Optimal allocation of a cross-connection and sectionalizers in distribution systems

In this paper, the placement of sectionalizers, as well as, a cross-connection is optimally determined so that the objective function is minimized. The objective function employed in this paper consists of two main parts, the switch cost and the reliability cost. The switch cost is composed of the cost of sectionalizers and cross-connection and the reliability cost is assumed to be proportional to a reliability index, SAIDI. To optimize the allocation of sectionalizers and cross-connection problem realistically, the cost related to each element is considered as discrete. In consequence of binary variables for the availability of sectionalizers, the problem is extremely discrete. Therefore, the probability of local minimum risk is high and a heuristic-based optimization method is needed. A Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization (DPSO) is employed in this paper to deal with this discrete problem. Finally, a testing distribution system is used to validate the proposed method.

Optimal allocation of water in village irrigation systems of Sri Lanka

This PhD study examines whether water allocation becomes more productive when it is re-allocated from 'low' to 'high' efficient alternative uses in village irrigation systems (VISs) in Sri Lanka. Reservoir-based agriculture is a collective farming economic activity, which inter-sectoral allocation of water is assumed to be inefficient due to market imperfections and weak user rights. Furthermore, the available literature shows that a „head-tail syndrome. is the most common issue for intra-sectoral water management in „irrigation. agriculture. This research analyses the issue of water allocation by using primary data collected from two surveys of 460 rice farmers and 325 fish farming groups in two administrative districts in Sri Lanka. Technical efficiency estimates are undertaken for both rice farming and culture-based fisheries (CBF) production. The equi-marginal principle is applied for inter and intra-sectoral allocation of water. Welfare benefits of water re-allocation are measured through consumer surplus estimation. Based on these analyses, the overall findings of the thesis can be summarised as follows. The estimated mean technical efficiency (MTE) for rice farming is 73%. For CBF production, the estimated MTE is 33%. The technical efficiency distribution is skewed to the left for rice farming, while it skewed to the right for CBF production. The results show that technical efficiency of rice farming can be improved by formalising transferability of land ownership and, therefore, water user rights by enhancing the institutional capacity of Farmer Organisations (FOs). Other effective tools for improving technical efficiency of CBF production are strengthening group stability of CBF farmers, improving the accessibility of official consultation, and attracting independent investments. Inter-sectoral optimal allocation shows that the estimated inefficient volume of water in rice farming, which can be re-allocated for CBF production, is 32%. With the application of successive policy instruments (e.g., a community transferable quota system and promoting CBF activities), there is potential for a threefold increase in marginal value product (MVP) of total reservoir water in VISs. The existing intra-sectoral inefficient volume of water use in tail-end fields and head-end fields can potentially be removed by reducing water use by 10% and 23% respectively and re-allocating this to middle fields. This re-allocation may enable a twofold increase in MVP of water used in rice farming without reducing the existing rice output, but will require developing irrigation practices to facilitate this re-allocation. Finally, the total productivity of reservoir water can be increased by responsible village level institutions and primary level stakeholders (i.e., co-management) sharing responsibility of water management, while allowing market forces to guide the efficient re-allocation decisions. This PhD has demonstrated that instead of farmers allocating water between uses haphazardly, they can now base their decisions on efficient water use with a view to increasing water productivity. Such an approach, no doubt will enhance farmer incomes and community welfare.

The allocation of taxing rights of ship and aircraft leasing profits under Australia's tax treaties

The Australian Federal Commissioner of Taxation recently released Draft Taxation Ruling TR 2008/D3 with the stated purpose of clarifying ‘what profits derived from the leasing of ships or aircraft fall within the ship and aircraft articles of each of Australia’s tax treaties’. In particular, TR 2008/D3 explains the taxing rights over different types of leasing profits, such as a full basis lease in respect of any transport by a ship operated in international traffic and bareboat leases which are ancillary to the lessor transport operations of ships in international traffic. This article outlines the Commissioner’s views on the application of the standard ships and aircraft articles in the tax treaties to which it is a party as well as considering the major variations on the standard adoption. In doing so, guidance is provided as to the allocation of taxing rights of ship and aircraft leasing profits under Australia’s tax treaties.

Double tax agreements and the international allocation of business income in Australia

Increasingly, the effectiveness of the present system of taxation of international businesses is being questioned. The problem associated with the taxation of such businesses is twofold. A system of international taxation must be a fair and equitable system, distributing profits between the relevant jurisdictions and, in doing so, avoiding double taxation. At the same time, the prevention of fiscal evasion must be secured. In an attempt to achieve a fair and equitable system Australia adopts unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures to avoid double taxation and restrict the avoidance of tax. The first step in ascertaining the international allocation of business income is to consider the taxation of business income according to domestic law, that is, the unilateral measures. The treatment of international business income under the Australian domestic law, that is, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), will depend on two concepts, first, whether the taxpayer is a resident of Australia and secondly, whether the income is sourced in Australia. After the taxation of business profits has been determined according to domestic law it is necessary to consider the applicability of the bilateral measures, that is, the Double Tax Agreements (DTAs) to which Australia is a party, as the DTAs will override the domestic law where there is any conflict. Australia is a party to 40 DTAs with another seven presently being negotiated. The preamble to Australia's DTAs provides that the purpose of such agreements is 'to conclude an Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income'. Both purposes, for different reasons, are equally important. It has been said that: The taxpayer hopes the treaty will prevent the double taxation of his income; the tax gatherer hopes the treaty will prevent fiscal evasion; and the politician just hopes. The first purpose, the avoidance of double taxation, is achieved through the provision of rules whereby the Contracting States agree to the classification of income and the allocation of that income to a particular State. In this sense DTAs do not allocate jurisdiction to tax but rather provide an arrangement whereby the States agree to restrict their substantive law. The restriction is either through the non-taxing of the income or via the provision of a tax credit.

On the allocation of a takeover purchase price under AASB1013

The purpose of this paper is to document and explain the allocation of takeover purchase price to identifiable intangible assets (IIAs), purchased goodwill, and/or target net tangible assets in an accounting environment unconstrained with respect to IIA accounting policy choice. Using a sample of Australian acquisitions during the unconstrained accounting environment from 1988 to 2004, we find the percentage allocation of purchase price to IIAs averaged 19.09%. The percentage allocation to IIAs is significantly positively related to return on assets and insignificantly related to leverage, contrary to opportunism. Efficiency suggests an explanation: profitable firms acquire and capitalise a higher percentage of IIAs in acquisitions. The target's investment opportunity set is significantly positively related to the percentage allocation to IIAs, consistent with information-signalling. The paper contributes to the accounting policy choice literature by showing how Australian firms make the one-off accounting policy choice in regards allocation of takeover purchase price (which is often a substantial dollar amount to) in an environment where accounting for IIAs was unconstrained.

Optimal allocation of conservation effort among subpopulations of a threatened species: How important is patch quality?

Money is often a limiting factor in conservation, and attempting to conserve endangered species can be costly. Consequently, a framework for optimizing fiscally constrained conservation decisions for a single species is needed. In this paper we find the optimal budget allocation among isolated subpopulations of a threatened species to minimize local extinction probability. We solve the problem using stochastic dynamic programming, derive a useful and simple alternative guideline for allocating funds, and test its performance using forward simulation. The model considers subpopulations that persist in habitat patches of differing quality, which in our model is reflected in different relationships between money invested and extinction risk. We discover that, in most cases, subpopulations that are less efficient to manage should receive more money than those that are more efficient to manage, due to higher investment needed to reduce extinction risk. Our simple investment guideline performs almost as well as the exact optimal strategy. We illustrate our approach with a case study of the management of the Sumatran tiger, Panthera tigris sumatrae, in Kerinci Seblat National Park (KSNP), Indonesia. We find that different budgets should be allocated to the separate tiger subpopulations in KSNP. The subpopulation that is not at risk of extinction does not require any management investment. Based on the combination of risks of extinction and habitat quality, the optimal allocation for these particular tiger subpopulations is an unusual case: subpopulations that occur in higher-quality habitat (more efficient to manage) should receive more funds than the remaining subpopulation that is in lower-quality habitat. Because the yearly budget allocated to the KSNP for tiger conservation is small, to guarantee the persistence of all the subpopulations that are currently under threat we need to prioritize those that are easier to save. When allocating resources among subpopulations of a threatened species, the combined effects of differences in habitat quality, cost of action, and current subpopulation probability of extinction need to be integrated. We provide a useful guideline for allocating resources among isolated subpopulations of any threatened species. © 2010 by the Ecological Society of America.

Comparative growth and biomass allocation of two varieties of cat's claw creeper, Dolichandra unguis-cati (Bignoniaceae) in Australia

Introduced as an ornamental vine, cat's claw creeper Dolichandra unguis-cati (syn. Macfadyena unguis-cati) has invaded coastal and subcoastal areas of subtropical eastern Australia. Two varieties have been indentified, one of which ('short-pod') is found throughout south-eastern Australia, while the other ('long-pod') appears to be restricted to several sites in south-eastern Queensland. We compared the growth and biomass allocation patterns of the two varieties in the field over a 22-month period to determine if a higher growth rate and/or more efficient allocation of biomass may contribute to this disparity in distribution. The long-pod variety produced greater aboveground and total biomass than the short-pod variety in both riparian and non-riparian zones. Belowground the two varieties produced a similar number of tubers and overall biomass, though the long-pod variety allocated a smaller portion of its carbon belowground. High growth rates and greater biomass allocation aboveground are characteristic of invasive species, allowing them to outcompete and crowd out existing vegetation. There was no significant site by variety interaction, an indication of consistency in variety performance across riparian and non-riparian sites. Results from our study suggest that differences in growth and biomass allocations are unlikely to have contributed to the disparity in distribution of the two varieties. Despite currently occupying a relatively small range, the long-pod variety may be a more adept invader than the short-pod variety, and could become more prevalent in the future. © 2012 CSIRO.

Optimal allocation of carbon credits to emitting agents in a carbon economy

Reduction of carbon emissions is of paramount importance in the context of global warming. Countries and global companies are now engaged in understanding systematic ways of achieving well defined emission targets. In fact, carbon credits have become significant and strategic instruments of finance for countries and global companies. In this paper, we formulate and suggest a solution to the carbon allocation problem, which involves determining a cost minimizing allocation of carbon credits among different emitting agents. We address this challenge in the context of a global company which is faced with the challenge of determining an allocation of carbon credit caps among its divisions in a cost effective way. The problem is formulated as a reverse auction problem where the company plays the role of a buyer or carbon planning authority and the different divisions within the company are the emitting agents that specify cost curves for carbon credit reductions. Two natural variants of the problem: (a) with unlimited budget and (b) with limited budget are considered. Suitable assumptions are made on the cost curves and in each of the two cases we show that the resulting problem formulation is a knapsack problem that can be solved optimally using a greedy heuristic. The solution of the allocation problem provides critical decision support to global companies engaged seriously in green programs.

A Convex Optimization Framework for Almost Budget Balanced Allocation of a Divisible Good

We address the problem of allocating a single divisible good to a number of agents. The agents have concave valuation functions parameterized by a scalar type. The agents report only the type. The goal is to find allocatively efficient, strategy proof, nearly budget balanced mechanisms within the Groves class. Near budget balance is attained by returning as much of the received payments as rebates to agents. Two performance criteria are of interest: the maximum ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, and the expected budget surplus, within the class of linear rebate functions. The goal is to minimize them. Assuming that the valuation functions are known, we show that both problems reduce to convex optimization problems, where the convex constraint sets are characterized by a continuum of half-plane constraints parameterized by the vector of reported types. We then propose a randomized relaxation of these problems by sampling constraints. The relaxed problem is a linear programming problem (LP). We then identify the number of samples needed for ``near-feasibility'' of the relaxed constraint set. Under some conditions on the valuation function, we show that value of the approximate LP is close to the optimal value. Simulation results show significant improvements of our proposed method over the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism without rebates. In the special case of indivisible goods, the mechanisms in this paper fall back to those proposed by Moulin, by Guo and Conitzer, and by Gujar and Narahari, without any need for randomization. Extension of the proposed mechanisms to situations when the valuation functions are not known to the central planner are also discussed. Note to Practitioners-Our results will be useful in all resource allocation problems that involve gathering of information privately held by strategic users, where the utilities are any concave function of the allocations, and where the resource planner is not interested in maximizing revenue, but in efficient sharing of the resource. Such situations arise quite often in fair sharing of internet resources, fair sharing of funds across departments within the same parent organization, auctioning of public goods, etc. We study methods to achieve near budget balance by first collecting payments according to the celebrated VCG mechanism, and then returning as much of the collected money as rebates. Our focus on linear rebate functions allows for easy implementation. The resulting convex optimization problem is solved via relaxation to a randomized linear programming problem, for which several efficient solvers exist. This relaxation is enabled by constraint sampling. Keeping practitioners in mind, we identify the number of samples that assures a desired level of ``near-feasibility'' with the desired confidence level. Our methodology will occasionally require subsidy from outside the system. We however demonstrate via simulation that, if the mechanism is repeated several times over independent instances, then past surplus can support the subsidy requirements. We also extend our results to situations where the strategic users' utility functions are not known to the allocating entity, a common situation in the context of internet users and other problems.