Issues in the prescribing of psychotropic and psychoactive medication for persons with learning disability: quantitative and qualitative perspectives

The administration of psychotropic and psychoactive medication for persons with learning disability and accompanying mental illness and/or challenging behaviour has undergone much critical review over the past two decades. Assessment and diagnosis of mental illness in this population continues to be psychopharmacological treatment include polypharmacy, irrational prescription procedures and frequent over-prescription. It is clear that all forms of treatment including non-pharmacological interventions need to be driven by accurate and appropriate diagnoses. Where a psychiatric diagnosis has been identified, it greatly aides the selection of appropriate medication, although a specific medication for each diagnosis, as was once hoped, is simply no longer a reality in practice. Part one of the present thesis seeks to address many of the current issues in mental health problems and pharmacological treatment to date. The author undertook a drug prevalence study within both residential and community facilities for persons with learning disability within the Mid-West region of Ireland in order to ascertain the current level of prescribing of psychotropic and psychoactive medications for this population. While many attempts have been made to account for the variation in prescribing, little systematic and empirical research has been undertaken to investigate the factors thought to influence such prescribing. While studies investigating the prescribing behaviours of General Practitioners (GP's) have illustrated the complex nature of the decision making process in the context of general practice, no similar efforts have yet been directed at examining the prescribing behaviours of Consultant Psychiatrists. Using The Critical Incident Technique, the author interviewed Consultant Psychiatrists in the Republic of Ireland to gather information relating not only to their patterns of prescribing for learning disabled populations, but also to examine reasons influencing their prescribing in addition to several related factors. Part two of this thesis presents the findings from this study and a number of issues are raised, not only in relation to attempting to account for the findings from part one of the thesis, but also with respect to implications for improved management and clinical practice.

A new world a new American foreign policy: the Carter administration, Nicaragua, and the legacy of the Vietnam War, 1977-1981

The impact of the Vietnam War conditioned the Carter administration’s response to the Nicaraguan revolution in ways that reduced US engagement with both sides of the conflict. It made the countries of Latin America counter the US approach and find their own solution to the crisis, and allowed Cuba to play a greater role in guiding the overthrow of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle. This thesis re-evaluates Carter’s policy through the legacy of the Vietnam War, because US executive anxieties about military intervention, Congress’s increasing influence, and US public concerns about the nation’s global responsibilities, shaped the Carter approach to Nicaragua. Following a background chapter, the Carter administration’s policy towards Nicaragua is evaluated, before and after the fall of Somoza in July 1979. The extent of the Vietnam influence on US-Nicaraguan relations is developed by researching government documents on the formation of US policy, including material from the Jimmy Carter Library, the Library of Congress, the National Security Archive, the National Archives and Records Administration, and other government and media sources from the United Nations Archives, New York University, the New York Public Library, the Hoover Institution Archives, Tulane University and the Organization of American States. The thesis establishes that the Vietnam legacy played a key role in the Carter administration’s approach to Nicaragua. Before the overthrow of Somoza, the Carter administration limited their influence in Nicaragua because they felt there was no immediate threat from communism. The US feared that an active role in Nicaragua, without an established threat from Cuba or the Soviet Union, could jeopardise congressional support for other foreign policy goals deemed more important. The Carter administration, as a result, pursued a policy of non-intervention towards the Central American country. After the fall of Somoza, and the establishment of a new government with a left wing element represented by the Sandinistas, the Carter administration emphasised non-intervention in a military sense, but actively engaged with the new Nicaraguan leadership to contain the potential communist influence that could spread across Central America in the wake of the Nicaraguan revolution.

The Ford administration, Angola and the perception of Post-Vietnam US credibility, 1974-1976

This thesis is a study of how the Gerald Ford administration struggled to address a perceived loss of US credibility after the collapse of Vietnam, with a focus on the role of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the formulation, implementation and subsequent defence of US Angolan policy. By examining the immediate post-Vietnam period, this thesis shows that Vietnam had a significant impact on Kissinger’s actions on Angola, which resulted in an ill conceived covert operation in another third world conflict. In 1974, Africa was a neglected region in Cold War US foreign policy, yet the effects of the Portuguese revolution led to a rapid decolonization of its African territories, of which Angola was to become the focus of superpower competition. After South Vietnam collapsed in April 1975, Kissinger became fixated on restoring the perceived loss of US prestige, Angola provided the first opportunity to address this. Despite objections from his advisors, Kissinger methodically engineered a covert program to assist two anti-Marxist guerrilla groups in Angola. As the crisis escalated, the media discovered the operation and the Congress decided to cease all funding. A period of heated tensions ensued, resulting in Kissinger creating a new African policy to outmanoeuvre his critics publicly, while privately castigating them to foreign leaders. This thesis argues that Kissinger’s dismissal of internal dissent and opposition from the Congress was influenced by what he perceived as bureaucrats being affected by the Vietnam syndrome, and his obsession with restoring US credibility. By looking at the private and public records – as expressed in government meetings and official reports, US newspaper and television coverage and diplomatic cables – this thesis addresses the question of how the lessons of Vietnam failed to influence Kissinger’s actions in Angola, but the lessons of Angola were heavily influential in the construction of a new US-African policy.