Is sociality driven by the costs of dispersal or the benefits of philopatry? A role for kin-discrimination mechanisms.

The role of ecological constraints in promoting sociality is currently much debated. Using a direct-fitness approach, we show this role to depend on the kin-discrimination mechanisms underlying social interactions. Altruism cannot evolve under spatially based discrimination, unless ecological constraints prevent complete dispersal. Increasing constraints enhances both the proportion of philopatric (and thereby altruistic) individuals and the level of altruistic investments conceded in pairwise interactions. Familiarity-based discrimination, by contrast, allows philopatry and altruism to evolve at significant levels even in the absence of ecological constraints. Increasing constraints further enhances the proportion of philopatric (and thereby altruistic) individuals but not the level of altruism conceded. Ecological constraints are thus more likely to affect social evolution in species in which restricted cognitive abilities, large group size, and/or limited period of associative learning force investments to be made on the basis of spatial cues.

Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

Evolutionary branching in deme-structured populations.

Adaptive dynamics shows that a continuous trait under frequency dependent selection may first converge to a singular point followed by spontaneous transition from a unimodal trait distribution into a bimodal one, which is called "evolutionary branching". Here, we study evolutionary branching in a deme-structured population by constructing a quantitative genetic model for the trait variance dynamics, which allows us to obtain an analytic condition for evolutionary branching. This is first shown to agree with previous conditions for branching expressed in terms of relatedness between interacting individuals within demes and obtained from mutant-resident systems. We then show this branching condition can be markedly simplified when the evolving trait affect fecundity and/or survival, as opposed to affecting population structure, which would occur in the case of the evolution of dispersal. As an application of our model, we evaluate the threshold migration rate below which evolutionary branching cannot occur in a pairwise interaction game. This agrees very well with the individual-based simulation results.