Access to knoledge in Brazil: new research on intellectual property, innovation and development

The present volume is the fruit of a research initiative on Access to Knowledge begun in 2004 by Yochai Benkler, Eddan Katz, and myself. Access to Knowledge is both a social movement and an approach to international and domestic policy. In the present era of globalization, intellectual property and information and communications technology are major determinants of wealth and power. The principle of access to knowledge argues that we best serve both human rights and economic development through policies that make knowledge, knowledge-creating tools, and nowledgeembedded goods as widely available as possible for decentralized innovation and use. Open technological standards, a balanced approach to intellectual property rights, and expansion of an open telecommunications infrastructure enable ordinary people around the world to benefit from the technological advances of the information age and allow them to generate a vibrant, participatory and democratic culture. Law plays a crucial role in securing access to knowledge, determining whether knowledge and knowledge goods are shared widely for the benefit of all, or controlled and monopolized for the benefit of a few.

Improvements and alternatives to intellectual property: a survey

Uma parcela importante do crescimento econômico é devida a inovações. Esta dissertação revisa a literatura recente em propriedade intelectual. Esta revisão discute os seguintes artigos: Kremer (1998), Boldrin e Levine (2001), Kremer (2001), Shavell e Ypersele (2001), Lerner (2002) e DiMasi, Hansen e Grabowski (2003). Estes contém tanto artigos empíricos quanto teóricos. Na primeira categoria está um artigo sobre efeitos na inovação de mudanças na força das patentes e outro sobre custo de desenvolver novos medicamentos. Os estudos teóricos propõem melhorias e alternativas ao sistema de patentes, por exemplo, recompensas opcionais, compras de patentes, eliminação de patentes em alguns setores e compromisso de compra prévio.

Intellectual property and competition as complementary policies: a test using an ordered probit model

Este Artigo Testa a Proposição da Teoria Econômica de que Propriedade Intelectual e Defesa da Concorrência são Políticas Complementares. um Modelo Probit Ordenado é Utilizado para Estimar os Efeitos Marginais do Uso e Qualidade do Enforcement dos Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual em uma Medida da Gravidade dos Problemas Relacionados À Concorrência. os Resultados Obtidos Reforçam a Noção de que as Políticas de Concorrência e Propriedade Intelectual não são Contraditórias.

The impact of property rights and its limits

The empirical evaluation of the effect of land property rights typically suffers from selection problems. The allocation of property rights across households is usually not random but based on wealth, family characteristics, political clientelism, or other mechanisms built on differences between the groups that acquire property rights and the groups that do not. In this paper, we address this selection concern exploiting a natural experiment in the allocation of property rights. Twenty years ago, a homogenous group of squatters occupied a piece of privately owned land in a suburban area of Buenos Aires, Argentina. When the Congress passed an expropriation law transferring the land from the former owners to the squatters, some of the former owners surrendered the land (and received a compensation), while others decide to sue in the slow Argentine courts. These different decisions by the former owners generated an allocation of property rights that is exogenous to the characteristics of the squatters. We take advantage of this natural experiment to evaluate the effect of the allocation of urban land property rights. Our preliminary results show significant effects on housing investment, household size, and school attrition. Contradicting De Soto's hypotheses, we found nonsignificant effects on labor income and access to credit markets.

A model of the rule of law

Economic development requires some limits on what those in power can do | the rule of law | but how can restraints be imposed on the powerful when there is no-one above them? This paper studies equilibrium rules allocating power and resources established by selfinterested incumbents under the threat of rebellions from inside and outside the group in power. Commitment to uphold individuals' rights can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as incumbents would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing endogenously enables incumbents to commit to otherwise time-inconsistent laws by ensuring more people receive rents under the status quo, and thus want to defend it.