Políticas de recursos humanos do Banco do Brasil: o discurso e a prática, caminhos de compatibilização

This study has as objective to present a proposal to analyze the politics of the Human Resource of the Bank of Brazil utilizing the Theory of sign" (semiotic) as a theory tool, connecting to the organizational usages that had been historically stable and a new speech from the directory body that search for excellence and modernity. It¿s necessary to identify the adequate strategies to manage human resources in a businesses considered excellent and that the Bank search to utilize (benchmarking), doing a semiotic cut, in other words, isolating the communicative aspect, to find how she produces the understanding of what really need to be done at the company. If the purpose of the Bank of Brazil is to reunite an associated team, guided to results progressively better, that makes it even more competitive, and achieve its mission "to be the solution to services and the finance intermediation, to attend the expectation of clients and shareholders, to fortify the liability between the public functionary and the company and to be useful to society", should implement a model weaved in the daily one of organization to start from the creation of adequate institutional channels rewards (promotions, direct or indirect salaries, training) that privilege the aptitude an constant learning. Through the bibliographical research, will be looked to select illustrious representative texts of the specialized literature that corroborates the idea that the Bank of Brazil possess the necessary management tools to a good management of Human Resources, lacking adjust them, through the acquisition of abilities. For in such a way one will search in internal documents, data on the management of the company, interpreting them to the light of the bibliographical research. Finally it will be included participant comment as link between the theory and the practical one, the speech and the action."

Parcerias público-privadas na presença de seleção adversa: uma análise numérica

Esta dissertação propõe-se a analisar a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas (PPP) em um ambiente de seleção adversa. Mais especi calmente, analiso se as tarefas de construir e operar uma infraestrutura para serviços públicos deve ser realizada por um consórcio ou se devem ser realizadas por fi rmas contratadas separadamente. Para tal, diferentemente da literatura existente para o problema, focadas nos problemas de contratos incompletos e moral hazard, construo um modelo de seleção adversa multidimensional, onde as firrmas possuem informação privada e podem exercer um esforço não observável em cada atividade, com a existência de externalidade entre as tarefas, em uma extensão do modelo de La¤ont e Tirole (1986). Após defi nir algumas condições sob as quais PPP domina os meios usuais de contratação, utilizo de uma análise numérica para melhor compreender a solução do modelo, que se mostra altamente dependente da correlação entre os parâmetros de informação privada das firmas.

Terceirização de serviços públicos e reforma gerencial: o caso Secretaria da Fazenda de Pernambuco

A terceirização de serviços é considerada uma ferramenta de gestão em tempos atuais. Essa modalidade de contratação de serviços se expande em qualquer das esferas pública ou privada. Nesta última, a globalização da economia e a competição desenfreada pelo mundo impulsionam a produtividade e a otimização das etapas da produção substituindo custo fixo por variável. Na esfera pública, a partir da década de 1970, a crise fiscal prevaleceu na maioria das discussões, sugerindo a idéia neoliberal de limitar a intervenção do Estado na economia para conter o déficit público. Emerge a solução reformista de isolar num pequeno núcleo as atividades principais, que são exclusivas do Estado e intransferíveis a terceiros. Por meio da desestatização, um dos eixos da reforma, os serviços sociais são publicizáveis e a produção de bens e de serviços públicos entregues ao mercado. O foco deste trabalho se concentra na apuração do resultado que subsidie estrategicamente a Secretaria da Fazenda do Estado de Pernambuco, em termos financeiros e de eficiência administrativa, a escolher a opção mais vantajosa para a Administração entre contratar servidores efetivos via concurso público para realizar as atividades acessórias de apoio ou terceirizar os serviços.

Isolated capital cities and misgovernance: theory and evidence

Motivated by a novel stylized fact { countries with isolated capital cities display worse quality of governance { we provide a framework of endogenous institutional choice based on the idea that elites are constrained by the threat of rebellion, and that this threat is rendered less e ective by distance from the seat of political power. In established democracies, the threat of insurgencies is not a binding constraint, and the model predicts no correlation between isolated capitals and misgovernance. In contrast, a correlation emerges in equilibrium in the case of autocracies. Causality runs both ways: broader power sharing (associated with better governance) means that any rents have to be shared more broadly, hence the elite has less of an incentive to protect its position by isolating the capital city; conversely, a more isolated capital city allows the elite to appropriate a larger share of output, so the costs of better governance for the elite, in terms of rents that would have to be shared, are larger. We show evidence that this pattern holds true robustly in the data. We also show that isolated capitals are associated with less power sharing, a larger income premium enjoyed by capital city inhabitants, and lower levels of military spending by ruling elites, as predicted by the theory.

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

Historically, payment systems and capital intermediation interact. Friedman (1959), and many observers of bank instabilities, have ad- vocated separating depositary from credit institutions. His proposal meets today an ever-increasing provision of inside money, and a short- age of monetary models of bank intermediation. In this paper, we eval- uate the proposal from a new angle, with a model in which isolating a safe payments system from commercial intermediation undermines information complementarities in banking activities. Some features of the environment resemble the models in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).