The impact of structured teaching methods on the quality of education

This paper estimates the impact of the use of structured methods on the quality of education of the students in primary public school in Brazil. Structure methods encompass a range of pedagogical and managerial instruments applied to the education system. In recent years, several municipalities in the State of São Paulo have contracted out private educational providers to implement these structured methods in their schooling system. Their pedagogical proposal involves structuring curriculum contents, elaboration and use of teachers and students textbooks, and training and supervision of the teachers and instructors. Using a difference in differences estimation strategy, we find that the fourth and eighth grader students in the municipalities with structured methods performed better in Portuguese and Math than students in municipalities not exposed to the methods. We find no differences in approval rates. However, a robustness check is not able to discard the possibility that unobserved municipal characteristics may affect the results.

Public investment in basic education and economic growth

The main objective of this paper was to visualize the relation between government spending on basic education and the human capital accumulation process, observing the impacts of this spending on individual investments in higher education, and on economic growth. It is used an overlapping-generations model where the government tax the adult generation and spent it in basic education of the next generations. It was demonstrated that the magnitude of the marginal effect of government spending in basic education on growth crucially depends on public budget constrains. The paper explains why some countries with a lot of public investment in basic education growth at low rates. In that sense if a country has only a lot of public investment in basic education without investment in higher education it may growth at low rates because the taxation can cause distortions in the agents incentives to invest in higher education.

Is 'tagging' a rationale for affirmative action in education?

In this paper, we try to rationalize the existence of one of the most common affirmative action policies: educational quotas. We model a two period economy with asymmetric information and endogenous human capital formation. Individuals may be from two different groups in the population, where each group is defined by an observable and exogenous characteristic. The distribution of skills differ across groups. We introduce educational quotas into the model by letting the planner reduce the effort cost that a student from one of the groups has to endure in order to be accepted into a university. Affirmative action policies can be interpreted as a form of ``tagging" since group characteristics are used as proxies for productivity. We find that although educational quotas are usually efficient, they need not subsidize the education of the low skill group.