Essays on Development Policy and the Political Economy of Conflict

Electoral Rules and Leader Selection: Experimental Evidence from Ugandan Community Groups. Despite a large body of work documenting how electoral systems affect policy outcomes, less is known about their impact on leader selection. We study this by comparing two types of participatory decision making in Ugandan community groups: (i) vote by secret ballot and (ii) open discussion with consensus. Random assignment allows us to estimate the causal impact of the rules on leader types and social service delivery. Vote groups are found to elect leaders more similar to the average member while discussion group leaders are positively selected on socio-economic characteristics. Further, dropout rates are significantly higher in discussion groups, particularly for poorer members. After 3.5 years, vote groups are larger in size and their members save less and get smaller loans. We conclude that the secret ballot vote creates more inclusive groups while open discussion groups favor the already economically successful. Preparing for Genocide: Community Meetings in Rwanda. How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure. The practice was highly politicized and, according to anecdotal evidence, regularly used by the political elites for spreading propaganda in the years before the genocide. This paper presents the first quantitative evidence of this abuse of the community meetings. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. Selection into Borrowing: Survey Evidence from Uganda. In this paper, I study how changes to the standard credit contract affect loan demand and selection into borrowing, using a representative sample of urban micro enterprises, most with no borrowing experience. Hypothetical loan demand questions are used to test whether firm owners respond to changes in loans' contractual terms and whether take-up varies by firms' risk type and other firm owner characteristics. The results indicate that contracts with lower interest rates and less stringent collateral requirements attract less risky borrowers, suggesting that there is scope for improvement of standard financial contract terms. Credit Contract Structure and Firm Growth: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial. We study the effects of credit contract structure on firm outcomes among small and medium sized firms. A randomized control trial was carried out to distinguish between some of the key constraints to efficient credit use connected to the firms' business environment and production function, namely (i) backloaded returns (ii) uncertain returns and (iii) indivisible fixed costs. Each firm was followed for the 1-year loan cycle. We describe the experiment and present preliminary results from the first 754 out of 2,340 firms to have completed the loan cycle. Firms offered a grace period have higher profits and higher household income than firms receiving a rebate later on as well as the control group. They also increased the number of paid employees  and reduced the number of unpaid employees, an effect also found among firms that received a cash subsidy at the beginning of the loan cycle. We discuss potential mechanisms behind these effects.

The political economy of industry dynamics in China:a microeconomic investigation

Using a unique firm level data, this paper analyses the role of political connections in the post-entry performance of private start-up companies in China. It documents robust evidence that political affiliation enhances firms’ survival and growth prospects. But interestingly politically neutral start-ups enjoy faster productivity improvements conditional on survival.. We conclude that the close association between the state and a segment of the business community is leading to sub-optimal resource allocation in the economy by interfering with the process of market selection.

A political economy of the ethnic chinese catering industry

The present political climate in which the ideals of entrepreneurship and self-help are strongly encouraged has drawn attention to those ethnic minorities noted for their entrepreneurial activity. Since the Chinese appear to be an exemplary case in point, this thesis focusses upon the historical material conditions which have led to the formation of a Chinese 'business* community in Britain, both past and present As such, it rejects the theories of cultural determinism which characterise most studies of the Chinese. For rather than representing the endurance of cultural norms, the existence of the contemporary Chinese 'niche' of ethnically exclusive firms in the catering industry is due to the conjunction of a number of historical processes. The first is the imperialist expansion into China of Britain's capitalist empire during the nineteenth century which established a relationship of dependency upon the interests of British capital by colonial Chinese labour. The second is the post war development of the catering industry and its demand for cheap labour as administered by the British state together with the contemporaneous development of the agricultural economy of colonial Hong Kong. Far from representing a source of material benefit to all, the ethnic Chinese 'niche' in catering is highly exploitative and merely underlines the racial oppression of Chinese in Britain. Attempts to promote business interests within the ethnic community therefore serve merely to entrench the structures of oppression.

The political economy of Poland's transition:New Firms and Reform Governments, J. Jackson, J. Klich, K. Poznanska. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2005), (xvi+277 pp., £45/$80, ISBN 0-521-83895-9)

Book review

Trimming the sails. The comparative political economy of expansionary fiscal consolidations. A Hungarian perspective

Provides a multidisciplinary and systematic analysis of the concept of fiscal consolidations. This book discusses the concept, suggesting that fiscal adjustment can be in trade-off with economic growth if certain conditions are met. Fiscal consolidation has significant short term costs which dampen economic growth. This widely shared consensus in literature on political economy makes fiscal adjustment highly unpopular. Benczes conducts a systematic analysis to find out whether it is possible to have fiscal consolidation and experience economic growth even in the short run.The book provides a clear, multidisciplinary and systematic analysis of the relatively new concept of the so-called expansionary fiscal consolidations. This concept suggests that fiscal adjustment can be in trade-off with economic growth if certain conditions are met. But why do only a few countries and only at certain times experience the expansionary effects, while others not at all? The necessary conditions and circumstances have been totally neglected in the literature, or analyzed only partially at best.Having evolved a theoretical framework, it is tested on a difficult case: Hungary, which has had the highest deficit in the European Union. The main question was whether Hungary has a chance to experience short term growth effects in times of adjustment. ----- Contents: List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgements 1. Introduction Part One: A critical Assessment of the Concept of Non-Keynesian Effects 2. Stylized Facts of EU Countries’ Major Fiscal Episodes 3. An Expectational View of Fiscal Policy: A Non-Linear Approach to Fiscal Consolidation 4. The Composition of Adjustment and the Structure of Labor Markets: A Linear Approach to Fiscal Consolidation Part Two: Testing the Institutional Conditions of Non-Keynesian Effects in Hungary 5. From Goulash Communism To Neo-Kadarism: An Overview 6. Financial Intermediation in Hungary—a Comparative Perspective 7. The Structure of the Hungarian General Budget—a Decompositional Analysis 8. The Labor Market and Wage Bargaining in Hungary—the (Ir)relevance of a Social Pact 9. Conclusion References Appendices Index

A költségvetési hiány politikai gazdaságtana (The political economy of budgetary deficit)

A fejlett ipari országokra a hetvenes évektől mind inkább jellemző tartós költségvetési hiányt sem a keynesi, sem pedig a neoklasszikus elmélet nem tudta kielégítően magyarázni. Az új politikai gazdaságtan azonban, úgy tűnik, sikerrel tárta fel nemcsak a tartós hiány és a növekvő eladósodottság okait, hanem a fiskális politikai teljesítményben országok között és időben mutatkozó jelentős eltérések forrásait is. A siker elsősorban annak köszönhető, hogy az új politikai gazdaságtan a költségvetési politika alakításának politikai és intézményi korlátai felé fordult, azzal a nem titkolt szándékkal, hogy kiterjessze a főáramú közgazdaságtan határait, és beépítse modelljeibe a gazdaságpolitikai döntéshozatal folyamatát. Tanulmányunkban négy átfogó magyarázatot tekintünk át - ezek: 1. az adósságállomány stratégiai használata, 2. a stabilizáció elodázása, 3. a politikai és választási rendszerek különbözősége és 4. a gyenge vagy széttöredezett végrehajtói hatalom -, azzal az egyértelmű igénnyel, hogy a szokásos pozitív elemzést normatív vizsgálódással egészítsük ki. / === / Neither Keynesian nor Neoclassical theory managed to explain adequately the increasingly typical state of chronic budgetary deficit found in developed industrial countries since the 1970s. But the new political economy seems to have revealed the causes of the chronic deficit and mounting indebtedness and of the reasons for the marked differences in fiscal-policy performance between countries and periods. The success can be ascribed primarily to the fact that the new political economy turned to the political and institutional constraints on the formation of budgetary policy, with the unconcealed aim of broadening the bounds of mainstream economics and building the policy-making process into it. The study examines four comprehensive explanations: 1. strategic use of debt stock, 2. postponement of stabilization, 3. differences of political and electoral systems, and 4. weak or fragmented executive power, with the clear intention of complementing the customary positive analysis with a normative examination.

Political economy of Caribbean drug trafficking: The case of the Dominican Republic

The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the relationship between narcotics trafficking and the processes of economic liberalization and democratization in the Caribbean. The salient social, political and economic processes were explored at each juncture of the drug trafficking chain to determine why certain groups and locales became integrated in the global narcotics economy. It also considered the national security implications of the global narcotics economy. ^ The Global Commodity Chain framework allowed the study to examine the social, political and economic processes that determine how a commodity is produced, transported, distributed and consumed in the global economy. A case study method was used to specify the commodity (cocaine) and locations (U.S. and Dominican Republic) where these processes were examined. ^ The important contributing factors in the study included: a liberalizing global economy, the social processes of migration, the formation of enclaves in the U.S., the opening of the political process and institutional weakness in the country of origin. All of these factors contributed to the Dominican Republic and Dominican migrants becoming key players in the cocaine commodity chain. It concluded that narcotics trafficking as a national security issue remains a fluid concept, contingent on specific cultural and historic antecedents. ^

The political economy of sovereign debt

This dissertation examines international lending arrangements between a competitive foreign investor and a less-developed country. Given that the benefits and costs of borrowing are distributed unequally across society, it is of interest to examine the conditions under which borrowing occurs and how the borrowed funds are allocated. Three theoretical models are developed to consider optimal lending arrangements in the presence of sovereign risk. The models show how a society's level and distribution of wealth influences its access to loans and the terms of the loan agreements. Optimal loan contracts are established, which place either a debt ceiling or a debt floor on the amount of the loan that, will be offered. ^

Essays on the political economy of the Dominican reform process

This dissertation provides an analytical framework to study the political economy of policy reform in the Dominican Republic during the nineties. Based on a country study, I develop two theoretical models that replicate the mechanisms of policy approval in developing countries with weak democracies. The first model considers a pro-reform President who submits a tariff bill to an anti-reform Congress dominated by the opposition party. In between, two opposing lobbies try to get their favored policy approved. Lobbies act as Stackelberg leaders vis a vis a weak President. The behavior of the Congress is determined exogenously while the lobbies act strategically pursuing the approval of the reform bill and indirectly affecting the President's decision. I show that in such a setting external agents like the Press play an important role in the decision-making process of the political actors. ^ The second model presents a similar framework. However, the President, who is a Stackelberg leader, is allowed only two choices, total reform or status-quo. I show how a lobby reacts to an increase in its rival's or its own size. These reactions depend on the President's level of commitment to the reform. Finally, I discuss the effect of variations in the size of the lobbies on the President's choice. The model suitably explains real events that took place in the Dominican Republic in the mid-nineties. ^

The political economy of poverty alleviation strategies. The initiative for heavily indebted poor countries in Bolivia: More of the same

In the year 2000, approximately 1.1 billion people lived in extreme poverty while developed countries spent US$600 billion a year on defense. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative is a recent component of a larger poverty reduction strategy supported by the International Financial Institutions, as well as many developed and developing countries. By implementing lessons of the past fifty years, this program attempts to diminish misery around the globe. As such, it provides debt relief while seeking to enable the poorest countries to simultaneously attain sustainable debt and promote human development. Interest in poverty reduction around the globe reemerged in the 1990s. This study contributes directly to this recent effort by presenting a nuanced approach that builds on the stepping-stones generated by other poverty scholars. To fulfill its goal, this investigation applies a political economy framework. Within this framework, the author conducts an actor-specific analysis. This dissertation addresses the following question: How do domestic and international actors respond to the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies? The author assumes actors desire to maximize their utility calculation and suggests these calculations are based on the player's motivations and external influences. Based on their motivations, the external influences, and the initiative's guidelines, each actor develops a set of expectations. To fulfill those expectations, stake holders utilize one or several strategies. Finally, the actors' ability to achieve their expectations determines each player's assessment of the initiative. The framework described is applied in an in-depth, actor-specific analysis of the HIPC in Bolivia. Bolivia's National Revolution represents the country's first attempt at reducing poverty. Since then, all governments have taken specific steps to combat poverty at the local and national levels. The Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is one of the most recent macro strategies of this kind. The case study demonstrated that three factors (national ownership, effective sponsorship and the local context) determine the success levels of poverty reduction strategies from abroad. In addition, the investigation clearly shows that poverty reduction is not the sole motivation in the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies. All actors, however, share the dream of poverty reduction.

The political economy of inequality and growth: Essays on sovereign debt, democracy and saving

This dissertation addresses three issues in the political economy of growth literature. The first study empirically tests the hypothesis that income inequality influences the size of a country's sovereign debt for a sample of developing countries for the period 1970–1990. The argument examined is that governments tend to yield to popular pressures to engage in redistributive policies, partially financed by foreign borrowing. Facing increased risk of default, international creditors limit the credit they extend, with the result that borrowing countries invest less and grow at a slower pace. The findings do not seem to support the negative relationship between inequality and sovereign debt, as there is evidence of increases in multilateral, countercyclical flows until the mid 1980s in Latin America. The hypothesis would hold for the period 1983–1990. Debt flows and levels seem to be positively correlated with growth as expected. ^ The second study empirically investigates the hypothesis that pronounced levels of inequality lead to unconsolidated democracies. We test the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between inequality and democracy for a sample of Latin American countries for the period 1970–2000, where democracy appears to consolidate at some intermediate level of inequality. We find that the nonmonotonic relationship holds using instrumental variables methods. Bolivia seems to be a case of unconsolidated democracy. The positive relationship between per capita income and democracy disappears once fixed effects are introduced. ^ The third study explores the nonlinear relationship between per capita income and private saving levels in Latin America. Several estimation methods are presented; however, only the estimation of a dynamic specification through a state-of-the-art general method of moments estimator yields consistent estimates with increased efficiency. Results support the hypothesis that income positively affects private saving, while system GMM reveals nonlinear effects at income levels that exceed the ones included in this sample for the period 1960–1994. We also find that growth, government dissaving, and tightening of credit constraints have a highly significant and positive effect on private saving. ^

Essays on the political economy of trade policy and economic *development

This dissertation studies the political economy of trade policy in a developing country, namely Turkey, under different economic and political regimes. The research analyzes the effects of these different regimes on the import structure, the trade policy and the industrialization process in Turkey and derives implications for aggregate welfare. ^ In the second chapter, the effects of trade liberalization policies on import demand are examined. Using disaggregated industry-level data, import demand elasticities for various sectors have been computed, analyzed under different economic regimes, and compared with those of developed countries. The results are statistically significant and reliable, and conform to the predictions of economic theory. Estimation of these elasticities is also a necessary ingredient for the third chapter of the dissertation. ^ The third chapter examines the predictions of the state-of-the-art “Protection For Sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Employing advanced econometric methods and a unique data set, strong support is found for the fundamental predictions of the model in the context of Turkey. Specifically, the government is found to attach a much higher weight to social welfare than to political contributions. This weight is higher under the democratic regime than under the dictatorship, a result potentially of interest to all researchers in the area of political economy. ^ The fourth chapter looks at the effects of industry concentration and import price shocks on protection, promotion and the choice of policy instruments in Turkey. In this context, it examines and finds support for the predictions of some well-known models in the literature. ^