments may decide to impose an inflation tax on these assets and use the revenues so collected to avoid an external debt crises. While the country that issues its own currency takes this decision independently, a country belonging to a monetary union depends on the joint decision of all member countries about the common monetary policy. In this way, an external debt crises may be avoided under the local and common currency regimes, if, respectively, the national and the union central banks have the ability to do monetary policy, represented by the reduction in the real return on the bonds denominated in these currencies. This resource is not available under dollarization. In a dollarized economy, the loss of control over national monetary policy does not allow adjustments for exogenous shocks that asymmetrically affect the client and the anchor countries, but credibility is strengthened. On the other hand, given the ability to inflate the local currency, the central bank may be subject to the political influence of a government not so strongly concerned with fiscal discipline, which reduces the welfare of the economy. In a similar fashion, under a common currency regime, the union central bank may also be under the influence of a group of countries to inflate the common currency, even though they do not face external restrictions. Therefore, the local and common currencies could be viewed as a way to provide welfare enhancing bankruptcy, if it is not abused. With these peculiarities of monetary regimes in mind, we simulate the levels of economic welfare for each, employing recent data for the Brazilian economy.

Det grekiska dramat. En Studie av euroländeras agerande i Greklandskrisen.

Jag granskar i min avhandling pro gradu den ekonomiska krisen i Grekland som kulminerade under vären 2010 när Grekland vände sig tili de övriga medlemsländerna i Ekonomiska och monetära Unionen (EMU) med en förfrägan om ekonomisk hjälp i formav län. Syftet med avhandlingen är att undersöka hur de övriga EMU-medlemmarna fattade sitt beslut om att ekonomiskt stöda Grekland efter att landets kreditvärdighet sänkts av de internationella kreditvärderingsinstituten. Jag granskar Greklandskrisen och dess utveckling, de lösningar som man gick in för inom ramen för valutaunionen, hur besluten om stödpaketet fattades och vilka faktorer som päverkade besluten. Jag tar avstamp i Optimum Currency Area-teorin (OCA-teorin) och teorier om europeisk ekonomisk integration. Dessutom för jag en diskussion kring solidariteten mellan EUländerna, som ocksä använts som argument för stödpaketet tili Grekland. Jag klassificerar euroländerna utgäende för hur det nationella beslutet om Greklandspaketet fattats och gör därefter en agglomerativ klusteranalys, med ambitionen att förklara vilka faktorer som päverkat besluten. Syftet med klusteranalysen är att klargöra huruvida politiska faktorer, som härrör sig tili regeringen och dess sammansättning, eller ekonomiska faktorer, som bclyser statsfinansernas tillständ, bäst förklarar hur ett land fattat sitt beslut. Resultatet visar att de politiska variablerna har päverkat ländernas beslut mer an de ekonomiska, men förklaringsgraden är relativt lag i bägge fallen. Jag för vidare en diskussion om resultatet ur ett OCA-perspektiv, kriterierna för ett optimalt valutaomräde samt EMU:s utveckling i dito riktning. Jag avslutar avhandlingen med en diskussion kring EMU:s framtid.

Monetary arrangements for emerging economies

In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.

Trade and Business Cycle Correlations in Asia-Pacific

Recent empirical studies challenge the traditional theory of optimum currency areas by arguing that a monetary union enhances trade and business cycle co-movements among its member countries sufficiently as to obviate the need for national monetary policy. This paper examines the empirical relationship between trade and business cycle correlations among thirteen Asia-Pacific countries, paying particular attention to the structural characteristics of their economies and other issues not explored fully in the literature. According to our result, although trade is relevant to the business cycles of individual countries, the main determinant of their international correlations is not the geographical structure of their trade but what they produce and export --more specifically the extent to which their output and exports are concentrated on electronic products.

Europe on the Road to the Third Stage of EMU: Recent Evidence. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.2, 1996

The paper deals with Europe's effort to proceed to the thud stage of EMU and establish a common currency. It is argued that the success of the common currency experiment will greatly depend on the fulfillment of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria, on the adoption of the proper adjustment policies as well as on the political desirability of the project. The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 deals briefly with the index of criteria that define an OCA. Section 2 examines the extent to which Europe experiences common demand disturbances, while sections 3 and 4 focus on evidence about the mobility of factors of production across Europe, namely labor and capital. Section 5 examines the possibility of an increase in trade volume across the EU under fixed exchange rates or a common currency regime. Section 6 sheds light on the possibility of the EURO (the ex-ECU} to become a vehicle currency in the international financial system, and Section 7 is concerned with the benefits and costs of the establishment of a European Central Bank (ECB), paying special attention to seigniorage revenues. Section 8 deals with the necessity of establishing an EU federal mechanism facilitating adjustment. Section 9 sketches out a proper role for a hegemonic power in a common currency regime. Finally, section 10 examines EMU prospects during the transitional period. The paper closes with some concluding remarks, where the role of politics and coordination of economic policies are particularly emphasized as of cardinal importance on the road to the third stage of EMU.

Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic

Using a panel of 21 OECD countries and 40 years of annual data, we find that countries with similar government budget positions tend to have business cycles that fluctuate more closely. That is, fiscal convergence (in the form of persistently similar ratios of government surplus/deficit to GDP) is systematically associated with more synchronized business cycles. We also find evidence that reduced fiscal deficits increase business cycle synchronization. The Maastricht "convergence criteria," used to determine eligibility for EMU, encouraged fiscal convergence and deficit reduction. They may thus have indirectly moved Europe closer to an optimum currency area, by reducing countries’ abilities to create idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. Our empirical results are economically and statistically significant, and robust.

A fiskális divergencia és a konjunktúraciklusok együttmozgása - a felelőtlen fiskális politika az aszimmetrikus sokkok forrása (Fiscal divergence and business cycle synchronization: irresponsibility is idiosyncratic)

A világ 115 országának - köztük 21 OECD-tagország - 40 évnyi adatait vizsgálva, arra a következtetésre jutottunk, hogy a hasonló állami költségvetési pozíciójú országok konjunktúraciklusai között szorosabb együttmozgás mutatható ki. Azaz, a fiskális konvergenciát (amelyet a költségvetési egyenleg GDP-hez viszonyt arányának konvergenciájaként definiáltunk) összehangoltabb konjunktúraciklusokkal lehet összefüggésbe hozni. Kutatásaink során arra is találtunk bizonyítékot, hogy a kisebb mértékű költségvetési deficitek növelik a konjunktúraciklusok együttmozgását. A maastrichti konvergenciakritériumok - amelyek az európai monetáris unió követelményeinek való megfelelést hivatottak meghatározni - a fiskális konvergenciát és a költségvetési deficit csökkentését ösztönözték, s ezzel közvetett módon hozzásegítették Európát egy optimális valutaövezet létrehozásához azáltal, hogy csökkent az egyes országok lehetősége a felelőtlen fiskális politika által gerjesztett sokkhatások létrehozására. Az általunk feltárt empirikus eredmények gazdasági és statisztikai szempontból is szignifikánsak és robusztusak. _____ Using panels of 115 countries of world – including 21 OECD countries – and 40 years of annual data, the authors find that countries with similar government budget positions tend to have business cycles that fluctuate more closely. Thus fiscal convergence (in the form of persistently similar ratios of government surplus/deficit to GDP) is systemati-cally associated with more strongly synchronized business cycles. Evidence is also found that reduced fiscal deficits increase business-cycle synchronization. The Maastricht "con-vergence criteria", used to determine eligibility for EMU, encouraged fiscal convergence and deficit reduction. So they may, indirectly, have moved Europe closer to an optimum currency area, by reducing countries abilities to create idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. The empirical results of the study are economically and statistically significant, and robust.

Magyar alkalmazkodás az Európai Unió monetáris együttműködéséhez - tanulságok (Hungarian adaption to the monetary cooperation)

A cikk röviden összefoglalja az optimális valutaövezetek elméletének fejlődési állomásait, miközben felvet néhány kérdést a 2008-ban kezdődött válsággal kapcsolatban. Ezt követően áttekinti az elmélet és a válság által felvetett problémákra a gazdasági és monetáris unió által adott válaszokat. Végül az elmélet, az európai szabályozás aktuális állapota és a hazai tapasztalatok, lehetőségek tükrében megvizsgálja, hogy a jelenlegi helyzetben Magyarországnak milyen érdekei és ellenérdekei fűződhetnek az euró bevezetéséhez. Az írás kísérletet tesz arra, hogy kijelölje a hazai gazdaságpolitika kívánatos irányvonalát. _______ The article briefly summarizes the developments of the optimum currency area (OCA) theory, while states some questions regarding the crises starting in 2008. Secondly, it reviews the solutions given by the economic and monetary union to the problems raised by the OCA theory and the crisis. Thirdly, it evaluates the pros and cons for Hungary to introduce the euro as its own currency in the light of the OCA theory, the state of the European legislation and the Hungarian track record and possibilities. Finally, it shows the desired direction for the official Hungarian economic and financial policy.

A Zona do Euro e a Teoria de Áreas Monetárias Ótimas: uma análise utilizando um Vetor Autorregressivo Aumentado por Fatores Dinâmicos (FAVAR)

Este trabalho tem como objetivos analisar as semelhanças das respostas dos países da Zona do Euro aos choques na política monetária e no câmbio (identificados através de restrições de sinais nas funções impulso-resposta) e investigar a simetria das flutuações na taxa de crescimento do nível de atividade na região através da análise da importância relativa da resposta do crescimento do PIB destes países aos choques comum e específico identificados pelo modelo FAVAR utilizado, que foi estimado através de um método Bayesiano desenvolvido para incorporar prioris de Litterman (1986). A importância do choque comum (relativamente ao específico) nos diversos países, fornece uma medida do grau de integração dos diversos membros da Zona do Euro. O trabalho contribui para a análise do grau de integração dos países da Zona do Euro ao utilizar uma metodologia que permite o uso de um amplo conjunto de variáveis e ao identificar o grau de simetria das flutuações na taxa de crescimento do nível de atividade dos membros da região através da identificação dos choques comuns e específicos. Foram utilizados dados trimestrais de 1999.I a 2013.I para os 17 países da região. Os resultados encontrados apontam para a existência de uma maior integração entre as grandes economias da Zona do Euro ( com exceção da França) e uma integração menor para as menores economias (com exceção da Finlândia).

Framing Banking Union in the Euro Area: Some empirical evidence. CEPS Working Document No. 389, 3 February 2014

Evidence shows that financial integration in the euro area is retrenching at a quicker pace than outside the union. Home bias persists: Governments compete on funding costs by supporting ‘their’ banks with massive state aids, which distorts the playing field and feeds the risk-aversion loop. This situation intensifies friction in credit markets, thus hampering the transmission of monetary policies and, potentially, economic growth. This paper discusses the theoretical foundations of a banking union in a common currency area and the legal and economic aspects of EU responses. As a result, two remedies are proposed to deal with moral hazard in a common currency area: a common (unlimited) financial backstop to a privately funded recapitalisation/resolution fund and a blanket prohibition on state aids.

Cross-country insurance mechanisms in currency unions. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/04, 27 March 2014

Countries in a monetary union can adjust to shocks either through internal or external mechanisms. We quantitatively assess for the European Union a number of relevant mechanisms suggested by Mundell’s optimal currency area theory, and compare them to the United States. For this purpose, we update a number of empirical analyses in the economic literature that identify (1) the size of asymmetries across countries and (2) the magnitude of insurance mechanisms relative to similar mechanisms and compare results for the European Monetary Union (EMU) with those obtained for the US. To study the level of synchronization between EMU countries we follow Alesina et al. (2002) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007). To measure the effect of an employment shock on employment levels, unemployment rates and participation rates we perform an analysis based on Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Decressin and Fatas (1995). We measure consumption smoothing through capital markets, fiscal transfers and savings, using the approach by Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Afonso and Furceri (2007). To analyze risk sharing through a common safety net for banks we perform a rudimentary simulation analysis. |