The legality of tissue transplants for the benefit of family members in the UK and Australia : implications for saviour siblings

The ethics of creating ‘saviour siblings’ for the benefit of another has received much attention, but little consideration has been given to the legal position of those saviours born who may be asked to provide tissue for transplantation to another during childhood. This article examines the ethical issues surrounding minor donation as well as the existing legal framework in the UK and Australia that regulates minors providing tissue for the benefit of another. Against this background the position of minor saviours, who are called upon to donate bone marrow or peripheral blood stem cells, is examined. This analysis suggests that the law does not provide sufficient protection for minor saviours who are called upon to donate to another. It is argued that specific ethical obligations are owed to saviours—that ought to be reflected in the law—in order to protect them from exploitation while they remain minors.

Commercialisation of regenerative human tissue : Regulation and reform in Australia and England, Wales and Northern Ireland

The commercialisation of therapeutic products containing regenerative human tissue is regulated by the common law, statute and ethical guidelines in Australia and England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This article examines the regulatory regimes in these jurisdictions and considers whether reform is required to both support scientific research and ensure conformity with modern social views on medical research and the use of human tissue. The authors consider the crucial role of informed consent in striking the balance between the interests of researchers and the interests of the public.

Advance Directives Refusing Treatment as an Expression of Autonomy: Do the Courts Practise What They Preach?

The principle of autonomy is at the heart of the right of a competent individual to make an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, and to have that directive complied with by medical professionals. That right is protected by both the common law and, to an extent, by legislation that has been enacted in the United Kingdom and many jurisdictions in Australia. The courts have a critical role in protecting that autonomy, both in those jurisdictions in which the common law continues to operate, and in those jurisdictions which are now governed by statute, and in which judicial determinations will need to be made about legislative provisions. The problem explored in this article is that while the judiciary espouses the importance of autonomy in its judgments, that rhetoric is frequently not reflected in the decisions that are reached. In the United Kingdom and Australia, there is a relatively small number of decisions that consider the validity and applicability of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. This article critically evaluates all of the publicly available decisions and concludes that there is cause for concern. In some cases, there has been an unprincipled evolution of common law principles, while in others there has been inappropriate adjudication through operational irregularities or failure to apply correct legal principles. Further, some decisions appear to be based on a strained interpretation of the facts of the case. The apparent reluctance of some members of the judiciary to give effect to advance directives that refuse treatment is also evidenced by the language used in the judgments. While the focus of this article is on common law decisions, reference will also be made to legislation and the extent to which it has addressed some of the problems identified in this article.

Adults who lack capacity : substitute decision-making

• Mechanisms to facilitate consent to healthcare for adults who lack capacity are necessary to ensure that these adults can lawfully receive appropriate medical treatment when needed. • In Australia, the common law plays only a limited role in this context, through its recognition of advance directives and through the parens patriae jurisdiction of superior courts. • Substitute decision-making for adults who lack capacity is facilitated primarily by guardianship and other related legislation. This legislation, which has been enacted in all Australian States and Territories, permits a range of decision-makers to make different types of healthcare decisions. • Substitute decision-makers can be appointed by the adult or by a guardianship or other tribunal. Where there is no appointed decision-maker, legislation generally empowers those close to the adult to make the relevant decision. Most Australian jurisdictions have also provided for statutory advance directives. • For the most serious of decisions, such as non-therapeutic sterilisations, consent can only be provided by a Tribunal. Other decisions can generally be made by a range of substitute decision-makers. Some treatment, such as very minor treatment or that which is needed in an emergency, can be provided without consent. • Guardianship legislation generally establishes a set of principles and/or other criteria to guide healthcare decisions. Mechanisms to resolve disputes as to who is the appropriate decision-maker and how a decision should be made have also been established.

The doctrine of double effect

• The doctrine of double effect is an exception to the general rule that taking active steps that end life is unlawful. • The essence of the doctrine at common law is intention. • Hastening a patient’s death through palliative care will be lawful provided the primary intention is to relieve pain, and not cause death, even if that death is foreseen. • Some States have enacted legislative excuses that deal with the provision of palliative care. • These statutory excuses tend to be stricter than the common law as they impose other requirements in addition to having an appropriate intent, such as adherence to some level of recognised medical practice.

Everyday life and the edges of existence : wrongs with no name or the wrong name?

Actions for wrongful life, as they have come unfortunately to be styled, encompass various types of claim. These include claims for alleged negligence after conception, those based on negligent advice or diagnosis prior to conception concerning possible effects of treatment given to the child's mother, contraception or sterilisation, or genetic disability. This distinguishes such claims from those for so called wrongful birth, which are claims by parents for the cost of raising either a healthy or a disabled child where the unplanned birth imposes costs on the parents as a result of clinical negligence. Two of the more controversial cases to have reached the High Court of Australia which are if interest to us here in the past decade are Cattanach v Melchior where the court, by a narrow majority (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ; Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon dissenting) acknowledged recovery for wrongful birth. In the second joined appeals of Harriton v Stephens and Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan the court overwhelmingly precluded a ‘wrongful life’ claim (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ; Kirby J dissenting). Both cases raised issues around the sanctity and value of life and the nature of harm and the assessment of damages, and this brief note affords us the opportunity to consider the way in which the ‘life as legal loss’ arguments were treated by the various judges in both cases.

Defending the sanctity of life principle : a reply to John Keown

This article is a response to Professor Keown’s criticism of my paper “Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze: Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia” (2005) 13 (3) Medical Law Review 357. The article takes up and responds to a number of criticisms raised by Keown in an attempt to further the debate concerning the moral and legal status of withdrawing life-sustaining measures, its distinction from euthanasia, and the implications of the lawfulness of withdrawal for the principle of the sanctity of life.

How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?

The purpose of this paper is to provide a basis from which to start an informed and rational dialogue in Australia about voluntary euthanasia (VE) and assisted suicide (AS). It does this by seeking to chart the broad landscape of issues that can be raised as relevant to how this conduct should be regulated by the law. It is not our purpose to persuade. Rather, we have attempted to address the issues as neutrally as possible and to canvass both sides of the argument in an even-handed manner. We hope that this exercise places the reader in a position to consider the question posed by this paper: How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide? In line with the approach taken in the paper, this question does not take sides in the debate. It simply asks how VE and AS should be regulated, acknowledging that both prohibition and legalisation of such conduct involve regulation. We begin by considering the wider legal framework that governs end of life decision-making. Decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment that result in a person’s death can be lawful. This could be because, for example, a competent adult refuses such treatment. Alternatively, stopping or not providing treatment can be lawful when it is no longer in a person’s best interests to receive it. The law also recognises that appropriate palliative care should not attract criminal responsibility. By contrast, VE and AS are unlawful in Australia and could lead to prosecution for crimes such as murder, manslaughter or aiding and abetting suicide. But this is not to say that such conduct does not occur in practice. Indeed, there is a body of evidence that VE and AS occur in Australia, despite them being unlawful. There have been repeated efforts to change the law in this country, mainly by the minor political parties. However, apart from a brief period when VE and AS was lawful in the Northern Territory, these attempts to reform the law have been unsuccessful. The position is different in a small but increasing number of jurisdictions overseas where such conduct is lawful. The most well known is the Netherlands but there are also statutory regimes that regulate VE and/or AS in Belgium and Luxembourg in Europe, and Oregon and Washington in the United States. A feature of these legislative models is that they incorporate review or oversight processes that enable the collection of data about how the law is being used. As a result, there is a significant body of evidence that is available for consideration to assess the operation of the law in these jurisdictions and some of this is considered briefly here. Assisting a suicide, if done for selfless motives, is also legal in Switzerland, and this has resulted in what has been referred to as ‘euthanasia tourism’. This model is also considered. The paper also identifies the major arguments in favour of, and against, legalisation of VE and AS. Arguments often advanced in favour of law reform include respect for autonomy, that public opinion favours reform, and that the current law is incoherent and discriminatory. Key arguments against legalising VE and AS point to the sanctity of life, concerns about the adequacy and effectiveness of safeguards, and a ‘slippery slope’ that will allow euthanasia to occur for minors or for adults where it is not voluntary. We have also attempted to step beyond these well trodden and often rehearsed cases ‘for and against’. To this end, we have identified some ethical values that might span both sides of the debate and perhaps be the subject of wider consensus. We then outline a framework for considering the issue of how Australia should regulate VE and AS. We begin by asking whether such conduct should be criminal acts (as they presently are). If VE and AS should continue to attract criminal responsibility, the next step is to enquire whether the law should punish such conduct more or less than is presently the case, or whether the law should stay the same. If a change is favoured as to how the criminal law punishes VE and AS, options considered include sentencing reform, creating context-specific offences or developing prosecutorial guidelines for how the criminal justice system deals with these issues. If VE and AS should not be criminal acts, then questions arise as to how and when they should be permitted and regulated. Possible elements of any reform model include: ensuring decision-making is competent and voluntary; ascertaining a person’s eligibility to utilise the regime, for example, whether it depends on him or her having a terminal illness or experiencing pain and suffering; and setting out processes for how any decision must be made and evidenced. Options to bring about decriminalisation include challenging the validity of laws that make VE and AS unlawful, recognising a defence to criminal prosecution, or creating a statutory framework to regulate the practice. We conclude the paper where we started: with a call for rational and informed consideration of a difficult and sensitive issue. How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?

How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?

This paper invites consideration of how Australia should regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. We have attempted to pose this question as neutrally as possible, acknowledging that both prohibition and legalisation of such conduct involve decisions about regulation. We begin by charting the wider field of law at the end of life, before considering the repeated, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempts at law reform in Australia. The situation in Australia is contrasted with permissive jurisdictions overseas where voluntary euthanasia and/or assisted suicide are lawful. We consider the arguments for and against legalisation of such conduct along with the available empirical evidence as to what happens in practice both in Australia and overseas. The paper concludes by outlining a framework for deliberating on how Australia should regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. We ask a threshold question of whether such conduct should be criminal acts (as they presently are), the answer to which then leads to a range of possible regulatory options.

The right to choose an assisted death : time for legislation?

The legal framework that operates at the end of life in Australia needs to be reformed. • Voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide are currently unlawful. • Both activities nevertheless occur not infrequently in Australia, in part because palliative care cannot relieve physical and psychological pain and suffering in all cases. • In this respect, the law is deficient. The law is also unfair because it doesn’t treat people equally. Some people can be helped to die on their own terms as a result of their knowledge and/or connections while some are able to hasten their death by the refusal of life-sustaining treatment. But others do not have access to the means for their life to end. • A very substantial majority of Australians have repeatedly expressed in public opinion polls their desire for law reform on these matters. Many are concerned at what they see is happening to their loved ones as they reach the end of their lives, and want the confidence that when their time comes they will be able to exercise choice in relation to assisted dying. • The most consistent reason advanced not to change the law is the need to protect the vulnerable. There is a concern that if the law allows voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide for some people, it will be expanded and abused, including pressures being placed on highly dependent people and those with disabilities to agree to euthanasia. • But there is now a large body of experience in a number of international jurisdictions following the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia and/or assisted suicide. This shows that appropriate safeguards can be implemented to protect vulnerable people and prevent the abuse that opponents of assisted dying have feared. It reveals that assisted dying meets a real need among a small minority of people at the end of their lives. It also provides reassurance to people with terminal and incurable disease that they will not be left to suffer the indignities and discomfort of a nasty death. • Australia is an increasingly secular society. Strong opposition to assisted death by religious groups that is based on their belief in divine sanctity of all human life is not a justification for denying choice for those who do not share that belief. • It is now time for Australian legislators to respond to this concern and this experience by legislating to enhance the quality of death for those Australians who seek assisted dying.

Enduring powers of attorney : promoting attorneys' accountability as substitute decision makers

Aim The misuse and abuse of Enduring Powers of Attorney (EPAs) by attorneys, particularly in relation to financial decision-making, is a growing concern. This paper explores the opportunities to enhance accountability of attorneys at the time of the execution of the document in Queensland. Method A four stage multi-method design comprised a critical reference group; semi-structured interviews with 32 principals or potential principals, attorneys and witnesses; two focus groups with service providers and a state wide survey of 76 principals, attorneys and witnesses. Results Across all methods and user groups, understanding the role and obligations of the attorney in an EPA was consistently identified as problematic. Conclusions Promoting accountability and understanding can be addressed by greater attention to the role of the attorney in the forms/ guidelines and in the structure and witnessing of the forms, increased direction about record keeping and access to appropriate advice and support.

Pleading intention

This article considers the scope of the application of the civil liability legislation, an issue which is still being clarified by the courts, despite the passage of some ten years since the enactment of the non-uniform civil liability legislation across Australia. The introduction of the civil liability legislation has made more important the pleading of intention, in addition to negligence, so as to maximise damages awards. This involves pleading torts traditionally referred to as intentional torts – particularly trespass to the person. Such an approach is attractive for plaintiffs because, in several jurisdictions, tort claims which plead intention have been excluded from the operation of the legislative restrictions on the quantum of damages awards, and prohibitions on exemplary and aggravated damages. This approach reflects the policy that those who intend the harmful consequences of their actions should be held fully responsible.

Advance health directives : competing perceptions, intentions and use by patients and doctors in Queensland

This paper reports on mixed method empirical research undertaken with individuals who have completed advance health directives (‘principals’) and doctors who have either attested to the principal’s capacity when the document was completed or been called upon to use these documents in clinical settings. Principals and doctors appear to have different understandings of the purpose of these documents and their role in decision-making about medical treatment. We recommend changes to the advance health directive form in Queensland to promote informed decision-making which will help to better align perceptions of principals and doctors about the role of these documents.