LA REGLA DE VOTACIÓN ADMITIDA EN LA CONVENCIÓN AMERICANA: UNA MIRADA DESDE SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

ResumenEn el presente artículo se analiza cuáles son las restricciones que impone la Convención Americanade Derechos Humanos en la construcción de un sistema de elección de representantes populares.Para ello, se tomarán herramientas de Social Choice Theory, que nos permitirán depurar y encontrarprecisamente cuales sistemas electorales no pueden ser tolerados en el Sistema Interamericano deDerechos Humanos.Palabras clave: Social Choice Theory, Derechos Políticos, Teorema de la Imposibilidad de Arrow,Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos.AbstractThis article analyzes which are the restrictions that the American Convention of Human Rights imposeson the construction of an electoral system for popular representation. To do so, tools from Social ChoiceTheory will be taken which will allow us to precise and find which exact electoral systems cannot be toleratedin the Inter-American Human Rights System.Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Political Rights, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, Inter-AmericanHuman Rights System.

Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia-Herzegovina'

What role do elections play in societies emerging from communal war and what type of institutions can serve as catalysts in deepening peace and compromise? While some analysts argue that ethnicity should be recognized through 'consociational' institutions, others maintain that 'integrative' devices - in particular, carefully crafted electoral rules - can limit or even break down the salience of ethnicity and increase the possibility for inter-ethnic accommodation. This article examines the post-war electoral experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), arguing that elections had a problematic, unintended impact on peacebuilding. First, timid integrative electoral devices were adopted in a consociational system that reifies ethnic division and complicates compromise; second, peacebuilding agencies needlessly manufactured electoral rules that backfired; third, group-based features of the BiH political system run counter to individual human rights. The article ends with suggestions for improving the electoral framework.

Party organisation in a multi-level system: Party organisational change in Spain and the UK

This article investigates the link between regionalization of the structure of government, regional elections and regionalism on the one hand, and the organization of state-wide political parties in Spain and the UK on the other. It particularly looks at two aspects of the relations between the central and regional levels of party organization: integration of the regional branches in central decision making and autonomy of the regional branches. It argues that the party factors are the most crucial elements explaining party change and that party leaders mediate between environmental changes and party organization. The parties' history and beliefs and the strength of the central leadership condition their ability or willingness to facilitate the emergence of meso-level elites. The institutional and electoral factors are facilitating factors that constitute additional motives for or against internal party decentralization.

Electoral Systems, Ethnic Cleavages, and Experience with Democracy

Recent studies show the effects of electoral systems and ethnic cleavages on the number of parties in emerging democracies differ from those effects observed in more established democracies. Building on recent arguments maintaining the quality of democracy improves with experience, we argue the reason for the differences in the findings between established and emerging democracies is that the effects of these variables on the number of parties differ according to a country’s experience with elections. To test this argument, we analyse party system fragmentation in 89 established and emerging democracies and the conditioning effects experience with elections have on the effects of district magnitude, ethnic cleavages, and variables relating to the presidential party system. The results show the effects of institutional and social cleavage variables differ substantially between emerging and established democracies, but these effects begin to approximate those seen in more established democracies with additional experience with elections.

Not all social cleavages are the same: On the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation

Most studies examining the relationship between social cleavages and party system fragmentation maintain that higher levels of social diversity lead to greater party system fragmentation. However, most aggregate-level studies focus on one type of social cleavage:ethnic diversity. In order to develop a better understanding of how different cleavages impact electoral competition, this paper considers another type of social cleavage: religious diversity.Contrary to previous literature, higher levels of religious diversity provide incentives for cross-religious cooperation, which in turn reduces party system fragmentation. Using a cross national data set of elections from 1946-2011, the results show that, in contrast to most studies examining the effects of social cleavage diversity on the number of parties, higher religious diversity is associated with lower levels of party system fragmentation.

The waning of the two giants: the electoral decline of the Italian Christian Democratic Party and the Italian Communist Party

Italy is currently experiencing profound political change. One aspect of this change involves the decline in electoral support for the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), now the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS). Signs of the electoral decline of both parties began to appear in the late 1970s and early 1980s and accelerated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The pr imar y purpos e of th is thes is is to expla i n the electoral decline of the DC and PCI/PDS in the last decade. The central question being addressed in this thesis is the following: What factors contributed to the decline in electoral support for the DC and PCI? In addition, the thesis attempts to better comprehend the change in magni tude and direction of the Italian party system. The thesis examines the central question within an analytical framework that consists of models explaining electoral change in advanced industrial democracies and in Italy. A review of the literature on electoral change in Italy reveals three basic models: structural (socioeconomic and demographic factors), subcultural (the decline of the Catholic and Communist subcultures), and pol i tical (factors such as party strategy, and the crisis and collapse of communism in iv Eastern Europe and the former soviet Union and the end to the Cold War). Significant structural changes have occurred in Italy, but they do not invariably hurt or benefit either party. The Catholic and Communist subcultures have declined in size and strength, but only gradually. More importantly, the study discovers that the decline of communism and party strategy adversely affected the electoral performances of the DC and PC!. The basic conclusion is that political factors primarily and directly contributed to the decline in electoral support for both parties, while societal factors (structural and subcultural changes) played a secondary and indirect role. While societal factors do not contribute directly to the decline in electoral support for both parties, they do provide the context within which both parties operated. In addition, the Italian party system is becoming more fragmented and traditional political parties are losing electoral support to new political movements, such as the Lega Nord (LN-Northern League) and the Rete (Network). The growing importance of the North-South and centre-periphery cleavages suggests that the Italian party system, which is traditionally based on religious and ideological cleavages, may be changing.

Senado 2006: impacto de la reforma político-electoral

Los sistemas electorales en sentido estricto, adicional a sus efectos técnicos, tienen efectos colaterales que sólo pueden ser visiblemente detectados después de tres o cuatro elecciones, lo que hace que el tiempo razonable de observación para el análisis y evaluación de los mismos no debe ser inferior a una década. Motivo por el cual el escenario político-electoral colombiano de los últimos tiempos se constituye en un laboratorio académico sin precedentes en nuestra historia. Más aún cuando a través del Acto Legislativo 01 de 2003 el Congreso logra aprobar su reforma política, en medio de un ambiente de tensiones y contrapesos entre el Legislativo y Ejecutivo, que busca cada uno a su manera, reformar estructuralmente la Constitución Política de Colombia, particularmente, en relación con la forma de obtener, conservar y ejercer el poder. Ante esta coyuntura de implementación y adaptación de la reforma, en el ámbito netamente electoral, el Observatorio de Procesos Electorales (OPE) ha emprendido la tarea de hacer seguimiento y sistematización de la información pertinente que le permita analizar los sistemas electorales –en sus efectos técnicos–, e ir observando a largo plazo sus efectos colaterales, así como su impacto real en la representación política, en la dinámica del sistema político y en el grado de gobernabilidad. En este cuadernillo se contextualizan los antecedentes de la elección senatorial y se presentan los resultados preliminares del seguimiento y sistematización de la información relacionada con el impacto inmediato de la reforma en la elección de 2006.

Perú - Partidos y outsiders. El proceso electoral peruano de 2006

El proceso electoral peruano del 2006 ha legitimado dos formas de hacer política: la política partidarizada que toma como base a los partidos más antiguos del sistema político (los mismos que han logrado reposicionarse luego de la década fujimorista); y la política del outsider antipartidario que toma como base un discurso crítico de la clase política y deja en un segundo plano la construcción de una propuesta orgánica e institucional. La política partidarizada subsiste a pesar de la prédica antipolítica del régimen fujimorista y del sistema partidario que colapsó en los noventa. Del mismo modo, la política del outsider permanece vigente a pesar de las reformas institucionales (Ley de Partidos Políticos) que se implementaron para evitar la fragmentación política y la incursión exitosa de estos nuevos políticos. Se establece así un “régimen de convivencia” luego de un período transicional inconcluso, que implementó tímidamente las reformas institucionales que no consiguieron fortalecer el sistema, y que estuvo signado por una constante inestabilidad política y conflictividad social.-----The 2006 Peruvian election process has legitimized two ways of going about politics: either a ‘partyist’ (or ‘partisan’) approach based on the older and more traditional parties of the political system (the same ones that have managed to reposition themselves after Fujimori’s decade), or the ‘outsider’s’ anti-party (or ‘anti-partisan’) approach which is based on a critical discourse of the extant political class, pushing aside the building-up of an institutional and organic proposal. The former type of politics survives in spite of the fervent anti-politics discourse of Fujimori’s regime and of the conspicuous collapse of the party system in the 1990’s. In much the same way, the outsiders’ politics remains in force in spite of institutional reforms (Ley de Partidos Políticos or “Political Parties Act”) which were implemented to avoid political fragmentation and/or the successful foray into the political arena of these new politicians. Thus, a “coexistence regime” has been established after an unfinished transitional period during which, very timidly, institutional reforms were implemented though they never really strengthened the system, and a regime which was marked by constant political instability and social upheaval.

Colombia - Oposición, competencia electoral y reformas para la paz en Colombia

Los problemas que enfrenta la oposición parlamentaria en Colombia requieren un enfoque sistémico en su solución que supere la perspectiva tradicional limitada a la discusión de un estatuto. Para una propuesta de reforma política es necesario evaluar los elementos que componen el sistema político, entendiendo que esos elementos están interactuando permanentemente entre ellos, demarcando el escenario de la competencia partidista, y que sus efectos estimulan u obstaculizan el funcionamiento de la oposición. Un contexto político que facilite la oposición parlamentaria y el esquema gobierno–oposición es más apropiado para el funcionamiento de partidos minoritarios y para el tránsito de organizaciones armadas que quieran pasar a la vida civil. Ninguna organización insurgente, a menos que militarmente esté derrotada, querrá desmovilizarse para tener una efímera participación en política.-----The problems faced by parliamentary opposition in Colombia need a systemic approach to go beyond the old outlook whereby all disputes are short-sightedly restricted to one statute. In order to consider a plausible political reform, it is first necessary to properly assess the elements that make up the current political system, under the assumption that they permanently interact with each other and mark out the arena where political parties compete; the effects of such competition either encourage or hinder the opposition’s action. A political context where parliamentary opposition and the government-opposition scheme are fostered is much more appropriate for minority parties and for the transition of armed groups into civil society. No insurgent group (unless militarily defeated) will ever demobilize only to play an ephemeral political role.

Venezuela - Las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela: de una democracia representativa a un régimen autoritario electoral

Desde 1958 hasta el presente el sistema político venezolano ha pasado de ser una democracia representativa, entre 1958 y 1998, para convertirse en un régimen autoritario electoral entre los años 1999 y 2006, durante la presidencia de Hugo Chávez. Este cambio de régimen ha tenido un impacto significativo y negativo sobre la institucionalidad electoral en el país, pues a diferencia del pasado reciente, los comicios en Venezuela han dejado de ser un mecanismo competitivo, con capacidad para expresar fidedignamente la voluntad colectiva y traducirla en esquemas idóneos de representación. En las páginas que siguen se examinan las recientes transformaciones del sistema político venezolano, su impacto sobre las reglas y condiciones del juego electoral, y las opciones y retos que enfrentan las fuerzas gubernamentales y las de oposición ante las elecciones presidenciales de diciembre 2006 en el marco del nuevo régimen autoritario electoral.-----From 1958 to the present, the Venezuelan political system has shifted from the representative democracy it was in the 1958–1998 period, to an authoritarian electoral regime from 1999 to 2006 under the presidency of Hugo Chávez. This change in the nature of the regime has had a significant and negative impact on the country’s electoral institutions and on its ‘institutionality’ since, unlike the recent past, elections in Venezuela are no longer a competition mechanism capable of reliably giving room to the expression of collective will and translating it into suitable representative frameworks. The paper examines these recent transformations undergone by the Venezuelan political system, their impact on the rules and conditions of the electoral contest, and the alternatives and challenges faced by both the government strongholds and the opposition vis-à-vis the coming December 2006 presidential elections in the midst of the new authoritarian regime’s electoral framework.

El precedente constitucional-electoral: redefinición del sistema tradicional de fuentes (Tema Central)

El reconocimiento de la jurisprudencia como fuente jurídica principal concede a todo fallo efectos vinculantes de alcance general y abstracto. Este cambio de esquema ha trastocado los cánones de tradición romano-germánica. La ubicación de la jurisprudencia dentro del sistema de fuentes dependerá, por la forma, de la jerarquía orgánica del juez o tribunal del que emanare. En cuanto al fondo, existen dos aristas. La primera, en cuanto a la materia, en aplicación del principio del paralelismo de las formas jurídicas: si existiese reserva constitucional o legal sobre una materia determinada, la jurisprudencia estará creando subreglas de idéntica naturaleza y jerarquía. Finalmente, desde la perspectiva axiológica, en atención al principio de interpretación pro homine y de progresividad de los derechos fundamentales, la jurisprudencia que prevalecería es aquella que presente un estándar mayormente garantista, sin importar la jerarquía orgánica del juez o tribunal emisor.

From the hustings to harbour views : electoral institutions in New South Wales 1856-2006

'Easy to enrol, easy to vote' was the slogan devised by the New South Wales electoral office in the 1980s. How did this system evolve from a British based model to a distinctively Australian one?

Social cleavages and electoral support in Turkey -- toward convergence?

Studies on Western democracies have shown that deep-seated social cleavages stabilize the electoral behavior and thus reduce electoral volatility. But how do social cleavages affect a party system that is undergoing democratic consolidation, such as in Turkey? In this study, investigations were carried out on long- and short-term relationships between social cleavages (religiosity, ethnicity, and sectarism) and electoral volatility in Turkey during the 1961-2002 period. Cross-sectional multiple regressions were applied to electoral and demographic data at the provincial level. The results showed that in the long-term, social cleavages on the whole have increased volatility rather than reduced it. The cleavage-volatility relationship, however, has changed over time. Repeated elections have mitigated the volatile effect of social cleavages on the voting behavior, as political parties have become more representative of the existent social cleavages.