Agricultural Policymaking: Interest Groups and Access to Governmental Officials

Conservation agriculture that focuses on soil recovery is both economically and environmentally sustainable. This lies in contrast with many of the current agricultural practices, which push for high production, which, in turn lead to over-depletion of the soil. Agricultural interest groups play a role in crafting farming policies with governmental officials. Therefore, my study examined three interest group types agribusinesses, farmer organizations, and environmental NGOs that seek to influence agricultural policy, specifically focusing on the federal farm bill, due to its large impact throughout the nation. The research in which data wasgathered through subject interviews, a literature review, and databases found that access to governmental officials affects the amount of influence a group can have. Access is contingent upon: 1) the number of networks (social, professional, and political), 2) amount of money spent through campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures, and 3) extent of business enterprises and subsidiaries. The evidence shows that there is a correlation between these variables and the extent of access. My research concludes that agribusiness interest groups have the most access to government officials, and thus have the greatest influence on agricultural policies. Because agribusinesses support subsidies of commodity-crops this indirectly impacts conservation agriculture, as the two programs compete in a zero-sum game for funding in the farm bills.

In Search of Political Influence: Strategic Choices and Media Coverage of Political Parties, Interest Groups and Social Movements in Western European Countries

Outside lobbying is a key strategy for social movements, interest groups and political parties for mobilising public opinion through the media in order to pressure policymakers and influence the policymaking process. Relying on semi-structured interviews and newspaper content analysis in six Western European countries, this article examines the use of four outside lobbying strategies – media-related activities, informing (about) the public, mobilisation and protest – and the amount of media coverage they attract. While some strategies are systematically less pursued than others, we find variation in their relative share across institutional contexts and actor types. Given that most of these differences are not accurately mirrored in the media, we conclude that media coverage is only loosely connected to outside lobbying behaviour, and that the media respond differently to a given strategy when used by different actors. Thus, the ability of different outside lobbying strategies to generate media coverage critically depends on who makes use of them.

The influence of ideological interest groups on congressional financial support of international family planning

The World Health Organization estimates there are about 585,000 maternal deaths each year, with 98% of the maternal deaths in developing countries. Access to family planning methods is one method to decrease maternal mortality and morbidity. ^ The U.S. was the leader in providing financial and technical assistance to developing countries to enable women to have this access. The election of Ronald Regan changed the course of U.S. support; abortion became a central factor in the political decision-making with regards to the financial support of international family planning. ^ One factor that may sway policy-makers' decisions is the influence of ideological interest groups, Political Action Committees funding of candidates in relation to votes on bills that impacted on financial support of international family planning and the amount spent by these groups on lobbyist was reviewed. Pro-choice funding of candidates was greater for the four of the fives votes supporting family planning. Pro-Choice lobbyist spending was $185,000 vs. $8,184,000 spent by Pro-Life ideological groups. ^

Interest groups on four continents.

"The ... result of a round-table conference held by the International Political Science Association at the University of Pittsburgh, September 9-13, 1957."

Interest groups in multiple streams:specifying their involvement in the framework

Although interests inhabit a central place in the multiple streams framework (MSF), interest groups have played only a minor role in theoretical and empirical studies until now. In Kingdon’s original conception, organized interests are a key variable in the politics stream. Revisiting Kingdon’s concept with a particular focus on interest groups and their activities—in different streams and at various levels—in the policy process, we take this argument further. In particular, we argue that specifying groups’ roles in other streams adds value to the explanatory power of the framework. To do this, we look at how interest groups affect problems, policies, and politics. The influence of interest groups within the streams is explained by linking the MSF with literature on interest intermediation. We show that depending on the number of conditions and their activity level, interest groups can be involved in all three streams. We illustrate this in case studies reviewing labor market policies in Germany and chemicals regulation at the European level.

Illicit interest groups: The political impact of the Medellin drug trafficking organizations in Colombia

Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the "Medellin Cartel." In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study's findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government's push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.

Explaining Interest Group Interactions with Party Group Members in the European Parliament : Dominant Party Groups and Coalition Formation

Peer reviewed

Explaining Interest Group Interactions with Party Group Members in the European Parliament : Dominant Party Groups and Coalition Formation

Peer reviewed

Crisis Cartels:Non-Economic Values, the Public Interest and Institutional Considerations

This paper considers the use of non-economic considerations in Article 101(3) analysis of industrial restructuring agreements, using the Commission's Decisions in Synthetic Fibres, Stichting Baksteen, and the recent UK Dairy Initiative as examples. I argue that contra to the Commission's recent economics-based approach; there is room for non-economic considerations to be taken into account within the framework of the European Treaties. The competition law issue is whether the provisions of Article 101(3) can save such agreements.
I further argue that there is legal room for non-economic considerations to be considered in evaluating these restructuring agreements, it is not clear who the appropriate arbiter of these considerations should be given the institutional limitations of courts (which have no democratic mandate), specialised competition agencies (which may be too technocratic in focus) and legislatures (which are susceptible to capture by rent-seeking interest groups).

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Interest Representation as a Clash of Unequal Allies

Organized interests do not have direct control over the fate of their policy agendas in Congress. They cannot introduce bills, vote on legislation, or serve on House committees. If organized interests want to achieve virtually any of their legislative goals they must rely on and work through members of Congress. As an interest group seeks to move its policy agenda forward in Congress, then, one of the most important challenges it faces is the recruitment of effective legislative allies. Legislative allies are members of Congress who “share the same policy objective as the group” and who use their limited time and resources to advocate for the group’s policy needs (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 76). For all the financial resources that a group can bring to bear as it competes with other interests to win policy outcomes, it will be ineffective without the help of members of Congress that are willing to expend their time and effort to advocate for its policy positions (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999). Given the importance of legislative allies to interest group success, are some organized interests better able to recruit legislative allies than others? This question has received little attention in the literature. This dissertation offers an original theoretical framework describing both when we should expect some types of interests to generate more legislative allies than others and how interests vary in their effectiveness at mobilizing these allies toward effective legislative advocacy. It then tests these theoretical expectations on variation in group representation during the stage in the legislative process that many scholars have argued is crucial to policy influence, interest representation on legislative committees. The dissertation uncovers pervasive evidence that interests with a presence across more congressional districts stand a better chance of having legislative allies on their key committees. It also reveals that interests with greater amounts of leverage over jobs and economic investment will be better positioned to win more allies on key committees. In addition, interests with a policy agenda that closely overlaps with the jurisdiction of just one committee in Congress are more likely to have legislative allies on their key committees than are interests that have a policy agenda divided across many committee jurisdictions. In short, how groups are distributed across districts, the leverage that interests have over local jobs and economic investment, and how committee jurisdictions align with their policy goals affects their influence in Congress.

Ecological perspectives and wellness

Since the industrial revolution, the development of a lifestyle lived predominantly indoors has resulted in less contact with nature. Research over the last twenty years has gradually been identifying the human health benefits attributed to re-connecting with the natural environment. The significance of feeling connected to natural environments, families and friends are described as a foundational requirement for human health and wellbeing (Maller et al., 2008). Also, the early findings of Schultz‟s (2002) work indicated that by feeling connected to the natural world a person is more likely to be committed to positively interact with and protect the natural world. Research on young people has indicated that young people are even more disconnected from the natural world. Leading some writers to call this disconnection a crisis termed “Nature Deficit Disorder.” Participants (n = 131) from 1st year university Physical Education and Human Movement Studies were asked to complete two questionnaires the Connectedness to Nature scale (CNS) (Mayer & Frantz, 2004) and the New Ecological Paradigm Scale (NEP) (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000). The NEP and CNS are two scales most commonly used to explore beliefs and feelings of connectedness to the natural world (Schultz, 2002). The NEP was developed over thirty years ago by Dunlap and Van Liere (1978) and originally termed the New Environmental Paradigm. The NEP is now the foremost International tool for measuring beliefs about the natural world (Dunlap, 2008). The CNS measures an individual‟s trait levels of emotional connection to the natural world. It is a relatively new tool for understanding ecological behaviour based on ecopsychology theory and employed to predict behaviour (Mayer and Frantz, 2004). Both questionnaires are based on a 1-5 scale (Strongly disagree to Strongly agree). By combing both scales the researchers aim to develop a snap shot of beliefs and emotional feelings towards the natural world and therefore an idea of intended behaviour. The two questionnaires were combined as one online survey with additional material asking for demographics and self assessments of type of leader included before the surveys. An email inviting outdoor leaders to participate was sent out to networks and interest groups. A basic descriptive statistical analysis was used to interpret data.