Does withdrawing life-sustaining treatment cause death or allow the patient to die?

The paper discusses the view of Franklin Miller and Robert Truog that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment causes death and so is a form of killing. I reject that view. I argue that even if we think there is no morally relevant difference between allowing a patient to die and killing her (itself a controversial view), it does not follow that allowing to die is a form of killing. I then argue that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is properly classified as allowing the patient to die rather than as killing her. Once this is accepted, the law cannot be criticised for inconsistency by holding, as it does, that it is lawful to withdraw life-sustaining treatment but unlawful to give patients a lethal injection.

Genetic secrets and the family

The issue of how individual patients and their doctors should act in relation to the knowledge that the patient has a genetic condition— specifically, whether the patient and/or the doctor should or must inform relevant members of the patient’s family—is a looming area of medicolegal controversy. Over the last fifteen years or so, the issue of confidentiality versus disclosure has been particularly controversial in relation to HIV/AIDS patients.1 It has been argued that medical information about genetic disease gives rise to special problems vis-à-vis blood relatives. Because genetic disease is transmitted only by way of procreation, information about genetic disease is unique in that there is a propensity (which is highly variable and depends upon a variety of factors) for the condition to be shared by members of a family who are biologically related. Thus, genetic information about an individual may reveal information about relatives of that individual which is ‘specific (that the person has or will develop a genetic disease); or predictive (that the person has an unspecified risk of developing the disease)’

Review : "Genetic Privacy: A challenge to Medico-Legal Norms" by Laurie, G

The discovery by Watson and Crick of the structure of DNA is one of the great scientific discoveries. In the period since that discovery new areas of genetic research have opened up which hold out the hope of developing treatments or cures for many illnesses and diseases. Yet with these discoveries have also come an array of ethical and legal dilemmas about the use of genetic information and concerns about the potential for those with genetic diseases or conditions to be stigmatised and discriminated against. The discussion about the developments in genetic science has become increasingly, a debate about the use of genetic information within our society. Graeme Laurie’s book, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms, guides the reader through the complexities of these debates by considering what we mean by privacy and asking whether our existing concepts are adequate to meet the challenges posed by the new genetics.

“Best interests” and withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from an adult who lacks capacity in the parens patriae jurisdiction

Disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment are increasingly coming before Australian Supreme Courts. Such cases are generally heard in the parens patriae jurisdiction where the test applied is what is in the patient’s “best interests”. However, the application of the “best interests” test, and its meaning, remains unclear in this context. To shed light on this emerging body of jurisprudence, this article analyses the Australian superior court decisions that consider an adult’s best interests in the context of decisions about life-sustaining treatment. We identify a number of themes from the current body of cases and consider how these themes may guide future decision-making. After then considering the law in the United Kingdom, we suggest an approach for assessing best interests that could be adopted by Australian Supreme Courts. We argue that the suggested approach will lead to a more structured and systematic decision-making process that better promotes the best interests of the patient.

End of Life Decision Making and Palliative Care

1. An emergency department attendance represents an opportunity to set goals for care during the attendance and beyond. 2. End of life discussions and advance care planning assist early decision-making about treatment goals and end of life care. 3. Knowledge of the law assists decision-making at the end of life. 4. Not all dying patients require the skill set of a palliative care specialist but every dying patient will benefit from a palliative approach. 5. Palliative care does not preclude active treatment where the intent is understood by patient and family. 6. Failure to diagnose dying can compromise patient care. 7. The emergency department should foster close relationships with local specialist palliative care providers to improve and ensure timely access for patients and families and so that emergency staff have access to the knowledge and skills provided.

Adults who lack capacity : substitute decision-making

• Mechanisms to facilitate consent to healthcare for adults who lack capacity are necessary to ensure that these adults can lawfully receive appropriate medical treatment when needed. • In Australia, the common law plays only a limited role in this context, through its recognition of advance directives and through the parens patriae jurisdiction of superior courts. • Substitute decision-making for adults who lack capacity is facilitated primarily by guardianship and other related legislation. This legislation, which has been enacted in all Australian States and Territories, permits a range of decision-makers to make different types of healthcare decisions. • Substitute decision-makers can be appointed by the adult or by a guardianship or other tribunal. Where there is no appointed decision-maker, legislation generally empowers those close to the adult to make the relevant decision. Most Australian jurisdictions have also provided for statutory advance directives. • For the most serious of decisions, such as non-therapeutic sterilisations, consent can only be provided by a tribunal. Other decisions can generally be made by a range of substitute decision-makers. Some treatment, such as very minor treatment or that which is needed in an emergency, can be provided without consent. • Guardianship legislation generally establishes a set of principles and/or other criteria to guide healthcare decisions. Mechanisms have also been established to resolve disputes as to who is the appropriate decision-maker and how a decision should be made.

Double effect and palliative care excuses

• The doctrine of double effect is an exception to the general rule that taking active steps that end life is unlawful. • The essence of the doctrine at common law is intention. • Hastening a patient’s death through palliative care will be lawful provided the primary intention is to relieve pain, and not cause death, even if that death is foreseen. • Some States have enacted legislative excuses that deal with the provision of palliative care. • These statutory excuses tend to be stricter than the common law as they impose other requirements in addition to having an appropriate intent, such as adherence to some level of recognised medical practice.

Posthumous conception in South Australia : the case continues in Re H, AE (No 3) [2013] SASC 196

This editorial considers the issue of posthumous conception as discussed in the case of Re H, AE (No 3) [2013] SASC 196, which involved an application by a South Australian woman to the Supreme Court for authorisation to export her deceased partner's sperm to the Australian Capital Territory, for use in an assisted reproductive technology procedure.

Prevalence and predictors of advance directives in Australia

Background Advance care planning is regarded as integral to better patient outcomes yet little is known about the prevalence of advance directives in Australia. Aims To determine the prevalence of advance directives (ADs) in the Australian population. Methods A national telephone survey about estate and advance planning. Sample was stratified by age (18-45 and >45 years) and quota sampling occurred based on population size in each State and Territory. Results Fourteen percent of the Australian population has an AD. There is State variation with people from South Australia and Queensland more likely to have an AD than people from other states. Will making and particularly completion of a financial enduring power of attorney are associated with higher rates of AD completion. Standard demographic variables were of limited use in predicting whether a person would have an AD. Conclusions Despite efforts to improve uptake of advance care planning (including ADs), barriers remain. One likely trigger for completing an AD and advance care planning is undertaking a wider future planning process (e.g. making a will or financial enduring power of attorney). This presents opportunities to increase advance care planning but steps are needed to ensure that planning which occurs outside the health system is sufficiently informed and supported by health information so that it is useful in the clinical setting. Variations by State could also suggest that redesign of regulatory frameworks (such as a user-friendly and well publicised form backed by statute) may help improve uptake of ADs.

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in a patient's best interests : Australian judicial deliberations

•Intractable disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity are rare but challenging. Judicial resolution may be needed in some of these cases. •A central concept for judicial (and clinical) decision making in this area is a patient's “best interests”. Yet what this term means is contested. •There is an emerging Supreme Court jurisprudence that sheds light on when life-sustaining treatment will, or will not, be judged to be in a patient's best interests. •Treatment that is either futile or overly burdensome is not in a patient's best interests. Although courts will consider patient and family wishes, they have generally deferred to the views of medical practitioners about treatment decisions.

Voluntary palliated starvation : A lawful and ethical way to die?

Increasingly, individuals want control over their own destiny. This includes the way in which they die and the timing of their death. The desire for self-determination at the end of life is one of the drivers for the ever-increasing number of jurisdictions overseas that are legalising voluntary euthanasia and/or assisted suicide, and for the continuous attempts to reform state and territory law in Australia. Despite public support for law reform in this field, legislative change in Australia is unlikely in the near future given the current political landscape. We argue that there may be another solution which provides competent adults with control over their death and to have any pain and symptoms managed by doctors, but which is currently lawful and consistent with prevailing ethical principles. ‘Voluntary palliated starvation’ refers to the process which occurs when a competent individual chooses to stop eating and drinking, and receives palliative care to address pain, suffering and symptoms that may be experienced by the individual as he or she approaches death. In this article, we argue that, at least in some circumstances, such a death would be lawful for the individual and doctors involved, and consistent with principles of medical ethics.

Property rights in and entitlement to possession of sperm following death

In May 2011, the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Jocelyn Edwards; re the estate of the late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478 granted an application by a wife, in her capacity as administrator of her late husband's estate, to possession of sperm extracted from the body of her late husband.

The Australian litigation landscape - Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery and general dentistry (oral surgery procedures): An analysis of litigation cases

Background: There are persistent concerns about litigation in the dental and medical professions. These concerns arise in a setting where general dentists are more frequently undertaking a wider range of oral surgery procedures, potentially increasing legal risk. Methods: Judicial cases dealing with medical negligence in the fields of general dentistry (oral surgery procedure) and Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery were located using the three main legal databases. Relevant cases were analysed to determine the procedures involved, the patients’ claims of injury, findings of negligence, and damages awarded. A thematic analysis of the cases was undertaken to determine trends. Results: Fifteen cases over a twenty-year period were located across almost all Australian jurisdictions (eight cases involved general dentists; seven cases involved Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons). Eleven of the fifteen cases involved determinations of whether or not the practitioner had failed in their duty of care; negligence was found in six cases. Eleven of the fifteen cases related to molar extractions (eight specifically to third molar). Conclusions: Dental and medical practitioners wanting to manage legal risk should have regard to circumstances arising in judicial cases. Adequate warning of risks is critical, as is offering referral in appropriate cases. Pre-operative radiographs, good medical records, and processes to ensure appropriate follow-up are also important.

The doctrine of necessity and the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment: Is there any justification?

In Australia, the legal basis for the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment is ad hoc and unclear. There is no comprehensive legal framework that authorises and regulates the detention of, for example, older people with dementia in locked wards or in residential aged care, people with disability in residential services or people with acquired brain injury in hospital and rehabilitation services. This paper focuses on whether the common law doctrine of necessity (or its statutory equivalents) should have a role in permitting the detention and restraint of people with disabilities. Traditionally, the defence of necessity has been recognised as an excuse, where the defendant, faced by a situation of imminent peril, is excused from the criminal or civil liability because of the extraordinary circumstances they find themselves in. In the United Kingdom, however, in In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) and R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L, the House of Lords broadened the defence so that it operated as a justification for treatment, detention and restraint outside of the emergency context. This paper outlines the distinction between necessity as an excuse and as a defence, and identifies a number of concerns with the latter formulation: problems of democracy, integrity, obedience, objectivity and safeguards. Australian courts are urged to reject the United Kingdom approach and retain an excuse-based defence, as the risks of permitting the essentially utilitarian model of necessity as a justification are too great.