Sentimentos morais e o conceito de justiça na filosofia moral de David Hume

Esta dissertação objetiva descrever e analisar criticamente o conceito de justiça no contexto da filosofia moral de David Hume. Com o propósito de fornecer uma explicação completa e consistente de sua teoria da justiça, pretende-se, em primeiro lugar, apresentar a teoria moral sentimentalista de Hume e explicar de que forma sua concepção de justiça se associa com os princípios fundamentais da moralidade. O primeiro capítulo da dissertação consiste, primeiramente, em uma breve exposição do problema do livre-arbítrio e do determinismo e, em segundo lugar, na apresentação da alternativa compatibilista de Hume. Conforme se pretende demonstrar ao longo deste capítulo, a estratégia da solução compatibilista de Hume deve necessariamente envolver a noção de sentimento moral, cujo conceito é central em seu sistema moral. Em seguida, no segundo capítulo, será examinada a teoria moral de Hume, a qual se estrutura em duas hipóteses principais: a tese negativa que contesta a ideia de que o fundamento da moralidade se baseie exclusivamente nas operações da razão (relações de ideias e questões de fato); e a tese positiva que afirma que a fonte da moralidade reside em nossas paixões, sentimentos e afetos de prazer e dor ao contemplarmos caracteres virtuosos e viciosos. O terceiro capítulo visa apresentar a teoria da justiça de Hume, objeto principal desta dissertação. A hipótese central que Hume sugere é que a virtude da justiça não é instintiva ou natural nos seres humanos. Ela é possível unicamente por intermédio de acordos, convenções e artifícios humanos motivados pelo auto-interesse. A tese de Hume é exatamente que a origem da justiça, enquanto uma convenção social, só pode ser explicada com base em dois fatores: a atuação dos sentimentos de nossa disposição interna e a circunstância externa caracterizada pela escassez relativa de bens materiais. Finalmente, o último capítulo desta dissertação visa discutir a teoria política de Hume com o propósito de complementar sua teoria da justiça. Hume defende que a justificação da instituição da autoridade soberana e dos deveres civis se funda nos mesmos princípios da convenção de justiça: eles também são artifícios criados exclusivamente para servir ao nosso próprio interesse.

[Ressenya del llibre Obres didàctiques I. Exercici sobre la Mitologia. Compendi de la Filosofia Moral. Les aventures d'Aristònous [Obra completa d'Antoni Febrer i Cardona, XVI]

Ressenya del llibre Obres didàctiques I. Exercici sobre la Mitologia. Compendi de la Filosofia Moral. Les aventures d’Aristònous. Es tracta d’un recull d’obres de l’autor antic Antoni Febrer i Cardona a càrrec de la filòloga clàssica Maria Paredes

A inferência causal na filosofia moral de Hume.

Starting from the idea that the result of the Humean analysis of causal inferences must be applied coherently to the remaining part of his work, including its moral theory, the present master thesis aims at investigating whether Hume´s moral philosophy is essentially based on feeling, or whether this would not be rather essentially a consequence of our causal inferences in human actions and deliberations. The main idea consists in showing that our moral inferences, to the extent that they are for Hume empirical , depend on our belief in a connexion between something which has been previously observed and something which is not being observed ( but that it is expected to occur or to be observed in the future). Thus, this very belief must base our moral inferences concerning the actions and deliberations of the individuals. Therefore, must e o ipso induce us to associate actions and behaviors, as well as character and moral claims of men to certain moral feelings. Accordingly, the thesis is unfolded in three chapters. In the first chapter Hume´s theory of the perception is reported as essential part of the explanation or the principles that bind ideas in our mind and constitute our inferences. In the second chapter, the Humean analysis of causal inferences is presented and the way they contribute in the formation of our moral inferences is explained. In the third and last chapter, the formation of our moral inferences and the real contribution of the doctrine of freedom and necessity for the examination or our actions are analysed and discussed.

Uma (re)leitura teleológica da filosofia moral em Kant : por uma necessidade de inclusão do homem na natureza

Made from the bases of metaphysics, this dissertation is related do Kant‟s moral philosophy. But the itinerary to reach the main speculation used to develop this current understanding of Kant‟s thoughts, it is nothing but an attempt to make the formal rigor more flexible, which has always been associated to Kantian ethics‟ perspectives. From the awareness of what this formalism could be, while a moral arrangement, it is how we will be able to come upon a teleological Kant. That is the fundamental element to comprehend some of the significant aspects in that ethical system, which necessarily comes through the effort to demonstrate the proximity between reason and sensibility, as well as nature and liberty. In this environment, the journey to achieve the autonomy, as the bedrock of liberty and morality, evokes the support of education in Kantian patterns, which enables a course of improvement of the human being, as an individual e, more significantly, as specie. This evolution progress, which tents to reveal the destiny of the humanity, is evolved in the relationship between necessity and finality, as a condition to make the structure of a project to humanity possible. We should mention that it is a rational, an educational and a moral project to be developed in the course of history. As a consequence, the amount of all these elements permits the development of the man‟s natural disposition as a creature that looks for self knowledge , becoming, afterward, dignified to be qualified as a human being. Finally, this study intent to figure out the necessity of the human being inclusion to nature, which happens throughout the acquirement of the individuals‟ conscience

Fundamentos da filosofia moral de Peter Singer

This research aims to reconstruct and explain the argument proposed by Peter Singer to justify the principle of equal consideration of interests (PECI). The PECI is the basic normative principle according to people should consider the interests of all sentient beings affected when somebody taking a moral decision. It is the join that Singer proposes between universalizability and the principle of equal consideration of interests that constitutes a compelling reason to justify it. The universalizability requires to disregard the numerical differences, putting yourself in other people s shoes, and to consider preferences, interests, desires and ideals of those affected. Singer joins universalizability to normative principle and molds the form and content of his theory. The first chapter introduces the discussion will be developed in this essay. The second chapter deals the historical and philosophical viewpoint from which Singer starts his studies. The third chapter is about the Singer s critiques of naturalism, intuitionism, relativism, simple subjectivism and emotivism. The fourth chapter exposes the design of universal prescriptivism proposed by R. M. Hare. The universal prescriptivism indicates, in the Singer s viewpoint, a consistent way to create the join between the universalizability and PECI. It highlights also the criticism designed by J. L. Mackie and Singer himself to universal prescriptivism. The second part of this chapter shows briefly some of the main points of the classical conception of utilitarianism and its possible relationship with the theory of Singer. The fifth chapter introduces the Singer s thesis about the origin of ethics and the universalizability as a feature necessary to the point of view of ethic, and the way which this argument is developed to form the PECI. The sixth chapter exposes the main distinctions that characterize the PECI. Finally the seventh chapter provides a discussion about the reasons highlighted by Singer for one who wants orient his life according to the standpoint of ethics. This structure allows explaining the main ideas of the author concerning the theoretical foundations of his moral philosophy

Filosofia racional, natural, metaficisa i moral [Texto impreso] : tomo IV Filosofia moral

Sign. : [ ]2, A-X8

Principios de filosofia moral /

Mode of access: Internet.

Manual de filosofia moral : en que está compendiada la obra que publicó en ingles William Paley intitulada Principios de filosofia moral /

El ed. consta en p. 2.

Los fundamentos de la jurisprudencia natural : traducción libre del francés, considerablemente aumentada y precedida de un plan de unas instituciones de filosofia moral, en las cuales se reunan la religión, la moral y la política /

Contiene: T. I (1821. XVI, 326 p.) -- T. II (1822. 233 p.)

La filosofia moral, declarada y propuesta a la juventud /

Mode of access: Internet.

La Filosofia moral declarada, y propuesta a la juventud /

Mode of access: Internet.

La filosofia moral declarada, y propuesta a la juventud /

Mode of access: Internet.

Filosofia Moral deriuada de la alta fuente del grande Aristoteles Stagirita /

Mode of access: Internet.

Discursos sobre la filosofia moral de Aristoteles /

Mode of access: Internet.