Beyond common priors

One property (called action-consistency) that is implicit in the common prior assumption (CPA) is identified and shown to be the driving force of the use of the CPA in a class of well-known results. In particular, we show that Aumann (1987)’s Bayesian characterization of correlated equilibrium, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)’s epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, and Milgrom and Stokey (1982)’s no-trade theorem are all valid without the CPA but with action-consistency. Moreover, since we show that action-consistency is much less restrictive than the CPA, the above results are more general than previously thought, and insulated from controversies around the CPA.

Uncertainty aversion and the optmal choice of portfolio

In this paper we apply the theory of declsion making with expected utility and non-additive priors to the choice of optimal portfolio. This theory describes the behavior of a rational agent who i5 averse to pure 'uncertainty' (as well as, possibly, to 'risk'). We study the agent's optimal allocation of wealth between a safe and an uncertain asset. We show that there is a range of prices at which the agent neither buys not sells short the uncertain asset. In contrast the standard theory of expected utility predicts that there is exactly one such price. We also provide a definition of an increase in uncertainty aversion and show that it causes the range of prices to increase.

The Bayesian Foundations of solution concepts of games

We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the pr iors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors and so on.We provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successfulIy eliminate strategies which are not best responses. This paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively unàominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984». Moreover, sufficient condi tions are also found for Nash equilibrium behavior. We also provide Aumann's (1985) results on correlated equilibria .

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences

Recently Kajii and (2008) proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have Gilboa--Schmeidler's MaxMin expected utility preferences, they only propose a sufficient condition. The objective of this paper is to complete Kajii and Ui's work by proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for interim efficiency for various models of ambiguity aversion and in particular MaxMin expected utility. Our proof is based on a direct application of some results proposed by Rigotti, Shannon and Stralecki (2008).

Divergências entre o parecer prévio do Tribunal de Contas do Estado (TCE) e o resultado do julgamento das contas anuais de prefeitos em Pernambuco

Este estudo tem como objetivo identificar quais os fundamentos que levam algumas Câmaras Municipais pernambucanas a não acompanhar o parecer prévio do Tribunal de Contas do Estado no julgamento das contas anuais dos prefeitos. Tendo em vista que uma parcela significativa dos julgamentos das contas anuais dos prefeitos realizados pelas Câmaras Municipais não tem acompanhado as recomendações emitidas nos Pareceres Prévios do TCE, inicialmente foram identificadas as abordagens teóricas sobre a estrutura da relação do executivo com o legislativo que oferecem subsídios para o entendimento da face política das Câmaras Municipais nestes julgamentos. Destacou-se também o aspecto técnicoadministrativo viabilizado pelo processo legislativo do julgamento das contas, passível da análise e solicitação de revisão judicial pelo Ministério Público com vistas à anulação, caso não apresente motivação legal formalmente registrada que atenda às disposições constitucionais. O estudo foi realizado por meio de pesquisa bibliográfica, documental e de campo, por meio de entrevistas semiestruturadas com vereadores das Câmaras Municipais pernambucanas. A metodologia qualitativa de análise de conteúdo foi escolhida para a análise dos dados. Os resultados da pesquisa permitiram identificar que os fundamentos que levam algumas Câmaras Municipais pernambucanas a não acompanhar o parecer prévio do Tribunal de Contas no julgamento das contas anuais dos prefeitos não estão formalmente evidenciados no processo legislativo pertinente, cujos documentos oficiais pesquisados não atendem aos requisitos legais de motivação, nem tampouco explicam as razões do não acompanhamento do parecer prévio do TCE. A opinião dos vereadores entrevistados conduz ao entendimento de que tais fundamentos são de natureza política, em detrimento dos fundamentos técnicos, explicados pela relação de preponderância do executivo sobre o poder legislativo municipal.

Três ensaios sobre política monetária e crédito

In the first essay, "Determinants of Credit Expansion in Brazil", analyzes the determinants of credit using an extensive bank level panel dataset. Brazilian economy has experienced a major boost in leverage in the first decade of 2000 as a result of a set factors ranging from macroeconomic stability to the abundant liquidity in international financial markets before 2008 and a set of deliberate decisions taken by President Lula's to expand credit, boost consumption and gain political support from the lower social strata. As relevant conclusions to our investigation we verify that: credit expansion relied on the reduction of the monetary policy rate, international financial markets are an important source of funds, payroll-guaranteed credit and investment grade status affected positively credit supply. We were not able to confirm the importance of financial inclusion efforts. The importance of financial sector sanity indicators of credit conditions cannot be underestimated. These results raise questions over the sustainability of this expansion process and financial stability in the future. The second essay, “Public Credit, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability”, discusses the role of public credit. The supply of public credit in Brazil has successfully served to relaunch the economy after the Lehman-Brothers demise. It was later transformed into a driver for economic growth as well as a regulation device to force private banks to reduce interest rates. We argue that the use of public funds to finance economic growth has three important drawbacks: it generates inflation, induces higher loan rates and may induce financial instability. An additional effect is the prevention of market credit solutions. This study contributes to the understanding of the costs and benefits of credit as a fiscal policy tool. The third essay, “Bayesian Forecasting of Interest Rates: Do Priors Matter?”, discusses the choice of priors when forecasting short-term interest rates. Central Banks that commit to an Inflation Target monetary regime are bound to respond to inflation expectation spikes and product hiatus widening in a clear and transparent way by abiding to a Taylor rule. There are various reports of central banks being more responsive to inflationary than to deflationary shocks rendering the monetary policy response to be indeed non-linear. Besides that there is no guarantee that coefficients remain stable during time. Central Banks may switch to a dual target regime to consider deviations from inflation and the output gap. The estimation of a Taylor rule may therefore have to consider a non-linear model with time varying parameters. This paper uses Bayesian forecasting methods to predict short-term interest rates. We take two different approaches: from a theoretic perspective we focus on an augmented version of the Taylor rule and include the Real Exchange Rate, the Credit-to-GDP and the Net Public Debt-to-GDP ratios. We also take an ”atheoretic” approach based on the Expectations Theory of the Term Structure to model short-term interest. The selection of priors is particularly relevant for predictive accuracy yet, ideally, forecasting models should require as little a priori expert insight as possible. We present recent developments in prior selection, in particular we propose the use of hierarchical hyper-g priors for better forecasting in a framework that can be easily extended to other key macroeconomic indicators.