"Viewers should not try this at home". Die Verfassungsgerichte Bosnien-Herzegowinas und Kosovos in deren Rolle als Schlichtungsinstanzen in ethnopolitischen Konflikten = The constitutional courts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in their role as arbitration bodies in ethno-political conflicts. EDAP 01/2014

The article analyzes the role of constitutional courts in Bosnia and Kosovo, both characterized by their partly internationalized membership, in the adjudication of cases that are highly controversial between the different ethno-political factions. The main focus is on the Constitutional Court of Bosnia, which presents one of the richest and most interesting examples of “lawfare” in divided societies. The concept of lawfare has been adapted to refer to the continuation of political battles by ethno-political actors through legal means, in this case, constitutional adjudication. In Kosovo, the Constitutional Court has been an important defender of diversity, albeit its primary focus and merit are to have contributed to the establishment of a concept of democracy close to the people of Kosovo. The article concludes that constitutional courts represent important institutions of internal conflict resolution in divided societies, which have been instrumental in shaping multiculturalism in these post-conflict societies divided by deep ethnic cleavages.

The German Constitutional Court’s decision about the European Central Bank’s OMT [Outright Monetary Transactions] mechanism: A masterpiece of judicial arrogance. European Policy Briefs No. 30, April 2014

The German Constitutional Court (BVG) recently referred different questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. They concern the legality of the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transaction mechanism created in 2012. Simultaneously, the German Court has threatened to disrupt the implementation of OTM in Germany if its very restrictive analysis is not validated by the European Court of Justice. This raises fundamental questions about the future efficiency of the ECB’s monetary policy, the damage to the independence of the ECB, the balance of power between judges and political organs in charge of economic policy, in Germany and in Europe, and finally the relationship between the BVG and other national or European courts.

How could Human Rights Law be used by the Courts to assist Victims of Domestic Violence? A Comparative Study

It has been increasingly recognised in recent years that domestic violence constitutes a human rights issue. This article seeks to shed light on the question of how human rights law may be used in the area of domestic violence through the medium of a litigation strategy. The method used is a comparative assessment of the approaches taken towards gender issues by the Constitutional Courts in three states that have famously dynamic judiciaries- India, South Africa and Canada. A number of the obstacles to the effectiveness of human rights law are also examined.

The German Federal Constitutional Court's Ruling on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) - Another Step Towards National Closure?

The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) ruling of 14 January 2014 deserves a thorough evaluation on several accounts: It is the first ever reference by the FCC to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), it represents a continuation of FCC case law aimed at restricting the impact of European Union law as interpreted by the Court of Justices of the European Union (CJEU) on German law as well as questioning Germany’s participation in an ever closer European Union, and it has the potential to dictate the future course of the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

This case note discusses three aspects of this decision. First, it considers the aims of challenging the youngest measures to contain the euro currency crisis before the FCC, focusing on the question in how far the claims are based on national closure as opposed to an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe. Secondly it analyzes in how far the aims the claims pursue are reflected in the FCC’s response. Thirdly, it considers the substantive relevance of this reference, highlighting the surprisingly vague consequences the FCC envisages should the CJEU not re-interpret the OMT decision as the FCC suggests, and illuminating the strategic aims of the reference without deference. In conclusion, it sketches the remaining scope for the EU to engage in or at least facilitate transnational solidarity.

Speaking with One Voice?: Ethno-national Division on the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The challenge of designing institutions to manage ethno-national conflict is one of the enduring concerns of political science. One important but relatively understudied aspect of this challenge is the design of constitutional courts. Courts are likely to play a key role in the maintenence of a constitutional settlement. But this role can be especially onerous in a deeply divided and post-conflict setting where the rule of law is weak and judges have ethno-national affiliations that may undermine the appearance of judicial neutrality. In such contexts, a court’s authority (including compliance with its decisions) cannot be taken for granted.

With reference the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and using an original dataset of the Court's non-unanimous plenary decisions, we test several hypotheses about the degree to which ethno-national affiliation influences judicial behavior. We find that (1) judges on the Constitutional Court do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, (2) that these patterns are robust to changes in the tenure system, and (3) are independent of party political background.

Constitutional Principles and Horizontal Effects: Kücükdeveci revisited

While German labour lawyers were still awaiting the German Constitutional Court’s final verdict on the principles established by the Mangold case, the Court of Justice of the European Union re-visited the question what exactly are the effects of Directive 2000/78 and the constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. This article analyses the constitutional relevance of this case in two respects. First, it argues that the Court has accepted neither direct horizontal effects of directives nor direct effects of constitutional principles, but rather - much more cautiously - reiterated the rule that directives on constitutional principles such as non-discrimination can exclude the application of national legislation in horizontal cases. The article also demonstrates that this cautious approach has succeeded in convincing the German Constitutional Court that the Mangold judgment was not ultra vires. Consequently, the claim challenging that judgment was dismissed and a constitutional crisis avoided.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The role of Constitutional Courts in deeply divided societies is complicated by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial decision-making and, consequently, undermine judicial independence and impartiality. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the Court’s decisions, we find that the judges do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, at least in certain types of cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, however, we find that long-term tenure does little to dampen the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings suggest that the longer a judge serves on the Court the more ethno-national affiliation seems to influence her decision-making. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.

Legal Institutions and Collective Memories

In recent decades the debate among scholars, lawyers, politicians and others about how societies deal with their past has been constant and intensive. 'Legal Institutions and Collective Memories' situates the processes of transitional justice at the intersection between legal procedures and the production of collective and shared meanings of the past. Building upon the work of Maurice Halbwachs, this collection of essays emphasises the extended role and active involvement of contemporary law and legal institutions in public discourse about the past, and explores their impact on the shape that collective memories take in the course of time. The authors uncover a complex pattern of searching for truth, negotiating the past and cultivating the art of forgetting. Their contributions explore the ambiguous and intricate links between the production of justice, truth and memory. The essays cover a broad range of legal institutions, countries and topics. These include transitional trials as 'monumental spectacles' as well as constitutional courts, and the restitution of property rights in Central and Eastern Europe and Australia. The authors explore the biographies of victims and how their voices were repressed, as in the case of Korean Comfort Women. They explore the role of law and legal institutions in linking individual and collective memories in the transitional period through processes of lustration, and they analyse divided memories about the past and their impact on future reconciliation in South Africa. The collection offers a genuinely comparative approach, allied to cutting-edge theory.

A politização do Supremo Tribunal Federal diante do mecanismo de escolha de seus ministros

Analisa a questão da politização do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) diante do mecanismo de escolha de seus ministros. Examina os tribunais constitucionais de quatro países do mundo - Estados Unidos, Alemanha, Portugal e Chile - e, bem assim, o mecanismo de escolha de seus membros.

Hermenêutica institucional, supremacia judicial e democracia

A presente tese pretende estudar dois modelos de função judicial o perfeccionismo (perfectionism) e o minimalismo (minimalism) judicial delineados por Cass Sunstein, destacando os seus fundamentos filosóficos, suas principais teses hermenêuticas, suas limitações decisórias e suas contribuições para o desenho institucional das relações entre os Poderes de Estado. O presente trabalho desenvolverá, neste sentido, duas perspectivas fundamentais, que são complementares, para o estudo das relações entre o constitucionalismo e a democracia nos sistemas político-jurídicos contemporâneos: em primeiro lugar, uma perspectiva hermenêutica, cuja preocupação reside, sobretudo, na sistematização das principais teses de cada um dos dois modelos no tocante à interpretação do texto constitucional. Em segundo lugar, será realizada uma abordagem institucionalista sobre as possíveis alternativas ao protagonismo do Supremo Tribunal Federal em termos de sua atuação como última instância na definição do significado dos dispositivos constitucionais. Para tanto, serão analisados, com apoio em um estudo comparativo, propostas de diálogo institucional que podem ser fomentadas a partir de uma visão minimalista de moderação judicial que contrasta, por sua vez, com a defesa hegemônica de uma atuação institucional ativista das cortes constitucionais na atualidade. Por último, com apoio nos modelos de função judicial delineados, será elaborada uma análise crítica da atividade jurisdicional dos ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal com fundamento no exame da argumentação empreendida em seus votos em casos constitucionais difíceis de grande repercussão política, moral e social.

Dimensões do ativismo judicial no Supremo Tribunal Federal

Considerando que o ativismo judicial é uma realidade contemporânea da prática decisória do Supremo Tribunal Federal, como melhor explicar sua recente ascensão e, principalmente, como identificar as decisões ativistas da Corte? Este trabalho é dedicado a investigar o ativismo judicial do Supremo Tribunal Federal de modo a tornar possível responder a essas perguntas. Nele são examinadas as práticas ativistas de importantes cortes constitucionais ou supremas cortes, principalmente a norte-americana, com o propósito de extrair lições para a elaboração de uma definição abrangente do ativismo judicial e para a montagem de um esquema explicativo e categorizador das decisões ativistas. As conclusões são por uma explicação multifacetada e por uma identificação multidimensional do ativismo judicial. Aplicando essas premissas sobre a realidade decisória do Supremo, é verificado que seu ativismo judicial responde a um conjunto de fatores institucionais, sociopolíticos e jurídico-culturais que se desenvolveram gradualmente a partir da Constituição de 1988. E, principalmente, que é possível descrever cinco dimensões de manifestação de seu ativismo judicial: metodológico (interpretativo); processual; estrutural (horizontal); de direitos; antidialógico.

As sentenças aditivas na jurisdição constitucional

Como o título deixa ver, o trabalho tem como objeto as sentenças aditivas, alvos de uma análise crítica, à luz de pressupostos filosóficos, sociais, políticos e jurídicos. Para isso, fez-se uma visitação à doutrina, nacional e estrangeira, em torno do tema, além de proceder à coleta posicionamentos, emanados das cortes supremas de alguns países expoentes, acerca da matéria em foco. O Supremo Tribunal Federal não poderia ficar como não ficou fora desse universo de pesquisa. O primeiro capítulo trata dos tópicos relativos ao Estado e à Jurisdição, contemplando as relações entre eles para focalizar, com propriedade, a Jurisdição Constitucional. O segundo capítulo traz à discussão a criação judicial do direito e o ativismo judicial, temas correlatos e imprescindíveis ao estudo proposto, porque a sentença aditiva tem, entranhada, uma dose de ativismo judicial. Tem-se, pois, que o criacionismo judicial insere-se nesse contexto e, por isso, carece de uma abordagem descritiva e crítica. O terceiro capítulo versa sobre as cortes constitucionais e o Supremo Tribunal Federal, móveis principais das sentenças aditivas, e que devem ser bem conhecidos para facilitar a digressão do tema-base. O quarto capítulo aborda as decisões no controle de constitucionalidade das normas e seus efeitos, de fundamental importância porque se conectam diretamente com as aditivas. Finalmente, a quinta parte centra-se, no núcleo do tema-objeto da dissertação, contemplando minudências referentes ao assunto, bastante conflituoso ressalte-se , no limite que separa as atribuições de dois Poderes do Estado, o Judiciário e o Legislativo.

Sovereignty, Article 4(2) TEU and the Respect of National Identities: Swinging the Balance of Power in Favour of the Member States?

The question of whether and to what extent sovereignty has been transferred to the European Union (EU) from its Member States remains a central debate within the EU and is interlinked with issues such as Kompetenz-Kompetenz, direct effect and primacy. Central to any claim to sovereignty is the principle of primacy, which requires that Member States uphold EU law over national law where there is a conflict. However, limitations to primacy can traditionally be found in national jurisprudence and the Maastricht Treaty introduced a possible EU limitation with the requirement that the EU respect national identities of Member States. The Lisbon Treaty provided only minimal further support to the principle of primacy whilst simultaneously developing the provision on national identities, now found within Article 4(2) TEU. There are indications from the literature, national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the EU that the provision is gathering strength as a legal tool and is likely to have a wider scope than the text might indicate. In its new role, Article 4(2) TEU bolsters the Member States’ claim to sovereignty and the possibility to uphold aspects crucial to them in conflict with EU law and the principle of primacy. Consequently, it is central to the relationship between the constitutional courts of the Member States and the CJEU, and where the final elements of control remain in ‘hard cases’. However, it does so as part of EU law, thereby facilitating the evasion of direct fundamental conflicts and reflecting the concept of constitutional pluralism.

The Shifting Battleground of Article 4(2) TEU: Evolving National Identities and the corresponding need for EU management?

Article 4(2) TEU requires that the European Union (EU) respect the Member States’ national identities, creating a legal obligation enforceable before the CJEU and valuable in political negotiations. However, the concept of national identities is unclear, leaving open questions about the scope or parameters of the provision and its applicability. The CJEU appears likely to take a relatively flexible approach in light of Article 4(2) TEU’s relationship with national constitutional courts’ reserves. This flexible approach would enable Member States to rely upon a range of aspects as part of their national identity, including ones that were previously unidentified. This is a crucial feature if one considers that national identities may evolve gradually or even dramatically, including where Member States purposefully attempt to develop their national identities further. This possibility of an evolved national identity is exemplified by the French Charte de l’Environnement. It may thereby be possible for Member States to stretch the scope and application of Article 4(2) TEU through reference to these evolving national identities. This potential raises significant challenges for the EU regarding the management of Article 4(2) TEU, which it will need to address if it wishes to ensure harmonisation and uniformity in the relevant areas.