Information as Property

Information is widely regarded as one of the key concepts of modern society. The production, distribution and use of information are some of the key aspects of modern economies. Driven by technological progress information has become a good in its own right. This established an information economy and challenged the law to provide an apt framework suitable to promote the production of information, enable its distribution and efficient allocation, and deal with the risks inherent in information technology. Property rights are a major component of such a framework. However, information as an object of property rights is not limited to intellectual property but may also occur as personality aspects or even tangible property. Accordingly, information as property can be found in the area of intellectual property, personality protection and other property rights. This essay attempts to categorize three different types of information that can be understood as a good in the economic sense and an object in the legal sense: semantic information, syntactic information and structural information. It shows how legal ownership of such information is established by different subjective rights. In addition the widespread debate regarding the justification of intellectual property rights is demonstrated from the wider perspective of informational property in general. Finally, in light of current debates, this essay explores whether “data producers” shall have a new kind of property right in data.

The Right to Be Forgotten More Than a Pandora’s Box?

Recently, political voices have stressed the need to introduce a right to be forgotten as new human right. Individuals should have the right to make potentially damaging information disappear after a certain time has elapsed. Such new right, however, can come in conflict with the principle of free speech. Therefore, its scope needs to be evaluated in the light of appropriate data protection rules. Insofar, a more user-centered approach is to be realized. “Delete” can not be a value as such, but must be balanced within a new legal framework.

Privacy as human flourishing: Could a shift towards virtue ethics strengthen privacy protection in the age of Big Data?

Privacy is commonly seen as an instrumental value in relation to negative freedom, human dignity and personal autonomy. Article 8 ECHR, protecting the right to privacy, was originally coined as a doctrine protecting the negative freedom of citizens in vertical relations, that is between citizen and state. Over the years, the Court has extended privacy protection to horizontal relations and has gradually accepted that individual autonomy is an equally important value underlying the right to privacy. However, in most of the recent cases regarding Article 8 ECHR, the Court goes beyond the protection of negative freedom and individual autonomy and instead focuses self-expression, personal development and human flourishing. Accepting this virtue ethical notion, in addition to the traditional Kantian focus on individual autonomy and human dignity, as a core value of Article 8 ECHR may prove vital for the protection of privacy in the age of Big Data.

On the Search for an Adequate Scope of the Right to Be Forgotten

During the last decades, the virtual world increasingly gained importance and in this context the enforcement of privacy rights became more and more difficult. An important emanation of this trend is the right to be forgotten enshrining the protection of the data subject’s rights over his/her “own” data. Even though the right to be forgotten has been made part of the proposal for a completely revised Data Protection Regulation and has recently been acknowledged by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“Google/Spain” decision), to date, the discussions about the right and especially its implementation with regard to the fundamental right to freedom of expression have remained rather vague and need to be examined in more depth.