Análisis del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional como modelo de guerrilla estética, a la luz de la teoría de la resistencia planteada por Jacques Rancière

Justo ahora, cuando parece haberse agotado el entendimiento del zapatismo como movimiento revolucionario tradicional, esta monografía propone dar un doble salto mortal para destruir las barreras obsoletas de las teorías revolucionarias y aterrizar en lo que Rancière llama la Resistencia de los Sin Parte. El alarido bestial se transforma en palabra para sacudir las estructuras más íntimas del orden y actualizar la pésima partición de los lugares y las funciones comunes en la comunidad. Las partes mal contadas acceden a la palabra para reclamar una partición justa de lo común, e inscribir así las libertades como axiomas para el todo comunitario. Lo descolorido toma color, lo oculto es visto, lo incontado entra en el conteo de las partes, lo que no tiene rostro ni voz es ahora escuchado, las sombras adquieren cuerpos y los cuerpos adquieren vida. La resistencia por la incorporación cambió para siempre la política tradicional mexicana, al punto de que ésta ha dejado de llamarse como tal para quien escribió esta investigación. La palabra común, la imagen del líder Marcos, y los símbolos como el pasamontañas, hacen que la rebelión zapatista sea una rebelión desde y para los sin parte, una voz para incorporar a los sin voz: el rostro indefinido de una máscara que defiende con enjundia a los olvidados y los devuelve a la arena de los vistos. Chiapas habla, los fantasmas resucitan, las partes mal contadas reclaman una justa partición de lo visible en la comunidad. Marcos y los suyo se han salido con la suya.

A Strategic-Equilibrium Based

The strategic equilibrium of an N-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a system composed of a cover collection of subsets of N and a set of extended imputations attainable through such equilibrium cover. The system describes a state of coalitional bargaining stability where every player has a bargaining alternative against any other player to support his corresponding equilibrium claim. Any coalition in the sable system may form and divide the characteristic value function of the coalition as prescribed by the equilibrium payoffs. If syndicates are allowed to form, a formed coalition may become a syndicate using the equilibrium payoffs as disagreement values in bargaining for a part of the complementary coalition incremental value to the grand coalition when formed. The emergent well known-constant sum derived game in partition function is described in terms of parameters that result from incumbent binding agreements. The strategic-equilibrium corresponding to the derived game gives an equal value claim to all players.  This surprising result is alternatively explained in terms of strategic-equilibrium based possible outcomes by a sequence of bargaining stages that when the binding agreements are in the right sequential order, von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN-M) non-discriminatory solutions emerge. In these solutions a preferred branch by a sufficient number of players is identified: the weaker players syndicate against the stronger player. This condition is referred to as the stronger player paradox.  A strategic alternative available to the stronger players to overcome the anticipated not desirable results is to voluntarily lower his bargaining equilibrium claim. In doing the original strategic equilibrium is modified and vN-M discriminatory solutions may occur, but also a different stronger player may emerge that has eventually will have to lower his equilibrium claim. A sequence of such measures converges to the equal opportunity for all vN-M solution anticipated by the strategic equilibrium of partition function derived game.    [298-words]

Heterogeneity and the formation of risk - sharing coalitions

We offer a new explanation of partial risk sharing based on coalition formation and segmentation of society in a risky environment, without assuming limited commitment and imperfect information. Heterogenous individuals in a society freely choose with whom they will share risk. A partition belonging to the core of the membership game obtains. Perfect risk sharing does not necessarily arise. Focusing on mutual insurance rule and assuming that individuals only differ with respect to risk, we show that the core partition is homophily-based. The distribution of risk affects the number and size of these coalitions. Individuals may pay a lower risk premium in riskier societies. A higher heterogeneity in risk leads to a lower degree of risk sharing. We discuss how the endogenous partition of society into risk-sharing coalitions may shed light on empirical evidence on partial risk sharing. The case of heterogenous risk aversion leads to similar results.