L'Union européenne face aux BRICS dans la gouvernance mondiale: Une réponse efficace? = The European Union facing the BRICS countries in world governance: an effective response? Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Paper 2/2014

Le présent travail se concentre sur deux principaux acteurs du monde en évolution, l'Union européenne (UE) et l'ensemble des pays BRICS, et le défi que posent collectivement ces derniers à la première sur la base de leurs poids économique et politique accrus dans le cadre de la gouvernance mondiale. On fait valoir que la doctrine d’un « multilatéralisme efficace » décrivant la position de l’UE sur la gouvernance mondiale est de plus en plus remise en cause par les BRICS dont l’approche repose sur un autre principe : celui d’un « multilatéralisme relationnel ». Afin de pouvoir analyser comment l’UE réagit à la confiance et la cohérence croissante des BRICS dans les instances internationales, ce travail examine la réponse de l’UE dans trois domaines de la gouvernance mondiale que sont le commerce, le changement climatique et la sécurité internationale. Ceci permet d’évaluer dans quelle mesure les différentes institutions européennes mettent en œuvre ce que ce travail qualifie de « réponse efficace » à la montée en puissance des BRICS. Au terme de l’analyse, cette étude s’attache à souligner que la réaction des institutions de l’UE à l'influence grandissante des BRICS sur la scène internationale ne peut être considérée comme efficace que dans le domaine du changement climatique.

Dealing with the Fallout: West Germany's Response to the Solange Decision (1974). ACES Working Papers, 2011

The European Union's powerful legal system has proven to be the vanguard moment in the process of European integration. As early as the 1960s, the European Court of Justice established an effective and powerful supranational legal order, beyond the original wording of the Treaties of Rome through the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. Whereas scholars have analyzed the evolution of EU case law and its implications, only very recent historical scholarship has examined how the Member States received this process in the context of a number of difficult political and economic crises for the integration process. This paper investigates how the national level dealt with these fundamental transformations in the European legal system. Specifically, it examines one of the Union's most important member states, the Federal Republic of Germany. Faced with a huge number of cases dealing with European law, German judges dealt with the supremacy of European law very cautiously, negotiating between increasingly polarized academic, public and ministerial debates on the question throughout the 1960s. By the mid 1970s, the German Constitutional Court famously limited the power of the ECJ in its Solange decision (1974). This was an expression of a broader discourse in Germany from 1968 onwards about the qualitative nature of democracy and participation in public life and was in some aspects a marker, at which the German elites felt comfortable expressing the value of their national constitutional system on the European stage. This paper examines the political, media and academic build up and response to the Constitutional Court's decision in the 1970s, arguing that the national "reception" is central to understanding the dynamics and evolution of European Union legal history.

The European Union’s Response to Piracy: Are the Lessons Learned in the Horn of Africa a Model for the Gulf of Guinea? EU Diplomacy Paper/2015

The European Union (EU) is seen as the leading actor in successfully fighting piracy around the Horn of Africa. As a global trade power with strong economic interests, the EU is also challenged by similar maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea. To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis to assess the potential transfer of successful EU instruments from the Horn of Africa to the piracy situation in West African waters. This paper examines to what extent the EU can draw on its experience made in the Horn of Africa to deter piracy in West African waters. Based on qualitative research interviews, lessons learned from East Africa are identified and subsequently applied to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea. The results show that the EU is only partially drawing on its experience made in the Horn of Africa. One the one hand, it is rather reluctant to use crisis management instruments such as naval operations. On the other hand, the EU is drawing on its successful leadership in international political and military cooperation from around the Horn of Africa in order to make more effective use of available resources in the Gulf of Guinea.