Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication

We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson–Wolinsky’s concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, through a refinement of the Nash equilibria of Myerson’s consent game. This refinement, denoted as monadic stability, describes myopically forward looking behavior of the players. We show through an equivalence that the class of monadically stable networks is a strict subset of the class of pairwise stable networks that can be characterized fully by modifications of the properties defining pairwise stability.

Northern Ireland's Consent to the Climate Change Act 2008: An Illusion?

This is the first in a two-part analysis of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the climate governance regime created by the UK Climate Change Act 2008. It contends that UK devolution has shaped this national regime and may itself be shaped by the national low carbon transition, particularly in the case of the UK’s most devolved region. In essence, while Northern Ireland’s consent to the application of the Act appeared to represent a long-term commitment to share power in the interests of present and future generations and thus to devolution itself, this first article argues that it was also potentially illusory. The second article argues that making an effective commitment to climate governance will require its devolved administration to allow constitutional arrangements designed for conflict resolution to mature. Failure to do so will have important implications for the UK’s putative ‘national’ low carbon transition and the longer term viability of devolution in the region.

Donor identification and consent for deceased organ donation: summary of NICE guidance.

Organ donation plays a major role in the management of patients with single organ failure of the kidneys, liver, pancreas, heart, or lung, or with combined organ failure of heart and lung (such as in cystic fibrosis) or of kidney and pancreas (such as in diabetes). A shortage of transplant organs has resulted in long waits for transplantation. Currently about 500 people in the United Kingdom die each year because of a shortage of donated organs,1 and at 31 March 2011 almost 7000 patients were waiting for a kidney transplant1 and would be having costly dialysis with serious morbidity and impact on quality of life. This shortage of organs is partly the result of relatively low numbers of road traffic deaths (lower than in many countries) but is also the result of inefficiencies in the donor identification and consent processes. This article summarises the most recent recommendations from the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) on improving donor identification and consent rates for deceased organ donation.2

Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.

Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership

Using the example of an unconsented mouth swab I criticise the view that an action of this kind taken in itself is wrongful in respect of its being a violation of autonomy. This is so much inasmuch as autonomy merits respect only with regard to ‘critical life choices’. I consider the view that such an action is nevertheless harmful or risks serious harm. I also respond to two possible suggestions: that the action is of a kind that violates autonomy; and, that the class of such actions violates autonomy. I suggest that the action is wrongful in as much as it is a bodily trespass. I consider, and criticise, two ways of understanding how morally I stand to my own body: as owner and as sovereign. In respect of the latter I consider Arthur Ripstein’s recent defence of a sovereignty principle. Finally I criticise an attempt by Joel Feinberg to explain bodily trespass in terms of personal autonomy.

Informed consent and the requirement to ensure understanding

It is generally held that doctors and researchers have an obligation to obtain informed consent. Over time there has been a move in relation to this obligation from a requirement to disclose information to a requirement to ensure that that information is understood.Whilst this change has been resisted, in this article I argue that both sides on this matter are mistaken.When investigating what information is needed for consent to be informed we might be trying to determine what information a person would need in order to consent at all, or we might be trying to determine what information a person needs in order to make an informed choice about whether or not to consent. I argue that the obligation to ensure understanding only applies to information generated by the ?rst type of enquiry; but that much of the information generally thought necessary in order for consent to be informed is only required if our concern is with the second type of enquiry. For this reason it is neither the case that doctors and researchers should ensure all the information they provide is understood, nor is it the case that their only obligation is to disclose it.