Social epistemology: A journal of knowledge, culture and policy

Provides a forum for philosophical and social scientific enquiry that incorporates the work of scholars from a variety of disciplines who share a concern with the production, assessment and validation of knowledge.

Irja' ila Nafsika: Suhraward's apperception of the self in light of Avicenna

Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d.687/1191) proposed a theory of apperception that constitutes the core of his “illuminative” epistemology. His theory of apperception purports to account for the soul’s immediate, reflexive, and unmediated knowledge of its own essence. Apperception may be defined as the direct experience the soul has of its essence. A closer examination of the Avicennan tradition (Avicenna died in 420/1037) reveals the existence of a number of arguments for the demonstration of an apperception of the self/soul similar to the arguments Suhrawardī later proposes. Contrary to admitted views, Avicenna had tackled issues related to the soul’s apperception, a type of perception distinct from the soul’s intellection of its essence. Avicenna alluded to the existence of a mode of perception specific to the soul that would guarantee both the soul’s unity and its personal identity. This apperception is defined as an unmediated presence of the soul to itself. These elements recur in Suhrawardī’s theory of apperception and numerous versions of Avicenna’s arguments for the demonstration of the presential nature of apperception

Should the knowledge-based economy be a savant or a sage? Wisdom and socially intelligent innovation

Discourse about knowledge-based economies rarely moves beyond the commercialization of science and engineering, and is locked in the discursive limits of functionalism. We argue that these discourses limit the scope of what knowledge-based economies might achieve because they are uninformed by an adequate conception of knowledge. In particular, knowledge management and knowledge-based economy discourse has not included the axiological dimension of knowledge that leads to wisdom. Taking an axiological perspective, we can discuss policy frameworks aimed at producing the social structures needed to bring fully formed and fully functioning knowledge societies into being. We argue that while the dominant discourse of industrial modernity remains rationalist, functionalist, utilitarian and technocratic, knowledge-based economies will resemble a savant rather than a sage. A wisdom-based renaissance of humanistic epistemology is needed to avoid increasing social dysfunction and a lack of wisdom in complex technological societies.

Improving teaching: Enhancing ways of being university teachers

My aim in this paper is to theorize my teaching in a course for experienced university teachers, in a context of increased attention to such courses. My focus in the course is transforming and enhancing ways of being university teachers, through integrating knowing, acting and being. In other words, epistemology is not seen as an end in itself, but rather it is in the service of ontology. In the paper, I explore and illustrate how this focus on ontology is enacted in the course.

Problems with the argument from fine tuning

The argument from fine tuning is supposed to establish the existence of God from the fact that the evolution of carbon-based life requires the laws of physics and the boundary conditions of the universe to be more or less as they are. We demonstrate that this argument fails. In particular, we focus on problems associated with the role probabilities play in the argument. We show that, even granting the fine tuning of the universe, it does not follow that the universe is improbable, thus no explanation of the fine tuning, theistic or otherwise, is required.

Critical health psychology - Who benefits?

This commentary deals with two issues raised by Hepworth (this issue). Concerning definitions, it argues that critical health psychology needs to be more explicit in defining itself as politically left-wing, and that its central defining characteristic should be that it is research and practice which aims primarily to benefit the participants, regardless of any specific method or epistemology. Concerning the value of critical health psychology, it argues that work which has improved health on a global scale and which aims to reduce inequities is being done, but not by critical psychologists, and suggests a need for more action and less rhetoric.