On the evolution of TFP in Latin America

Due to several policy distortions, including import-substitution industrialization, widespread government intervention and both domestic and international competitive barriers, there has been a general presumption that Latin America has been much less productive than the leading economies in the last decades. In this paper we show, however, that until the late seventies Latin American countries had high productivity levels relative to the United States. It is only after the late seventies that we observe a fast decrease of relative TFP in Latin America. We also show that the inclusion of human capital in the production function makes a crucial diference in the TFP calculations for Latin America.

Structural Transformation and Productivity in Latin America

We investigate the role of sectorial differences in labor productivity and the process of structural transformation (reallocation of labor across sectors) in accounting for the time path of aggregate productivity across six Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) from 1950 to 2003. We used a general equilibrium model with three sectors (agriculture, industry and services) calibrated to those six economies. The model is used to compare the trajectory of productivity in each sector of activity with that of the United States and it impact on aggregate productivity.While in Brazil and Argentina, the Service Sector was responsible for reversing the process of catch up in productivity that occurred until the 1980s, in others, like Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, low productivity growth of the three sectors explain their poor performance.

Need and opportunity: what are the main security threats to the pharmaceuticals industry in Latin America?

Os preços altos de produtos farmacêuticos patenteados sempre têm sido uma polêmica na América Latina. Considerando as disparidades económicas na região e a falta histórica do desenvolvimento, muitas vezes os preços altos servem como barreiras contra o acesso aos medicamentos essenciais. Por um lado, as companhias farmacêuticas dizem que os preços elevados são necessários para financiar os processos de pesquisa e desenvolvimento e para gerar um retorno do investimento lucrativo. Por outro lado, os consumidores, tanto privados como públicos, dizem que os preços altos têm resultado em uma falta histórica de medicamentos baratos. Neste debate, ambos lados têm realizado uma série de manobras e contramanobras que têm exposto algumas das vulnerabilidades do setor. Utilizando vários métodos de análise e entrevistas com profissionais no setor, este projeto analisa as vulnerabilidades do setor para determinar o risco, ao mesmo tempo tentando a responder à pergunta: Quais são as ameaças principais na segurança da indústria farmacêutica na América Latina? Justificação deste projeto é o aumento dos crimes relacionados aos produtos farmacêuticos na última década, que têm exposto os pacientes a um número de riscos mais alto. Uma compreensão das ameaças principais é necessária para melhor mitigar o risco, garantir a integridade de produtos e preservar a saúde pública.

Theorizing Latin America : transactions, resources and institutions

Nos anos 80, a América Latina, uma das regiões menos desenvolvidas do mundo, enfrentou um período de mudanças econômicas e políticas significativas que levaram essa região a um lugar de destaque no mercado mundial. Por conseguinte, a América Latina foi objeto de diversos estudos, que, por sua vez, foram compilados nesta revisão de literatura, a fim de que se possam identificar quais os avanços foram feitos no âmbito da Gestão e Negócios Internacionais. Como base, tomou-se a metodologia aplicada por Meyer e Peng (2005), fazendo um paralelo entre três importantes teorias da área (Teoria de Baseada em Recursos, Teoria Baseada no Custo das Transações e Teoria Institucional) e alguns assuntos-chave de extrema relevância ao entendimento do tema (Construindo Vantagens Competitivas, Liberalização Econômica versus Regulação Governamental e Internacionalização) Ao final, delimitamos as contribuições da América Latina ao estudo da Gestão e Negócios Internacionais, fazendo algumas sugestões para futuros pesquisas nesse âmbito.

The experience of semi-formal infrastructure finance in developing countries: proposals for Brazil and Latin America

This paper has the purpose of analyzing the role of civil society in funding and providing nfrastructure projects in developing countries. Considering that local associations around the world have been directly engaged on some infrastructure projects – some scholars define it as “semi-formal finance” –, the intention is to demonstrate that the experiences on such arrangements in developing countries have been responsible for fostering infrastructure investments in the poorer regions where the government is more absent. Based upon legal, economic and social aspects, this paper aims to contribute to a broader debate for the development of infrastructure in emerging countries. The conclusion is that, under a more social approach, the legal and economic mechanisms in developing countries are able to consider such arrangements in the benefit of their development.

On the evolution of TFP in Latin America

Due to several policy distortions, including import-substitution industrialization, widespread government intervention and both domestic and international competitive barriers, there has been a general presumption that Latin America has been much less productive than the leading economies in the last decades. In this paper we show, however, that until the late seventies Latin American countries had high productivity levels relative to the United States. It is only after the late seventies that we observe a fast decrease of relative TFP in Latin America. We also show that the inclusion of human capital in the production function makes a crucial difference in the TFP calculations for Latin America.

Impact investing: portfolio company selection in Latin America

O documento analisa como investidores de impacto selecionar suas companhias de portfólio na América Latina e que critérios são avaliados no processo. Uma vez que praticamente ne-nhuma pesquisa sobre isso foi con conduzidos até à data, e desde que o modelo de processo de seleção aplicados em capital de risco não é dissemelhantes, foi adotado essa abordagem. Os resultados revelam que os investidores de impacto originar e avaliar negócios de uma for-ma semelhante a capitalistas de risco , mas que alguns critérios são ajustados e outros adicio-nados a fim de refletir o duplo objectivo de investimento de impacto. Os investidores de im-pacto podem originar ofertas passivamente, mas eles preferem procurar empreendimentos sociais de forma proativa: contatos pessoais, o acesso a redes e eventos do setor são cruciais neste contexto. Impacto Investidores considerando um investimento em pesquisa para a Amé-rica Latina inteira, empreendedores sociais honestos e confiáveis comprometidos com impacto social; empreendimentos sociais elegíveis devem ser rentáveis com potencial de escalabilidade; o produto deve ter um impacto social, ou seja, criar valor para o consumidor individual e para a comunidade em geral; tamanho do mercado e crescimento do mercado são fatores externos cruciais; e as características de negócio dependem de atitude de risco do investidor e as perspectivas de uma saída bem sucedida, tanto em termos financeiros e sociais. Os investi-dores de impacto também estão dispostos a dar apoio não financeiro antes de um investimen-to, se um empreendimento social, mostra alto potencial para atingir o seu objectivo dual.

Structural transformation and productivity in Latin America

This article examines the e¤ects of sectorial shifts and structural transformation on the recent productivity path of Latin America. We use a four-sector (agriculture, industry, modern services and traditional services) general equilibrium model calibrated to the main economies in the region. The model very closely replicates labor reallocations across sectors and the growth of aggregate labor productivity from 1950 to 2005. Structural transformation explains a sizeable portion of the region s convergence in the rst decades. In most cases, the poor performance of the traditional services sector is the main cause of the slowdown in productivity growth observed in the region after the mid-1970s and is a key factor in explaining the divergence during this period.

Common factors in Latin America's business cycles

This paper constructs new business cycle indices for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico based on common dynamic factors extracted from a comprehensive set of sectoral output, external trade, fiscal and financial variables. The analysis spans the 135 years since the insertion of these economies into the global economy in the 1870s. The constructed indices are used to derive a business cyc1e chronology for these countries and characterize a set of new stylized facts. In particular, we show that ali four countries have historically displayed a striking combination of high business cyc1e volatility and persistence relative to advanced country benchmarks. Volatility changed considerably over time, however, being very high during early formative decades through the Great Depression, and again during the 1970s and ear1y 1980s, before declining sharply in three of the four countries. We also identify a sizeable common factor across the four economies which variance decompositions ascribe mostly to foreign interest rates and shocks to commodity terms of trade.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.