A summary view of government cost recovery policies in Australia and New Zealand relating to the supply of public sector information

Researching administrative history is problematical. A trail of authoritative documents is often hard to find; and useful summaries can be difficult to organise, especially if source material is in paper formats in geographically dispersed locations. In the absence of documents, the reasons for particular decisions and the rationale underpinning particular policies can be confounded as key personnel advance in their professions and retire. The rationale for past decisions may be lost for practical purposes; and if an organisation’s memory of events is diminished, its learning through experience is also diminished. Publishing this document tries to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort by other researchers that need to venture into how policies of charging for public sector information have been justified. The author compiled this work within a somewhat limited time period and the work does not pretend to be a complete or comprehensive analysis of the issues.----- A significant part of the role of government is to provide a framework of legally-enforceable rights and obligations that can support individuals and non-government organisations in their lawful activities. Accordingly, claims that governments should be more ‘business-like’ need careful scrutiny. A significant supply of goods and services occurs as non-market activity where neither benefits nor costs are quantified within conventional accounting systems or in terms of money. Where a government decides to provide information as a service; and information from land registries is archetypical, the transactions occur as a political decision made under a direct or a clearly delegated authority of a parliament with the requisite constitutional powers. This is not a market transaction and the language of the market confuses attempts to describe a number of aspects of how governments allocate resources.----- Cost recovery can be construed as an aspect of taxation that is a sole prerogative of a parliament. The issues are fundamental to political constitutions; but they become more complicated where states cede some taxing powers to a central government as part of a federal system. Nor should the absence of markets be construed necessarily as ‘market failure’ or even ‘government failure’. The absence is often attributable to particular technical, economic and political constraints that preclude the operation of markets. Arguably, greater care is needed in distinguishing between the polity and markets in raising revenues and allocating resources; and that needs to start by removing unhelpful references to ‘business’ in the context of government decision-making.

Relative income, happiness, and utility : an explanation for the Easterlin paradox and other puzzles

The well-known Easterlin paradox points out that average happiness has remained constant over time despite sharp rises in GNP per head. At the same time, a micro literature has typically found positive correlations between individual income and individual measures of subjective well-being. This paper suggests that these two findings are consistent with the presence of relative income terms in the utility function. Income may be evaluated relative to others (social comparison) or to oneself in the past (habituation). We review the evidence on relative income from the subjective well-being literature. We also discuss the relation (or not) between happiness and utility, and discuss some nonhappiness research (behavioral, experimental, neurological) related to income comparisons. We last consider how relative income in the utility function can affect economic models of behavior in the domains of consumption, investment, economic growth, savings, taxation, labor supply, wages, and migration.

Cross culture comparison of tax morale and tax compliance : evidence from Costa Rica and Switzerland

This paper analyzes the effects of internal and external social norms on tax morale and tax compliance behavior. Field data and data derived from laboratory experiments are used to examine tax morale and tax compliance behavior in Costa Rica and Switzerland. The results indicate that internal and external social norms have a significant effect on tax morale and tax compliance.

Tax morale affects tax compliance : evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment

Our working hypotheses is that cross-cultural differences in tax compliance behaviour have foundations in the institutions of tax administration and citizen assessment of the quality of governance. Tax compliance being a complex behavioural issue. Its investigation requires use of a variety of methods and data sources. Results from artefactual field experiments conducted in countries with substantially different political histories and records of governance quality demondtrate that observed differences in tax compliance levels persist over alternative levels of enforcement. The experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey response measures of tax compliance.

Tax morale and conditional cooperation

Why so many people pay their taxes, even though fines and audit probability are low, is a central question in the tax compliance literature. Positing a homo oeconomicus having a refined motivation structure sheds light on this puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 West and East European countries. We find a high correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale. The results remain robust after exploiting endogeneity and conducting several robustness tests. We also observe a strong positive correlation between institutional quality and tax mmorale. Keywords: Tax morale; Tax compliance; Tax evasion; Pro-social behavior; Institutions

On inequality tax evasion and progressive taxes

This paper proposes a simple variation of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) construct and integrates it to a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents. We study an overlapping generations framework i n which agents must initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, they then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that in comparison with the basic approach, the ‘evade or not’ choice drastically reduced the extent of evasion in the economy. This outcome is the result of an anomaly intrinsic to the basic Allingham and Sandmo version of the model, which makes the evade-or-not extension a more suitable approach to modelling the issue. We also find that the basic model, and the model with and ‘evade-or-not’ choice have strikingly different political economy implications, , which suggest fruitful avenues of empirical research.

What shapes attitudes toward paying taxes? Evidence from multicultural European countries

Objectives. Considerable evidence suggests that enforcement efforts cannot fully explain the high degree of tax compliance. To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, several researchers have argued that citizens' attitudes toward paying taxes, defined as tax morale, helps to explain the high degree of tax compliance. However, most studies have treated tax morale as a black box, without discussing which factors shape it. Additionally, the tax compliance literature provides little empirical research that investigates attitudes toward paying taxes in Europe. Methods. Thus, this article is unique in its examination of citizen tax morale within three multicultural European countries, Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain, a choice that allows far more detailed examination of the impact of culture and institutions using data sets from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. Results. The results indicate the tendency that cultural and regional differences affect tax morale. Conclusion. The findings suggest that higher legitimacy for political institutions leads to higher tax morale.