Cost of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.

The research and development costs of 93 randomly selected new chemical entities (NCEs) were obtained from a survey of 12 U.S.-owned pharmaceutical firms. These data were used to estimate the pre-tax average cost of new drug development. The costs of abandoned NCEs were linked to the costs of NCEs that obtained marketing approval. For base case parameter values, the estimated out-of-pocket cost per approved NCE is $114 million (1987 dollars). Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a 9% discount rate yielded an average cost estimate of $231 million (1987 dollars).

Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: New estimates of R&D costs.

The research and development costs of 106 randomly selected new drugs were obtained from a survey of 10 pharmaceutical firms. These data were used to estimate the average pre-tax cost of new drug and biologics development. The costs of compounds abandoned during testing were linked to the costs of compounds that obtained marketing approval. The estimated average out-of-pocket cost per approved new compound is $1395 million (2013 dollars). Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a real discount rate of 10.5% yields a total pre-approval cost estimate of $2558 million (2013 dollars). When compared to the results of the previous study in this series, total capitalized costs were shown to have increased at an annual rate of 8.5% above general price inflation. Adding an estimate of post-approval R&D costs increases the cost estimate to $2870 million (2013 dollars).

Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances

© 2012 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.This article considers the determinants and effects of M&As in the pharmaceutical industry, with a particular focus on innovation and R&D productivity. As is the case in other industries, mergers in the pharmaceutical field are driven by a variety of company motives and conditions. These include defensive responses to industry shocks as well as more proactive rationales, such as economies of scale and scope, access to new technologies, and expansion to new markets. It is important to take account of firms' characteristics and motivations in evaluating merger performance, rather than using a broad aggregate brushstroke. Research to date on pharmaceuticals suggests considerable variation in both motivation and outcomes. From an antitrust policy standpoint, the larger horizontal mergers in pharmaceuticals have run into few challenges from regulatory authorities in the United States and the European Union, given the option to spin off competing therapeutic products to other drug firms.

The distribution of sales revenues from pharmaceutical innovation.

OBJECTIVE: This report updates our earlier work on the returns to pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) in the US (1980 to 1984), which showed that the returns distributions are highly skewed. It evaluates a more recent cohort of new drug introductions in the US (1988 to 1992) and examines how the returns distribution is emerging for drugs with life cycles concentrated in the 1990s versus the 1980s. DESIGN AND SETTING: Methods were described in detail in our earlier reports. The current sample included 110 new drug entities (including 28 orphan drugs), and sales data were obtained for the period 1988 to 1998, which represented between 7 and 11 years of sales for the drugs included. 20 years was chosen as the expected market life for this cohort, and a 2-step procedure was used to project future sales for the drugs--during the period until patent expiry and then beyond patent expiry until the 20-year time-horizon was completed. Thus, the values in the first half of the life cycle are essentially based on realised sales, while those in the second half are projected using information on patent expiry and other inputs. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES AND RESULTS: Peak annual sales for the top decile of drugs introduced between 1988 and 1992 in the US amounted to almost $US1.1 billion compared with peak sales of less than $US175 million (1992 values) for the mean compound. In particular, the top decile accounted for 56% of overall sales revenue. Although the sales distributions were skewed in both our earlier and current analysis, the top decile in the later time-period exhibited more rapid rates of growth after launch, a peak that was more than 50% greater in real terms than for the 1980 to 1984 cohort, and a faster rate of expected decline in sales after patent expiry. One factor contributing to the distribution of sales revenues becoming more skewed over time is the orphan drug phenomenon (i.e. most of the orphan drugs are concentrated at the bottom of the distribution). CONCLUSION: The distribution of sales revenues for new drug compounds is highly skewed in nature. In this regard, the top decile of new drugs accounts for more than half of the total sales generated by the 1988 to 1992 cohort analysed. Furthermore, the distribution of sales revenues for this cohort is more skewed than that of the 1980 to 1984 cohort we analysed in previous research.