The role of the audit committee and institutional investors in constraining earnings management : evidence from Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong

Using data from 2004 to 2008, we find that an audit committee is an important monitoring mechanism as audit committee independence, expertise and size are associated with reduced levels of abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings management. This study also attempts to discern when the monitoring role of the audit committee is more salient for the firm. We find that ownership concentration and the presence of government officials on the audit committee are important determinants of the negative association between audit committee characteristics and earnings management. In contrast, we find no significant associations between the audit committee and abnormal accruals for Chinese firms listed only on the Chinese domestic Stock Exchanges. The paper contributes to the corporate governance literature in a transitional economy. Identifying the role of audit committees of firms listed on markets other than the domicile market demonstrates the importance of considering the institutional setting in governance research.

Can an effective audit committee help to mitigate earnings management in Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong?

This paper attempts to determine whether the adoption of recommended corporate governance practices by Chinese firms is associated with less earnings management proxied by abnormal accruals. We examine the role of the audit committee and ownership concentration in preventing earnings management using Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong. The results of this preliminary analysis show that the frequency of audit committee meetings is associated with reduced levels of abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings management. We conclude that audit committee activity is an important factor in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management. In contrast, we find that the size of the audit committee is associated with increased levels of abnormal accruals and suggest that increasing the size of the audit committee creates information asymmetry between the audit committee and management that reduces the monitoring capacity of the audit committee. We do not find any association between audit committee independence, financial and industry experience, or ownership concentration and abnormal accruals.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

Were regulatory changes in reporting "abnormal items" justified? : evidence of intra-period classificatory earnings management practices in Australia

Purpose Managers generally have discretion in determining how components of earnings are presented in financial statements in distinguishing between ‘normal’ earnings and items classified as unusual, special, significant, exceptional or abnormal. Prior research has found that such intra-period classificatory choice is used as a form of earnings management. Prior to 2001, Australian accounting standards mandated that unusually large items of revenue and expense be classified as ‘abnormal items’ for financial reporting, but this classification was removed from accounting standards from 2001. This move by the regulators was partly in response to concerns that the abnormal classification was being used opportunistically to manage reported pre-abnormal earnings. This study extends the earnings management literature by examining the reporting of abnormal items for evidence of intra-period classificatory earnings management in the unique Australian setting. Design/methodology/approach This study investigates associations between reporting of abnormal items and incentives in the form of analyst following and the earnings benchmarks of analysts’ forecasts, earnings levels, and earnings changes, for a sample of Australian top-500 firms for the seven-year period from 1994 to 2000. Findings The findings suggest there are systematic differences between firms reporting abnormal items and those with no abnormal items. Results show evidence that, on average, firms shifted expense items from pre-abnormal earnings to bottom line net income through reclassification as abnormal losses. Originality/value These findings suggest that the standard setters were justified in removing the ‘abnormal’ classification from the accounting standard. However, it cannot be assumed that all firms acted opportunistically in the classification of items as abnormal. With the removal of the standardised classification of items outside normal operations as ‘abnormal’, firms lost the opportunity to use such disclosures as a signalling device, with the consequential effect of limiting the scope of effectively communicating information about the nature of items presented in financial reports.

Earnings management and the role of the audit committee: an investigation of the influence of cross-listing and government officials on the audit committee

This paper extends research on the corporate governance practices of transitional economies by examining whether the ability of the audit committee to constrain earnings management in Chinese firms is associated with the listing environment and the presence of government officials on the audit committee. Despite considerable regulatory reforms by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, there remain incentives for Chinese firms to manage earnings. However, government initiatives to encourage domestic firms to cross-list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are accompanied by improved governance. We find that the expertise and independence of the audit committee for cross-listed (CL) Chinese firms are associated with lower abnormal accruals, our measure of earnings management. Both domestic only listed firms and CL Chinese firms appoint government officials as independent members on the audit committee. However, due to the political connection between government officials and the controlling shareholder (the State), these appointments can severely mitigate audit committee independence. Subsequently, we find a significant and positive association between audit committee independence and experience and earnings management when there are government officials on the audit committee.

Asset revaluations and earnings management: Evidence from Australian companies

This paper examines the association between asset revaluations and discretionary accruals (a proxy for earnings management) using a sample of the largest 300 Australian companies. The results from this study indicate that the revaluation of non-current assets is positively associated with discretionary accruals. This finding is consistent with the argument that revaluation of assets reflects higher agency problems in the form of increased earnings management. Additional findings are that discretionary accruals are higher for firms reporting their non-current assets at fair values appraised by directors, than those of firms that use external appraisers. As well, the choice of auditors and the strength of corporate governance can constrain the opportunistic behaviour of managers in the accounting choice to revalue non-current assets.

Detecting Earnings Management Using Neural Networks

Detecting Earnings Management Using Neural Networks. Trying to balance between relevant and reliable accounting data, generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) allow, to some extent, the company management to use their judgment and to make subjective assessments when preparing financial statements. The opportunistic use of the discretion in financial reporting is called earnings management. There have been a considerable number of suggestions of methods for detecting accrual based earnings management. A majority of these methods are based on linear regression. The problem with using linear regression is that a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables must be assumed. However, previous research has shown that the relationship between accruals and some of the explanatory variables, such as company performance, is non-linear. An alternative to linear regression, which can handle non-linear relationships, is neural networks. The type of neural network used in this study is the feed-forward back-propagation neural network. Three neural network-based models are compared with four commonly used linear regression-based earnings management detection models. All seven models are based on the earnings management detection model presented by Jones (1991). The performance of the models is assessed in three steps. First, a random data set of companies is used. Second, the discretionary accruals from the random data set are ranked according to six different variables. The discretionary accruals in the highest and lowest quartiles for these six variables are then compared. Third, a data set containing simulated earnings management is used. Both expense and revenue manipulation ranging between -5% and 5% of lagged total assets is simulated. Furthermore, two neural network-based models and two linear regression-based models are used with a data set containing financial statement data from 110 failed companies. Overall, the results show that the linear regression-based models, except for the model using a piecewise linear approach, produce biased estimates of discretionary accruals. The neural network-based model with the original Jones model variables and the neural network-based model augmented with ROA as an independent variable, however, perform well in all three steps. Especially in the second step, where the highest and lowest quartiles of ranked discretionary accruals are examined, the neural network-based model augmented with ROA as an independent variable outperforms the other models.

Essays on Earnings Management (summary section only)

There is much literature developing theories when and where earnings management occurs. Among the several possible motives driving earnings management behaviour in firms, this thesis focuses on motives that aim to influence the valuation of the firm. Earnings management that makes the firm look better than it really is may result in disappointment for the single investor and potentially leads to a welfare loss in society when the resource allocation is distorted. A more specific knowledge of the occurrence of earnings management supposedly increases the awareness of the investor and thus leads to better investments and increased welfare. This thesis contributes to the literature by increasing the knowledge as to where and when earnings management is likely to occur. More specifically, essay 1 adds to existing research connecting earnings management to IPOs and increases the knowledge in arguing that the tendency to manage earnings differs between the IPOs. Evidence is found that entrepreneur owned IPOs are more likely to be earnings managers than the institutionally owned ones. Essay 2 considers the reliability of quarterly earnings reports that precedes insider selling binges. The essay contributes by suggesting that earnings management is likely to occur before high insider selling. Essay 3 examines the widely studied phenomenon of income smoothing and investigates if income smoothing can be explained with proxies for information asymmetry. The essay argues that smoothing is more pervasive in private and smaller firms.

Initial losses, corporate governance and earnings management

This thesis examines the relationship between initial loss events and the corporate governance and earnings management behaviour of these firms. This is done using four years of corporate governance information spanning the report of an initial loss for companies listed on the UK Stock Exchange. An industry- and sizematched control sample is used in a difference-in-difference analysis to isolate the impact of the initial loss event during the period. It is reported that, in general, an initial loss motivates an improvement in corporate governance in those loss firms where a relative weakness existed prior to the loss and that these changes mainly occur before the initial loss is announced. Firms with stronger (i.e. better quality) corporate governance have less need to alter it in response to the loss. It is also reported that initial loss firms use positive abnormal accruals in the year before the loss in an attempt to defer/avoid the loss — the weaker corporate governance the more likely is it that loss firms manage earnings in this manner. Abnormal accruals are also found to be predictive of an initial loss and when used as a conditioning variable, the quality of corporate governance is an important mitigating factor in this regard. Once the loss is reported, loss firms unwind these abnormal accruals although no evidence of big-bath behaviour is found. The extent to which these abnormal accruals are subsequently unwound are also found to be a function of both the quality of corporate governance as well as the severity of the initial loss.

Earnings management in firms seeking to be acquired

Empirical evidence regarding accrual-based earnings management around mergers and acquisitions has been setting-specific as far as target firms are concerned. This might be due to the fact that target firms cannot always anticipate an acquisition proposal, and thus lack the motive and the time necessary to manage their earnings in order to facilitate or impede the deal. In this paper, we provide clear evidence of downward earnings management by a sample of target firms that have both time and motive to engage in such actions. These are firms that publicly announce their intention to be acquired. Publicly ‘seeking a buyer’ represents a rather unusual corporate event, and we find that these firms engage in downward earnings management in the years surrounding the ‘announcement year’. To some extent, this result is explained by overrepresentation of low performance and growth among these firms, and it can be interpreted under alternative explanations. Furthermore, we show that such downward earnings management negatively affects the probability for a ‘seeking buyer’ firm to secure an acquisition within a reasonable amount of time, a possible indication of efficient diligence by prospective buyers having a preference for firms ‘seeking buyer’ with no informationally obscure earnings.

Accrual-based and real earnings management before and after IFRS adoption: the case of Greece

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the use of accrual-based vs real earnings management (EM) by Greek firms, before and after the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The research is motivated by the fact that past studies have indicated the existence of significant levels of EM for Greece in particular before IFRS. Design/methodology/approach – Accrual-based earnings management (AEM) is examined by assessing performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, while real earnings management (REM) is defined in terms of abnormal levels of production costs, discretionary expenses, and cash flows from operations, for a three-year period before and after the adoption of IFRS in 2005. Findings – The authors find evidence on a statistically significant shift from AEM to REM after the adoption of IFRS, indicating the replacement of one form of EM with the other. Research limitations/implications – The validity of the results depends on the ability of the empirical models used to efficiently capture the existence of AEM and REM. Practical implications – IFRS adoption aims to improve accounting quality, especially in countries with high need for such an improvement; however, the tendency to substitute one form of EM with another highlights unintended consequences of IFRS adoption, which do not improve the informational content of financial statements if EM continues under different forms. Originality/value – Under the expectation that IFRS adoption should lead to improvements in accounting quality, this study examines whether IFRS actually led to a reduction of EM practices for a country with exceptionally high levels of EM before IFRS, by accounting for all possible forms of EM.

The effect of financial leverage on real and accrual-based earnings management

Past research has documented a substitution effect between real earnings management (RM) and accrual-based earnings management (AM), depending on relative costs. This study contributes to this research by examining whether levels of (and changes in) financial leverage have an impact on this empirically documented trade-off. We hypothesise that in the presence of high leverage, firms that engage in earnings manipulation tactics will exhibit a preference for RM due to a lower possibility—and subsequent costs—of getting caught. We show that leverage levels and increases positively and significantly affect upward RM, with no significant effect on income-increasing AM, while our findings point towards a complementarity effect between unexpected levels of RM and AM for firms with very high leverage levels and changes. This is interpreted as an indication that high leverage could attract heavy outsider scrutiny, making it necessary for firms to use both forms of earnings management in order to achieve earnings targets. Furthermore, we document that equity investors exhibit a significantly stronger penalising reaction to AM vs. RM, indicating that leverage-induced RM is not as easily detectable by market participants as debt-induced AM, despite the fact that the former could imply deviation from optimal business practices.