Green Party Factionalism. The Case of the Federation of Ecologists Alternatives, Greece

To date, the Federation of Ecologists Alternatives (FEA) is the only Greek green party to have achieved representation in Parliament. Based on written accounts of the period and in-depth interviews with the main protagonists, this article offers a theoretical explanation of FEA's short-lived trajectory (1989-92), describing it as a case of 'primordial factionalism': a case of intraparty factionalism stemming from externally imposed stresses rather than any internal debate about ideological purity (the classical Realo/Fundi conflict). The article maintains that in such cases, it is highly probable for an emerging green party to disintegrate during its formative period, thus adding a new perspective to classical green party factionalism theories.

Third Party Rights of Appeal in Planning: Reflecting on the Experience of the Republic of Ireland

The potential introduction of third party planning appeals in the UK as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998 has increased interest in those countries that have established third party appeal procedures. The closest of these is the Republic of Ireland, which has had a third party right of appeal since 1963. This paper describes the impact these appeals have had on planning in the Irish Republic by explaining the appeal process, describing past trends and providing background information on the parties that engage in third party appeals. An overall assessment of the Republic’s experience is given and the paper concludes with a few comparative remarks relating this to planning and rights discourse in the UK

Making 'party identification' more versatile: operationalising the concept for the multiparty setting

The conventional operationalisation of the concept of party identification is not appropriate for the multiparty setting. I offer new measures that facilitate multiple, and negative as well as positive, identities. Using survey evidence from Northern Ireland, these new measures are validated in a number of ways and their role in a comprehensive model of voting is illustrated.

Multi-Party Negotiation When Agents Have Subjective Estimates of Bargaining Powers

This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given bargaining power. More precisely each DM is supposed to have a subjective estimate of the power of the different parties. We study the convergence of the method, and provide examples where there is no possible agreement resulting from it.