Multi-level knowledge transfer in software development outsourcing projects : the agency theory view

In recent years, software development outsourcing has become even more complex. Outsourcing partner have begun‘re- outsourcing’ components of their projects to other outsourcing companies to minimize cost and gain efficiencies, creating a multi-level hierarchy of outsourcing. This research in progress paper presents preliminary findings of a study designed to understand knowledge transfer effectiveness of multi-level software development outsourcing projects. We conceptualize the SD-outsourcing entities using the Agency Theory. This study conceptualizes, operationalises and validates the concept of Knowledge Transfer as a three-phase multidimensional formative index of 1) Domain knowledge, 2) Communication behaviors, and 3) Clarity of requirements. Data analysis identified substantial, significant differences between the Principal and the Agent on two of the three constructs. Using Agency Theory, supported by preliminary findings, the paper also provides prescriptive guidelines of reducing the friction between the Principal and the Agent in multi-level software outsourcing.

Angel Investing in Finland: An Analysis Based on Agency Theory and the Incomplete Contracting Theory

Wealthy individuals - business angels who invest a share of their net worth in entrepreneurial ventures - form an essential part of an informal venture capital market that can secure funding for entrepreneurial ventures. In Finland, business angels represent an untapped pool of capital that can contribute to fostering entrepreneurial development. In addition, business angels can bridge knowledge gaps in new business ventures by means of making their human capital available. This study has two objectives. The first is to gain an understanding of the characteristics and investment behaviour of Finnish business angels. The strongest focus here is on the due diligence procedures and their involvement post investment. The second objective is to assess whether agency theory and the incomplete contacting theory are useful theoretical lenses in the arena of business angels. To achieve the second objective, this study investigates i) how risk is mitigated in the investment process, ii) how uncertainty influences the comprehensiveness of due diligence as well as iii) how control is allocated post investment. Research hypotheses are derived from assumptions underlying agency theory and the incomplete contacting theory. The data for this study comprise interviews with 53 business angels. In terms of sample size this is the largest on Finnish business angels. The research hypotheses in this study are tested using regression analysis. This study suggests that the Finnish informal venture capital market appears to be comprised of a limited number of business angels whose style of investing much resembles their formal counterparts’. Much focus is placed on managing risks prior to making the investment by strong selectiveness and by a relatively comprehensive due diligence. The involvement is rarely on a day-to-day basis and many business angels seem to see board membership as a more suitable alternative than involvement in the operations of an entrepreneurial venture. The uncertainty involved does not seem to drive an increase in due diligence. On the contrary, it would appear that due diligence is more rigorous in safer later stage investments and when the business angels have considerable previous experience as investors. Finnish business angels’ involvement post investment is best explained by their degree of ownership in the entrepreneurial venture. It seems that when investors feel they are sufficiently rewarded, in terms of an adequate equity stake, they are willing to involve themselves actively in their investments. The lack of support for a relationship between increased uncertainty and the comprehensiveness of due diligence may partly be explained by an increasing trend towards portfolio diversification. This is triggered by a taxation system that favours investments through investment companies rather than direct investments. Many business angels appear to have substituted a specialization strategy that builds on reducing uncertainty for a diversification strategy that builds on reducing firm specific (idiosyncratic) risk by holding shares in ventures whose returns are not expected to exhibit a strong positive correlation.

Agency theory, national culture and management Control Systems

Management control system of an organization is the structured facet of management, the formal vehicle by which the management process is executed. In most organizations, systems exist for planning, organizing, directing, controlling and motivating. Depending on the level of appropriateness and quality of the management control systems, the task of management is either facilitated or hindered. The end goal of a management control system is achieving organizational objectives. Because employees (agents) do not always give their best efforts for achieving organizational objectives, management control systems need to strive for aligning goals of agents (e.g., employees, subordinates) with that of principals (e.g., senior management, owners). Agency theory and its extension, principal agent model, provide insights to the problem of goal congruence and suggest remedies, at least in the Western cultural context. Whether the agency theory presumptions, predictions and prescriptions are universally applicable is an important issue in management. Their validity in different cultural contexts is largely unknown. The available literature to date indicates the possibility that agency theory may not be valid in non-western cultures. However, further empirical research is needed in non-western cultures to shed more light to this issue.

Agency theory and culture : implications for research in management control systems

The objective of this paper is to encourage further research into the applicability of agency theory for the study of management control issues of organisations in Asian societies.

Agency theory and accounting research : an overview of some conceptual and empirical issues

This chapter aims to give the reader an overview of agency theory (AT) and its application in accounting research. It delineates the basic assumptions and concepts of AT and identifies the various measures that can be undertaken to minimise agency costs. The chapter also provides a summary of the commonalities and differences across the three major paradigms adopted by accounting researches when using an agency framework: Principal-Agent, Transaction Cost Economics and Positivist (Rochester) model. Further, a review of some recent theoretical and empirical studies on the design of optimal contracts, namely those relating to implicit contracts, multi-agents and multi-period issues is undertaken. Several suggestions are made for future studies adopting an AT-based approach.

Understanding the concept of elasticity in supply chain relationships : an agency theory perspective

The issue of flexibility in supply chains has been receiving heightened attention by scholars and practitioners especially as business environment becoming more turbulent and uncertain. Notwithstanding, one of the important aspects of flexibility – relationship flexibility – which has the potential to proliferate responsiveness and postpone bifurcation in buyer -supplier relationships has not been well understood and researched. Identifying this gap within the literature, this paper proposes a concept of elasticity as an important element of relationship flexibility in supply chains. It is argued that the tolerance threshold of coopering parties in presence of their sudden behaviour change will determine their state of relationship elasticity (i.e. elastic or inelastic). The theoretical development of this paper has been primarily based on review of the literature and insights from agency perspective. It is proposed that relationship governance mechanisms advocated by agency theory has the potential to influence elasticity status of principal agent relationships.

Application of the agency theory for the analysis of performance-based mechanisms in road management

El WCTR es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte, y aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper develops a model based on agency theory to analyze road management systems (under the different contract forms available today) that employ a mechanism of performance indicators to establish the payment of the agent. The base assumption is that of asymmetric information between the principal (Public Authorities) and the agent (contractor) and the risk aversion of this latter. It is assumed that the principal may only measure the agent?s performance indirectly and by means of certain performance indicators that may be verified by the authorities. In this model there is presumed to be a relation between the efforts made by the agent and the performance level measured by the corresponding indicators, though it is also considered that there may be dispersion between both variables that gives rise to a certain degree of randomness in the contract. An analysis of the optimal contract has been made on the basis of this model and in accordance with a series of parameters that characterize the economic environment and the particular conditions of road infrastructure. As a result of the analysis made, it is considered that an optimal contract should generally combine a fixed component and a payment in accordance with the performance level obtained. The higher the risk aversion of the agent and the greater the marginal cost of public funds, the lower the impact of this performance-based payment. By way of conclusion, the system of performance indicators should be as broad as possible but should not overweight those indicators that encompass greater randomness in their results.

Agency theory problems behind the fall of shopping centers

The present article assesses agency theory related problems contributing to the fall of shopping centers. The negative effects of the financial and economic downturn started in 2008 were accentuated in emerging markets like Romania. Several shopping centers were closed or sold through bankruptcy proceedings or forced execution. These failed shopping centers, 10 in number, were selected in order to assess agency theory problems contributing to the failure of shopping centers; as research method qualitative multiple cases-studies is used. Results suggest, that in all of the cases the risk adverse behavior of the External Investor- Principal, lead to risk sharing problems and subsequently to the fall of the shopping centers. In some of the cases Moral Hazard (lack of Developer-Agent’s know-how and experience) as well as Adverse Selection problems could be identified. The novelty of the topic for the shopping center industry and the empirical evidences confer a significant academic and practical value to the present article.