Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Industrial Organization: a Contract Based approach

Industrial Organization, a Contract Based approach (aka IOCB) offers an extensive and an up-to-date panorama of Industrial Organization. It is aimed at advanced undergraduates, graduates, academics and practitioners with an interest in the field. The analysis of market interactions, business strategies and public policy is performed using the standard framework of game theory and the recent advances of contract theory and information economics

Essays on industrial organization

Esta tese compõe-se de três ensaios que versam sobre o formato, em termos de estrutura de governança, das indústrias e como a estrutura interna das mesmas in fluenciam esses formatos e seus produtos. O primeiro capítulo apresenta um modelo de como a qualidade institucional, confiança e incompleteza contratual afetam as decisiões das firmas sobre a melhor forma de se organizarem internacionalmente. O segundo capítulo vai na mesma direcão de explicar a organização das indústrias, mas com foco no efeito da transmissão de informação entre as unidades constituintes das organizações sobre o formato ótimo das mesmas. Ambos trabalhos usam modelos dinâmicos. O terceiro capítulo se utiliza da modelagem de organização industrial para mostrar como a estrutura interna de uma indústria in fluencia no risco de crédito consignado.

Essays on Industrial Organization and Environmental Economics

This dissertation studies environmental regulation issues in the hog production industry as well as forces behind the reorganization of the industry during the past two decades. Federal and State-level environmental regulations imposed on U.S. hog production during the year 2003 are examined in Chapter 1. Based on the number of regulations passed by the Federal government and states, the 2003 regulatory index is constructed. The regulatory stringency index suggests that state-level regulations vary across states and have increased over the years. In addition, state-level regulations are more stringent than federal regulations. Chapter 2 develops an empirically implementable theoretical model which allows us to investigate the long-run effects of environmental regulations on the U.S. hog industry. Hog feeding operations (HFOs) are divided into large feeding operations (LHFOs) and small feeding operations (SHFOs). The impact of the presence of a large number of LHFOs on the entry and exit of CHFOs is also examined. Results of this study suggest that: Increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the output of SHFOs; increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the output of LHFOs; increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the number of SHFOs; SHFO output rises significantly in states that have a greater number of LHFOs; LHFO output rises significantly in states that have a greater number of LHFOs; the number of SHFOs significantly increases in states that have a greater numbers of LHFOs; regulation increases the average SHFO size; and regulation decreases the average LHFO size. Chapter 3 examines the importance of input availability, market attractiveness, agglomeration economies and environmental regulations on the reorganization of U.S. hog production for a panel of 22 U.S. hog producing states which include, Northern states, Southern states and Midwest states for the period 1994-2006. Results from this study suggest that: Hog production in a state is positively affected by hog production in a nearby state, confirming the presence of agglomeration economies; Environmental regulations and high corn price have negative effects on state-level U.S. hog production; High hog prices, and favorable labor cost, and land values attract hog production; and transportation cost has no effect on hog production. Advisors: Azzeddine Azzam and Karina Schoengold

Essays in industrial organization

The thesis consists in three papers that investigate two debated topics in industrial organization (in particular in competition policy) through formal models based on game-theory. The first paper deals with potential effects of conglomerate mergers among leading brands in facilitating foreclosure of new suppliers through the retailing channel. The two remaining papers analyze antitrust policy with respect to monopolization of markets of spare parts and aftermarkets by monopolistic equipment manufacturers.

Three essays in industrial organization

This dissertation comprises three essays on the topic of industrial organization. The first essay considers how different intellectual property systems can affect the incentives to invest in R&D when innovation is cumulative. I introduce a distinction between plain and sophisticated technological knowledge, which plays a crucial role in determining how different appropriability rules affect the incentives to innovate. I argue that the positive effect of weak intellectual property regimes on the sharing of intermediate technological knowledge vanishes when technological knowledge is sophisticated, as is likely to be the case in many high tech industries. The second essay analyzes a two-sided market for news where advertisers may pay a media outlet to conceal negative information on the quality of their own product (paying positive to avoid negative) and/or to disclose negative information on the quality of their competitors products (paying positive to go negative). It is shown that whether advertisers have negative consequences on the accuracy of media reports or not, ultimately depends on the extent of correlation among advertisers products. The third essay considers the role of social learning in the diffusion of a new technology. A population of agents can choose between two risky technologies: an old one for which they know the expected outcome, and a new one for which they have only a prior. Different environments are confronted. In the benchmark case agents are isolated and can perform costly experiments to infer the quality of the new technology. In the other cases agents are settled in a network and can observe the outcomes of neighbors. We observe that in expectations the quality of the new technology may be overestimated when there is a network spread of information.

Essays in Industrial Organization

This dissertation comprises four essays on the topic of industrial organization and environmental economics. The first essay investigates the profitability of horizontal mergers of firms with price adjustments. We take a differential game approach and both the open-loop as well as the closed-loop equlibria are considered. In the second essay, using the same approach as the first one, we study the profitability of horizontal merger of firms where the demand function is nonlinear. We take into consideration the open-loop equilibrium. The third essay studies the profitability of exogenous output constraint in a differential game model with price dynamics under the feedback strategies. The fourth essay investigates a second-best trade agreement between two countries when pollution spillovers are asymmetric to examine the strategic behavior of governments in using pollution taxes and tariffs under trade liberalization.

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

Essays in Industrial Organization

This dissertation extends the empirical industrial organization literature with two essays on strategic decisions of firms in imperfectly competitive markets and one essay on how inertia in consumer choice can result in significant welfare losses. Using data from the airline industry I study a well-known puzzle in the literature whereby incumbent firms decrease fares when Southwest Airlines emerges as a potential entrant, but is not (yet) competing directly. In the first essay I describe this so-called Southwest Effect and use reduced-form analysis to offer possible explanations for why firms may choose to forgo profits today rather than wait until Southwest operates the route. The analysis suggests that incumbent firms are attempting to signal to Southwest that entry is unprofitable so as to deter its entry. The second essay develops this theme by extending a classic model from the IO literature, limit pricing, to a dynamic setting. Calibrations indicate the price cuts observed in the data can be captured by a dynamic limit pricing model. The third essay looks at another concentrated industry, mobile telecoms, and studies how inertia in choice (be it inattention or switching costs) can lead to consumers being on poorly matched cellphone plans and how a simple policy proposal can have a considerable effect on welfare.

Essays on Energy Economics and Industrial Organization

The dissertation consists of three chapters related to the low-price guarantee marketing strategy and energy efficiency analysis. The low-price guarantee is a marketing strategy in which firms promise to charge consumers the lowest price among their competitors. Chapter 1 addresses the research question "Does a Low-Price Guarantee Induce Lower Prices'' by looking into the retail gasoline industry in Quebec where there was a major branded firm which started a low-price guarantee back in 1996. Chapter 2 does a consumer welfare analysis of low-price guarantees to drive police indications and offers a new explanation of the firms' incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee. Chapter 3 develops the energy performance indicators (EPIs) to measure energy efficiency of the manufacturing plants in pulp, paper and paperboard industry.

Chapter 1 revisits the traditional view that a low-price guarantee results in higher prices by facilitating collusion. Using accurate market definitions and station-level data from the retail gasoline industry in Quebec, I conducted a descriptive analysis based on stations and price zones to compare the price and sales movement before and after the guarantee was adopted. I find that, contrary to the traditional view, the stores that offered the guarantee significantly decreased their prices and increased their sales. I also build a difference-in-difference model to quantify the decrease in posted price of the stores that offered the guarantee to be 0.7 cents per liter. While this change is significant, I do not find the response in comeptitors' prices to be significant. The sales of the stores that offered the guarantee increased significantly while the competitors' sales decreased significantly. However, the significance vanishes if I use the station clustered standard errors. Comparing my observations and the predictions of different theories of modeling low-price guarantees, I conclude the empirical evidence here supports that the low-price guarantee is a simple commitment device and induces lower prices.

Chapter 2 conducts a consumer welfare analysis of low-price guarantees to address the antitrust concerns and potential regulations from the government; explains the firms' potential incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee. Using station-level data from the retail gasoline industry in Quebec, I estimated consumers' demand of gasoline by a structural model with spatial competition incorporating the low-price guarantee as a commitment device, which allows firms to pre-commit to charge the lowest price among their competitors. The counterfactual analysis under the Bertrand competition setting shows that the stores that offered the guarantee attracted a lot more consumers and decreased their posted price by 0.6 cents per liter. Although the matching stores suffered a decrease in profits from gasoline sales, they are incentivized to adopt the low-price guarantee to attract more consumers to visit the store likely increasing profits at attached convenience stores. Firms have strong incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee on the product that their consumers are most price-sensitive about, while earning a profit from the products that are not covered in the guarantee. I estimate that consumers earn about 0.3% more surplus when the low-price guarantee is in place, which suggests that the authorities should not be concerned and regulate low-price guarantees. In Appendix B, I also propose an empirical model to look into how low-price guarantees would change consumer search behavior and whether consumer search plays an important role in estimating consumer surplus accurately.

Chapter 3, joint with Gale Boyd, describes work with the pulp, paper, and paperboard (PP&PB) industry to provide a plant-level indicator of energy efficiency for facilities that produce various types of paper products in the United States. Organizations that implement strategic energy management programs undertake a set of activities that, if carried out properly, have the potential to deliver sustained energy savings. Energy performance benchmarking is a key activity of strategic energy management and one way to enable companies to set energy efficiency targets for manufacturing facilities. The opportunity to assess plant energy performance through a comparison with similar plants in its industry is a highly desirable and strategic method of benchmarking for industrial energy managers. However, access to energy performance data for conducting industry benchmarking is usually unavailable to most industrial energy managers. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), through its ENERGY STAR program, seeks to overcome this barrier through the development of manufacturing sector-based plant energy performance indicators (EPIs) that encourage U.S. industries to use energy more efficiently. In the development of the energy performance indicator tools, consideration is given to the role that performance-based indicators play in motivating change; the steps necessary for indicator development, from interacting with an industry in securing adequate data for the indicator; and actual application and use of an indicator when complete. How indicators are employed in EPA’s efforts to encourage industries to voluntarily improve their use of energy is discussed as well. The chapter describes the data and statistical methods used to construct the EPI for plants within selected segments of the pulp, paper, and paperboard industry: specifically pulp mills and integrated paper & paperboard mills. The individual equations are presented, as are the instructions for using those equations as implemented in an associated Microsoft Excel-based spreadsheet tool.

An Analysis of Colombian Power Market Price Behavior from an Industrial Organization Perspective

We analyze the behavior of spot prices in the Colombian wholesale power market, using a series of models derived from industrial organization theory -- We first create a Cournot-based model that simulates the strategic behavior of the market-leader power generators, which we use to estimate two industrial organization variables, the Index of Residual Demand and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- We use these variables to create VAR models that estimate spot prices and power market impulse-response relationships -- The results from these models show that hydroelectric generators can use their water storage capability strategically to affect off-peak prices primarily, while the thermal generators can manage their capacity strategically to affect on-peak prices -- In addition, shocks to the Index of Residual Capacity and to the HHI cause spot price fluctuations, which can be interpreted as the generators´ strategic response to these shocks

An industrial organisation economic supply chain approach for the construction industry : a review

Understanding industries in terms of the concepts of chains, clusters and networks is becoming increasingly important in economies around the world. Supply chain management for an individual organization is an
emerging field of research in the construction management discipline, but less attention has been devoted to investigating the nature of the construction supply chains and their industrial organizational economic environment. This selected review of construction and mainstream management supply chain literature is organized around four themes; distribution, production, strategic procurement management and industrial
organization economics, and highlights the need to develop an industrial organization economic supply chain framework for construction. The merging of the supply chain concept with the industrial organization model
as a methodology for understanding firm conduct and industry structure and performance is an important contribution to both construction supply chain and construction economic theory. Much of the industrial organization supply chain literature has tended to focus upon manufacturing industries, where typically firms are permanent organizations. This raises issues as to the differences between industries founded upon temporary compared with permanent organizations. There is potential for the development of an industrial organization methodology applicable to the project based industry. Ultimately industrial organization research seeks to have direct implications for industry performance and government policies.

Em quais setores investir nos BRICs?: uma análise sob o prisma da organização industrial

Este trabalho analisou 2770 empresas nos BRICs entre 1995 e 2008 para identificar quais os setores mais atrativos para investimento conforme a relação risco-retorno, geração de valor e a tradição da Organização Industrial (IO). Os resultados reforçam os de Fama e French (1992), Mohanram (2005) e Goldszmidt, Brito e Vasconcelos (2007), porém divergem de World Bank (2008) quanto à China. Constatou-se que os setores mais atrativos na perspectiva de risco-retorno sobre o patrimônio líquido seriam óleo & gás na Rússia e mineração no Brasil, Índia e China, enquanto aqueles com menor atratividade seriam os setores têxtil, motores, máquinas & ferramentas e telecomunicações no Brasil.