The stewardship paradigm : an enquiry into the ethical obligation associated with being in control of resorces

The resource allocation and utilization discourse is dominated by debates about rights particularly individual property rights and ownership. This is due largely to the philosophic foundations provided by Hobbes and Locke and adopted by Bentham. In our community, though, resources come not merely with rights embedded but also obligations. The relevant laws and equitable principles which give shape to our shared rights and obligations with respect to resources take cognizance not merely of the title to the resource (the proprietary right) but the particular context in which the right is exercised. Moral philosophy regarding resource utilisation has from ancient times taken cognizance of obligations but with ascendance of modernity, the agenda of moral philosophy regarding resources, has been dominated, at least since John Locke, by a preoccupation with property rights; the ethical obligations associated with resource management have been largely ignored. The particular social context has also been ignored. Exploring this applied ethical terrain regarding resource utilisation, this thesis: (1) Revisits the justifications for modem property rights (and in that the exclusion of obligations); (2) Identifies major deficiencies in these justifications and reasons for this; (3) Traces the concept of stewardship as understood in classical Greek writing and in the New Testament, and considers its application in the Patristic period and by Medieval and reformist writers, before turning to investigate its influence on legal and equitable concepts through to the current day; 4) Discusses the nature of the stewardship obligation,maps it and offers a schematic for applying the Stewardship Paradigm to problems arising in daily life; and, (5) Discusses the way in which the Stewardship Paradigm may be applied by, and assists in resolving issues arising from within four dominant philosophic world views: (a) Rawls' social contract theory; (b) Utilitarianism as discussed by Peter Singer; (c) Christianity with particular focus on the theology of Douglas Hall; (d) Feminism particularly as expressed in the ethics of care of Carol Gilligan; and, offers some more general comments about stewardship in the context of an ethically plural community.

Ancient Philosophers on Mental Illness

This dissertation is about ancient philosophers notions of mental illness, from Plato onwards. Mental illness here means disorders that, in ancient medical thought, were believed to originate in the body but to manifest themselves predominantly through mental symptoms. These illnesses were treated by physical means, which were believed to address the bodily cause of the illness, conceived of as an elemental imbalance or a state of cephalic stricture , for example. Sometimes the mental symptoms were addressed directly by psychotherapeutic means. The first and most important question explored concerns how the ancient philosophers responded to the medical notion of mental illness, and how they explained such illnesses in their theories of physiology and psychology. Although the illnesses are seldom discussed extensively, the philosophers were well aware of their existence and regarded their occurrence an indication of the soul s close dependence on the body. This called for a philosophical account. The second question addressed has to do with the ancient philosophers role as experts in mental problems of a non-medical kind, such as unwanted emotions. These problems were dubbed diseases of the soul , and the philosophers thus claimed to be doctors of the soul. Although the distinction between mental illnesses and diseases of the soul was often presented as rather obvious, there was some vagueness and overlap. There is still a third question that is explored, concerning the status of both mental illnesses and diseases of the soul as unnatural conditions, the role of the human body in the philosophical aetiologies of evil, and the medico-philosophical theories of psycho-physiological temperaments. This work consists of an introduction and five main chapters, focusing on Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Galen, and the Sceptics, the Epicureans and later Platonists. The sources drawn on are the original Greek and Latin philosophical and medical texts. It appears that the philosophers accepted the medical notion of mental illness, but interpreted it in various ways. The differences in interpretation were mostly attributable to differences in their theories of the soul. Although the distinction between mental illness and diseases of the soul was important, marking the boundary between the fields of expertise of medicine and philosophy, and of the individual s moral responsibilities, the problematic aspects of establishing it are discussed rather little in ancient philosophy. There may have been various reasons for this. The medical descriptions of mental illness are often extreme, symptoms of the psychotic type excluding the possibility of the condition being of the non-medical kind. In addition, the rigid normativeness of ancient philosophical anthropologies and their rigorous notion of human happiness decreased the need to assess the acceptability of individual variation in their emotional and intellectual lives and external behaviour.

Se convertir à l'épicurisme : ou comment devenir pieux.

Les épicuriens étaient-ils pieux? Des témoins du moyen et du dernier épicurisme, tels Cicéron et Plutarque, ont eu beaucoup de peine à le croire : selon eux, les épicuriens ne voyaient dans les prêtres que des bouchers, et ne participaient au culte populaire que pour éviter les accusations d’athéisme. Les épicuriens, quant à eux, se sont toujours qualifiés de pieux. L’archéologie nous confirme que les épicuriens ont activement participé au culte populaire, et ce tout au long de l’histoire de l’école. Malgré ces preuves archéologiques, la théologie épicurienne reste problématique : bien que leur éthique fasse des dieux des modèles, il ne semble pas y avoir de place pour les dieux dans leur physique. Que faire, donc, des pratiques rituelles où les dieux sont invoqués, voire où ils sont montrés au moyen d’un support matériel? Pourrait-on réduire la piété épicurienne à un exercice rationnel, froid et distant, au cœur même des temples? Mais cette distance avec le culte ne supposerait-elle pas une certaine hypocrisie, celle-là même qui fut décriée par Cicéron ou par Plutarque? Notre travail entend montrer de quelle manière les épicuriens purent être pieux, de façon non distante, tout en restant cohérents avec le problème philosophique de la représentation des dieux. Cette cohérence ne sera possible qu’au prix d’une « conversion » à l’épicurisme (et à son épistémologie) grâce à laquelle nous pourrons voir les dieux et nous reconnaître nous-mêmes comme des dieux.