“Show me a bad kid and I’ll show you a lousy parent” : making parents responsible for youth crime in Australian and Canadian contexts

In this article we survey relevant international literature on the issue of parental liability and responsibility for the crimes of young offenders. In addition, as a starting point for needed cross-jurisdictional research, we focus on different approaches that have been taken to making parents responsible for youth crime in Australia and Canada. This comparative analysis of Australian and Canadian legislative and policy approaches is situated within a broader discussion of arguments about parental responsibility, the ‘punitive turn’ in youth justice, and cross-jurisdictional criminal justice policy transfer and convergence. One unexpected finding of our literature survey is the relatively sparse attention given to the issue of parental responsibility for youth crime in legal and criminological literature compared to the attention it receives in the media and popular-public culture. In Part I we examine the different views that have been articulated in the social science literature for and against parental responsibility laws, along with arguments that have been made about why such laws have been enacted in an increasing number of Western countries in recent years. In Part II, we situate our comparative study of Australian and Canadian legislative and policy approaches within a broader discussion of arguments about the ‘punitive turn’ in youth justice, responsibilisation, and cross-jurisdictional criminal justice policy transfer and convergence. In Part III, we identify and examine the scope of different parental responsibility laws that have been enacted in Australia and Canada; noting significant differences in the manner and extent to which parental responsibility laws and policies have been invoked as part of the solution to dealing with youth crime. In our concluding discussion, in Part IV, we try to speculate on some of the reasons for these differences and set an agenda for needed future research on the topic.

Juvenile justice in Queensland and Canada : new legislation reflecting new directions

Due to their similar colonial histories and common law heritage, Australia and Canada provide an ideal comparative context for examining legislation reflecting new directions in the field of juvenile justice. Toward this end, this article compares the revised juvenile justice legislation which came into force in Queensland and Canada in 2003 (Canada, Youth Criminal Justice Act, enacted on 19 February 2002 and proclaimed in force 1 April 2003; Queensland, Juvenile Justice Act, amended 2003). There are a series of questions that could be addressed including: How similar and how sweeping have been the legislative changes introduced in each jurisdiction?; What are likely to be some of the effects of the implementation of these new legislative regimes?; and, how well does the legislation enacted in either jurisdiction address the fundamental difficulties experienced by children who have been caught up in juvenile justice systems? This article addresses mainly the first of these questions, offering a systematic comparison of recent Queensland and Canadian legislative changes. Although, due to the recentness of these changes, there is no data available to assess long-term effects, anecdotal evidence and preliminary research findings from our comparative study are offered to provide a start at answering the second question. We also offer critical yet sympathetic comments on the ability of legislation to address the fundamental difficulties experienced by children caught up in juvenile justice systems. Specifically, we conclude that while more than simple legislative responses are required to address the difficulties faced by youth offenders, and especially overrepresented Indigenous young offenders, the amended Queensland and new Canadian legislation appear to provide some needed reforms that can be used to help address some of these fundamental difficulties.

Researching crime and violence: Untold stories from the field

Undertaking empirical research on crime and violence can be a tricky enterprise fraught with ethical, methodological, intellectual and legal implications. This chapter takes readers on a reflective journey through the qualitative methodologies I used to research sex work in Kings Cross, miscarriages of justice, female delinquency, sexual violence, and violence in rural and regional settings over a period of nearly 30 years. Reflecting on these experiences, the chapter explores and analyses the reality of doing qualitative field research, the role of the researcher, the politics of subjectivity, the exercise of power, and the ‘muddiness’ of the research process, which is often overlooked in sanitised accounts of the research process (Byrne-Armstrong, Higgs and Horsfall, 2001; Davies, 2000).

Finding a way through the ethical and legal maze : withdrawing medical treatment and euthanasia

This article examines Finnis' and Keown's claim that the intention/foresight distinction should be used as the basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawing medical treatment, rather than the act/omission distinction which is currently used. I argue that whilst the intention/foresight distinction is sound and can apply to palliative pain relief hastening death, it cannot be applied to withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. Instead, the act/omission distinction remains the better basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawal, and law reform is consequently unnecessary.

Punitiveness and the criminalisation of the other : State wards, unlawful non-citizens and Indigenous youth

This paper explores the genealogies of bio-power that cut across punitive state interventions aimed at regulating or normalising several distinctive ‘problem’ or ‘suspect’ deviant populations, such as state wards, non-lawful citizens and Indigenous youth. It begins by making some general comments about the theoretical approach to bio-power taken in this paper. It then outlines the distinctive features of bio-power in Australia and how these intersected with the emergence of penal welfarism to govern the unruly, unchaste, unlawful, and the primitive. The paper draws on three examples to illustrate the argument – the gargantuan criminalisation rates of Aboriginal youth, the history of incarcerating state wards in state institutions, and the mandatory detention of unlawful non-citizens and their children. The construction of Indigenous people as a dangerous presence, alongside the construction of the unruly neglected children of the colony — the larrikin descendants of convicts as necessitating special regimes of internal controls and institutions, found a counterpart in the racial and other exclusionary criteria operating through immigration controls for much of the twentieth century. In each case the problem child or population was expelled from the social body through forms of bio-power, rationalised as strengthening, protecting or purifying the Australian population.

Omissions, causation and responsibility

In this paper I discuss a recent exchange of articles between Hugh McLachlan and John Coggon on the relationship between omissions, causation and moral responsibility. My aim is to contribute to their debate by isolating a presupposition I believe they both share, and by questioning that presupposition. The presupposition is that, at any given moment, there are countless things that I am omitting to do. This leads them both to give a distorted account of the relationship between causation and moral or (as the case may be) legal responsibility, and, in the case of Coggon, to claim that the law’s conception of causation is a fiction based on policy. Once it is seen that this presupposition is faulty, we can attain a more accurate view of the logical relationship between causation and moral responsibility in the case of omissions. This is important because it will enable us, in turn, to understand why the law continues to regard omissions as different, both logically and morally, from acts, and why the law seeks to track that logical and moral difference in the legal distinction it draws between withholding life-sustaining measures and euthanasia.

Drawing the line : the legal status and treatment of the 17-year-old accused in Queensland

Seventeen year olds who come into contact with the police in Queensland are classified as adults and are not afforded the protections available under the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) (YJA). As with any other adult, their offences are dealt with under a raft of legislative provisions including the Criminal Code 1889 (Qld) (the Code), the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) (PPRA) and the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (PSA). This article argues that this situation is unfair and contravenes international human rights agreements which Australia has ratified, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC). Article 1 of that Convention defines a child as a person under the age of 18. The youth offences legislation in Queensland only applies to those who have not yet turned 17. This article examines the effects of this anomaly in Queensland, focusing in particular on the pre-adjudication treatment of ‘17 year old adults’.

How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?

The purpose of this paper is to provide a basis from which to start an informed and rational dialogue in Australia about voluntary euthanasia (VE) and assisted suicide (AS). It does this by seeking to chart the broad landscape of issues that can be raised as relevant to how this conduct should be regulated by the law. It is not our purpose to persuade. Rather, we have attempted to address the issues as neutrally as possible and to canvass both sides of the argument in an even-handed manner. We hope that this exercise places the reader in a position to consider the question posed by this paper: How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide? In line with the approach taken in the paper, this question does not take sides in the debate. It simply asks how VE and AS should be regulated, acknowledging that both prohibition and legalisation of such conduct involve regulation. We begin by considering the wider legal framework that governs end of life decision-making. Decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment that result in a person’s death can be lawful. This could be because, for example, a competent adult refuses such treatment. Alternatively, stopping or not providing treatment can be lawful when it is no longer in a person’s best interests to receive it. The law also recognises that appropriate palliative care should not attract criminal responsibility. By contrast, VE and AS are unlawful in Australia and could lead to prosecution for crimes such as murder, manslaughter or aiding and abetting suicide. But this is not to say that such conduct does not occur in practice. Indeed, there is a body of evidence that VE and AS occur in Australia, despite them being unlawful. There have been repeated efforts to change the law in this country, mainly by the minor political parties. However, apart from a brief period when VE and AS was lawful in the Northern Territory, these attempts to reform the law have been unsuccessful. The position is different in a small but increasing number of jurisdictions overseas where such conduct is lawful. The most well known is the Netherlands but there are also statutory regimes that regulate VE and/or AS in Belgium and Luxembourg in Europe, and Oregon and Washington in the United States. A feature of these legislative models is that they incorporate review or oversight processes that enable the collection of data about how the law is being used. As a result, there is a significant body of evidence that is available for consideration to assess the operation of the law in these jurisdictions and some of this is considered briefly here. Assisting a suicide, if done for selfless motives, is also legal in Switzerland, and this has resulted in what has been referred to as ‘euthanasia tourism’. This model is also considered. The paper also identifies the major arguments in favour of, and against, legalisation of VE and AS. Arguments often advanced in favour of law reform include respect for autonomy, that public opinion favours reform, and that the current law is incoherent and discriminatory. Key arguments against legalising VE and AS point to the sanctity of life, concerns about the adequacy and effectiveness of safeguards, and a ‘slippery slope’ that will allow euthanasia to occur for minors or for adults where it is not voluntary. We have also attempted to step beyond these well trodden and often rehearsed cases ‘for and against’. To this end, we have identified some ethical values that might span both sides of the debate and perhaps be the subject of wider consensus. We then outline a framework for considering the issue of how Australia should regulate VE and AS. We begin by asking whether such conduct should be criminal acts (as they presently are). If VE and AS should continue to attract criminal responsibility, the next step is to enquire whether the law should punish such conduct more or less than is presently the case, or whether the law should stay the same. If a change is favoured as to how the criminal law punishes VE and AS, options considered include sentencing reform, creating context-specific offences or developing prosecutorial guidelines for how the criminal justice system deals with these issues. If VE and AS should not be criminal acts, then questions arise as to how and when they should be permitted and regulated. Possible elements of any reform model include: ensuring decision-making is competent and voluntary; ascertaining a person’s eligibility to utilise the regime, for example, whether it depends on him or her having a terminal illness or experiencing pain and suffering; and setting out processes for how any decision must be made and evidenced. Options to bring about decriminalisation include challenging the validity of laws that make VE and AS unlawful, recognising a defence to criminal prosecution, or creating a statutory framework to regulate the practice. We conclude the paper where we started: with a call for rational and informed consideration of a difficult and sensitive issue. How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?

Australian laws and policies on child neglect

This chapter describes the features of different Australian State and Territory laws and policies about child neglect. It makes observations about three major domains of law and policy: laws about child neglect to enable protection of children who are suffering severe neglect (child protection laws); laws and policies about the provision of services for children and their families when experiencing neglect (support-oriented laws and policies); and criminal laws about child neglect.

Cameron's hot air. Pollution, fraud and the politics of carbon emissions

It is widely recognised that exposure to air pollutants affect pulmonary and lung dysfunction as well as a range of neurological and vascular disorders. The rapid increase of worldwide carbon emissions continues to compromise environmental sustainability whilst contributing to premature death. Moreover, the harms caused by air pollution have a more pernicious reach, such as being the major source of climate change and ‘natural disasters’, which reportedly kills millions of people each year (World Health Organization, 2012). The opening quotations tell a story of the UK government's complacency towards the devastation of toxic and contaminating air emissions. The above headlines greeted the British public earlier this year after its government was taken to the Court of Appeal for an appalling air pollution record that continues to cause the premature deaths of 30,000 British people each year at a health cost estimated at £20 billion per annum. This combined with pending legal proceedings against the UK government for air pollution violations by the European Commission, point to a Cameron government that prioritises hot air and profit margins over human lives. The UK's legal air pollution regimes are an industry dominated process that relies on negotiation and partnership between regulators and polluters. The entire model seeks to assist business compliance rather than punish corporate offenders. There is no language of ‘crime’ in relation to UK air pollution violations but rather a discourse of ‘exceedence’ (Walters, 2010). It is a regulatory system not premised on the ‘polluter pay’ principle but instead the ‘polluter profit’ principle.

Green crime and the role of environmental courts

Environmental issues continue to capture international headlines and remain the subject of intense intellectual, political and public debate. As a result, environmental law is widely recognised as the fastest growing area of international jurisprudence. This, combined with the rapid expansion of environmental agreements and policies, has created a burgeoning landscape of administrative, regulatory and judicial regimes. Emerging from these developments are increases in environmental offences, and more recently environmental crimes. The judicial processing of environmental or ‘green’ crimes is rapidly developing across many jurisdictions. Since 1979, Australia has played a lead role in criminal justice processing of environment offences through the New South Wales Land and Environment Court (NSW LEC). This article draws on case data, observations and interviews with court personnel, to examine the ways in which environmental justice is now administered through the existing court structures, and how it has changed since the Court’s inception.

How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?

This paper invites consideration of how Australia should regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. We have attempted to pose this question as neutrally as possible, acknowledging that both prohibition and legalisation of such conduct involve decisions about regulation. We begin by charting the wider field of law at the end of life, before considering the repeated, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempts at law reform in Australia. The situation in Australia is contrasted with permissive jurisdictions overseas where voluntary euthanasia and/or assisted suicide are lawful. We consider the arguments for and against legalisation of such conduct along with the available empirical evidence as to what happens in practice both in Australia and overseas. The paper concludes by outlining a framework for deliberating on how Australia should regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. We ask a threshold question of whether such conduct should be criminal acts (as they presently are), the answer to which then leads to a range of possible regulatory options.

Prosecutorial guidelines for voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide : autonomy, public confidence and high quality decision-making

This article proposes offence-specific guidelines for how prosecutorial discretion should be exercised in cases of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. Similar guidelines have been produced in England and Wales but we consider them to be deficient in a number of respects, including that they lack a set of coherent guiding principles. In light of these concerns, we outline an approach to constructing alternative guidelines that begins with identifying three guiding principles that we argue are appropriate for this purpose: respect for autonomy, the need for high quality prosecutorial decision-making and the importance of public confidence in that decision-making.