Prosecutorial discretion in assisted dying in Canada : a proposal for charging guidelines

An Expert Panel of the Royal Society of Canada and a Select Committee of the Québec National Assembly both recently recommended the issuance of permissive guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion on voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide and “medical aid in dying” respectively. It seems timely, therefore, to propose a set of offence-specific guidelines for how prosecutorial discretion should be exercised in cases of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canadian provinces and territories. We take as our starting point the only existing guidelines of this sort currently in force in the world (i.e. the British Columbia Guidelines, and the England and Wales Guidelines). In light of certain concerns we have with these guidelines, we outline an approach to constructing guidelines for Canadian jurisdictions that begins with identifying three guiding principles we argue are appropriate for this purpose (respect for autonomy, the need for high-quality prosecutorial decision making, and the importance of public confidence in that decision making), and ends with a concrete and detailed set of proposed guidelines. The paper is consistent with, but also extends, the work of the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel on End of Life Decision Making. Un panel d’expert de la Société Royale du Canada et une Commission spéciale de l’Assemblée nationale du Québec ont tous les deux récemment recommandé que soit émises des directives permettant exercice d’un pouvoir de poursuite discrétionnaire concernant l’euthanasie et le suicide assisté et « l’assistance médicale pour mourir », respectivement. Il semble donc à propos de proposer une série de directives spécifiques aux offenses sur la façon dont le pouvoir de poursuite discrétionnaire dans les territoires et provinces canadiennes serait appliqué dans les cas d’euthanasie et de suicide assisté. Nous avons pris comme point de départ les seules directives de la sorte existant déjà (c’est-à-dire celle de la Colombie-Britannique et de l’Angleterre et du Pays de Galles). Par contre, compte tenu de certaines de nos réserves concernant ces directives, nous avons ensuite établi les grandes lignes d’une approche permettant de mettre sur pied des directives pour les juridictions canadiennes, qui débute par l’identification de trois principes de base qui sont selon nous appropriées à cette fin (respect de l’autonomie, besoin pour une grande qualité de prise de prise de décision du poursuivant et la confiance du public envers cette prise de décision) pour se terminer par une série de directives concrètes et détaillées. Le présent document est compatible avec le travail de la Société royale du Canada tout en en augmentant la portée.

Submission to the Queensland Department of Communities Review of the Juvenile Justices Act 1992 Issues Paper 2007

This submission addresses the Queensland Government’s Department of Communities Issues Paper regarding the Review of the Juvenile Justice Act 1992 (August 2007). The Queensland University of Technology Faculty of Law has a Criminal Justice Program within the Law and Justice Research Centre. The members of this Program wish to participate in the debate on these issues which are critically important to the Queensland community at large but especially to our young people.

The right to choose an assisted death : time for legislation?

The legal framework that operates at the end of life in Australia needs to be reformed. • Voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide are currently unlawful. • Both activities nevertheless occur not infrequently in Australia, in part because palliative care cannot relieve physical and psychological pain and suffering in all cases. • In this respect, the law is deficient. The law is also unfair because it doesn’t treat people equally. Some people can be helped to die on their own terms as a result of their knowledge and/or connections while some are able to hasten their death by the refusal of life-sustaining treatment. But others do not have access to the means for their life to end. • A very substantial majority of Australians have repeatedly expressed in public opinion polls their desire for law reform on these matters. Many are concerned at what they see is happening to their loved ones as they reach the end of their lives, and want the confidence that when their time comes they will be able to exercise choice in relation to assisted dying. • The most consistent reason advanced not to change the law is the need to protect the vulnerable. There is a concern that if the law allows voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide for some people, it will be expanded and abused, including pressures being placed on highly dependent people and those with disabilities to agree to euthanasia. • But there is now a large body of experience in a number of international jurisdictions following the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia and/or assisted suicide. This shows that appropriate safeguards can be implemented to protect vulnerable people and prevent the abuse that opponents of assisted dying have feared. It reveals that assisted dying meets a real need among a small minority of people at the end of their lives. It also provides reassurance to people with terminal and incurable disease that they will not be left to suffer the indignities and discomfort of a nasty death. • Australia is an increasingly secular society. Strong opposition to assisted death by religious groups that is based on their belief in divine sanctity of all human life is not a justification for denying choice for those who do not share that belief. • It is now time for Australian legislators to respond to this concern and this experience by legislating to enhance the quality of death for those Australians who seek assisted dying.

Does withdrawing life-sustaining treatment cause death or allow the patient to die?

The paper discusses the view of Franklin Miller and Robert Truog that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment causes death and so is a form of killing. I reject that view. I argue that even if we think there is no morally relevant difference between allowing a patient to die and killing her (itself a controversial view), it does not follow that allowing to die is a form of killing. I then argue that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is properly classified as allowing the patient to die rather than as killing her. Once this is accepted, the law cannot be criticised for inconsistency by holding, as it does, that it is lawful to withdraw life-sustaining treatment but unlawful to give patients a lethal injection.

ABC Conversations with Richard Fidler & Dr Paul Bennett, a forensic podiatrist

Podiatry is the medical science of the bones, muscle and skin of the foot. Paul Bennett is sometimes called on by police to help solve crime. He can provide vital evidence by applying his medical expertise and extraordinary talent for pattern recognition to footprints left at crime-scenes. Paul is a senior lecturer at the Quensland University of Technology's School of Clinical Sciences.

‘The door creaked shut’: The new breach of bail offence for youth in Queensland

As part of the 2014 amendments to the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) the previous Queensland government introduced a new breach of bail offence and a reverse onus provision in relation to the new offence. Also included in the raft of amendments was a provision removing the internationally accepted principle that, in relation to young offenders, detention should be used as ‘a last resort’. This article argues that these changes are likely to increase the entrenchment of young people within the criminal justice system.

Recent developments in DNA evidence

DNA evidence has made a significant contribution to criminal investigations in Australia and around the world since it was widely adopted in the 1990s (Gans & Urbas 2002). The direct matching of DNA profiles, such as comparing one obtained from a crime scene with one obtained from a suspect or database, remains a widely used technique in criminal investigations. A range of new DNA profiling techniques continues to be developed and applied in criminal investigations around the world (Smith & Urbas 2012). This paper is the third in a series by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) on DNA evidence. The first, published in 1990 when the technology was in its relative infancy, outlined the scientific background for DNA evidence, considered early issues such as scientific reliability and privacy and described its application in early criminal cases (Easteal & Easteal 1990). The second, published in 2002, expanded on the scientific background and discussed a significant number of Australian cases in a 12-year period, illustrating issues that had arisen in investigations, at trial and in the use of DNA in the review of convictions and acquittals (Gans & Urbas 2002). There have been some significant developments in the science and technology behind DNA evidence in the 13 years since 2002 that have important implications for law enforcement and the legal system. These are discussed through a review of relevant legal cases and the latest empirical evidence. This paper is structured in three sections. The first examines the scientific techniques and how they have been applied in police investigations, drawing on a number of recent cases to illustrate them. The second considers empirical research evaluating DNA evidence and databases and the impact DNA has on investigative and court outcomes. The final section discusses significant cases that establish legal precedent relating to DNA evidence in criminal trials where significant issues have arisen or new techniques have been applied that have not yet been widely discussed in the literature. The paper concludes by reflecting on implications for policy and practice.

The Presumption of Innocence and Irish Criminal Law:Whittling the Golden Thread

The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty has been described as the 'golden thread' running through the web of the English criminal law and a 'fundamental postulate' of Irish criminal law which enjoys constitutional protection. The purpose of this book is to consider whether the reality matches the rhetoris surrounding this central precept of our criminal law and to consider its efficacy in light of recent legislative innovations.