Litigiousness in Australia: Lessons from comparative law

How litigious are Australians? Although quantitative studies have comprehensively debunked the fear of an Australian civil justice system in crisis, the literature has yet to address the qualitative public policy question of whether Australians are under- or over-using the legal system to resolve their disputes. On one view, expressed by the insurance industry, the mass media and prominent members of the judiciary, Australia is moving towards an American-style hyper-litigiousness. By contrast, Australian popular culture paints the typical Australian as culturally averse to formal rights assertion. This article explores the comparative law literature on litigiousness in two jurisdictions that have attracted significant scholarly attention — the United States and Japan. More specifically, it seeks to draw lessons from this literature for both understanding litigiousness in modern Australia and framing future research projects on the issue.

Comparative Law and European Harmonisation - a Match Made in Heaven or Uneasy Bedfellows?

Developing the controversy indicated in the heading, this article will proceed as follows. It establishes a notion of critical comparative law, by showing how comparative law may be capable of providing critique and analysis of law-making through judicial and legislative activity at a European level. This is followed by an exemplary discussion of how comparative law is actually used in relation to European harmonisation through case law, legislation and “soft law”. The question will then be asked whether and how these uses would change under a critical approach to comparative law. The discussion will focus on industrial relations and equality law.
In both fields, recent ECJ case law has proved controversial: This article submits that such controversy could partly be avoided by making better use of critical comparative law in deciding cases and in choosing adequate forms and content of legislation.

The regulation of Internet content. A qualitative, Colombian and comparative law study

 The incursion of Internet has created new forms of information and communication. As a result, today’s generation is culturally socialized by the influence of information and communication technologies in their various forms. This has generated a series of characteristics of social and cultural behaviour which are derivative of didactic, academic or recreational use. Nevertheless the use of the Internet from an early age represents not only a useful educational tool; it can constitute a great danger when it is used to access contents unsuitable for their adaptive development. Accordingly, it is necessary to study the legal regulation of internet content and to evaluate how such regulation may affect rights. Further, it is also important to study of the impact and use of this technological tool at level of the familiar unit, to understand better how it can suggest appropriate social mechanisms for the constructive use of Internet. The present investigation involves these two aspects with the purpose of uniting the legal and social perspective in a joint analysis that allows one more a more integral vision of this problem of great interest at the global level. 

The South African Doctrine of Notice: a comparative law perspective

The doctrine of notice was received into South African law in Cohen v Shires, Mchattie and King (1881-1884) 1 SAR TS 41 by reference to a 17th century Dutch decision and English equity.The reception of the polar star of equity has led to doctrinal problems and differing views as to requirements for the operation of the doctrine ever since. This is illustrated in the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Meridian Bay Restaurant (Pty) Ltd v Mitchell 2011 (4) SA 1 (SCA). The Court mentioned fraud and equity as the doctrinal basis but also accepted the view that the doctrine is an anomaly which does not fit into the principles of either the law of delict or property law.The Court required actual notice (or dolus eventualis) and wrongfulness for the operation of the doctrine of notice. In the following discussion of the decision it is argued that for the operation of the doctrine it should be required that: (a) a prior personal right aimed at the acquisition of a real right existed; (b) a holder of a subsequent personal right was actually aware or foresaw the possibility of the existence of the prior personal right; and (c) the holder of the real right nonetheless infringed upon the prior personal right by concluding a subsequent contract and obtaining registration of the real right in the deeds office.

The comparative law of marriage and divorce.

"Table of authorities": p. [xi]-xix.

Comparative Law Series. New Series

Mode of access: Internet.

Why do national court judges refer to human rights treaties?: A comparative international law analysis of CEDAW

An analysis was conducted of 325 national judicial decisions across 55 jurisdictions, in which CEDAW was referred to in the reported decision. Despite predictions to the contrary based on previous scholarship, significant variations between courts in their interpretation of CEDAW occurred relatively infrequently, courts referred relatively seldom to interpretations of CEDAW by other national courts, and there was little evidence of transnational dialogic approaches to judging. An analysis of these results suggests that domestic judges invoking CEDAW act primarily as domestic actors who use international law in order to advance domestic goals, rather than acting primarily as agents of the international community in applying CEDAW domestically, or contributing to the transnational shaping of international law to suit national interests. The Article suggests an understanding of the domestic implementation of a human rights treaty as not only law, but a unique kind of law that performs a particular function, in light of its quality as something akin to hard and soft law simultaneously.

Triangulation of rights, balancing of interests : exploring the tensions between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion in comparative constitutional law

La liberté de religion, souvent reconnue comme étant la « première liberté » dans de nombreuses traditions juridiques, reflète également les différentes conceptions de la place de l’individu et de la communauté dans la société. Notre étude analysera les modèles constitutionnels canadien, américain et européen de liberté de religion et conscience. Dans un premier chapitre, nous examinerons les conceptions théoriques de la religion dans les sciences sociales ainsi les approches juridiques afin de mieux cerner comment la religion est conçue et de plus, comprendre les diverses influences sur sa conceptualisation. Dans un second et troisième chapitre, nous tenterons d’une part, de qualifier la relation entre la liberté de conscience et la liberté de religion au Canada en nous livrant à une analyse approfondie des deux libertés et d’autre part, d’identifier les questions qui demeurent irrésolues. Dans le chapitre final, nous observerons comment la liberté de conscience a été interprétée dans les contextes américain et dans l’Union Européenne, par le biais de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’Homme. Notre hypothèse est que l’on peut arriver à une meilleure compréhension de la relation entre les libertés de conscience et religion en clarifiant les conceptions théoriques de la religion et de la conscience en droit constitutionnel comparé.