Representations and evolutionary operators for the scheduling of pump operations in water distribution networks.

Reducing the energy consumption of water distribution networks has never had more significance. The greatest energy savings can be obtained by carefully scheduling the operations of pumps. Schedules can be defined either implicitly, in terms of other elements of the network such as tank levels, or explicitly by specifying the time during which each pump is on/off. The traditional representation of explicit schedules is a string of binary values with each bit representing pump on/off status during a particular time interval. In this paper, we formally define and analyze two new explicit representations based on time-controlled triggers, where the maximum number of pump switches is established beforehand and the schedule may contain less switches than the maximum. In these representations, a pump schedule is divided into a series of integers with each integer representing the number of hours for which a pump is active/inactive. This reduces the number of potential schedules compared to the binary representation, and allows the algorithm to operate on the feasible region of the search space. We propose evolutionary operators for these two new representations. The new representations and their corresponding operations are compared with the two most-used representations in pump scheduling, namely, binary representation and level-controlled triggers. A detailed statistical analysis of the results indicates which parameters have the greatest effect on the performance of evolutionary algorithms. The empirical results show that an evolutionary algorithm using the proposed representations improves over the results obtained by a recent state-of-the-art Hybrid Genetic Algorithm for pump scheduling using level-controlled triggers.

An evolutionary model explaining the Neolithic transition from egalitarianism to leadership and despotism.

The Neolithic was marked by a transition from small and relatively egalitarian groups, to much larger groups with increased stratification. But the dynamics of this remain poorly understood. It is hard to see how despotism can arise without coercion, yet coercion could not easily have occurred in an egalitarian setting. Using a quanti- tative model of evolution in a patch-structured population, we demonstrate that the interaction between demographic and ecological factors can overcome this conundrum. We model the co-evolution of individual preferences for hierarchy alongside the degree of despotism of leaders, and the dispersal preferences of followers. We show that voluntary leadership without coercion can evolve in small groups, when leaders help to solve coordination problems related to resource production. An example is coordinating construction of an irrigation system. Our model predicts that the transition to larger despotic groups will then occur when: 1. surplus resources lead to demographic expansion of groups, removing the viability of an acephalous niche in the same area and so locking individuals into hierarchy; 2. high dispersal costs limit followers' ability to escape a despot. Empirical evidence suggests that these conditions were likely met for the first time during the subsistence intensification of the Neolithic.

How institutions shaped the last major evolutionary transition to large-scale human societies.

What drove the transition from small-scale human societies centred on kinship and personal exchange, to large-scale societies comprising cooperation and division of labour among untold numbers of unrelated individuals? We propose that the unique human capacity to negotiate institutional rules that coordinate social actions was a key driver of this transition. By creating institutions, humans have been able to move from the default ‘Hobbesian’ rules of the ‘game of life’, determined by physical/environmental constraints, into self-created rules of social organization where cooperation can be individually advantageous even in large groups of unrelated individuals. Examples include rules of food sharing in hunter–gatherers, rules for the usage of irrigation systems in agriculturalists, property rights and systems for sharing reputation between mediaeval traders. Successful institutions create rules of interaction that are self-enforcing, providing direct benefits both to individuals that follow them, and to individuals that sanction rule breakers. Forming institutions requires shared intentionality, language and other cognitive abilities largely absent in other primates. We explain how cooperative breeding likely selected for these abilities early in the Homo lineage. This allowed anatomically modern humans to create institutions that transformed the self-reliance of our primate ancestors into the division of labour of large-scale human social organization.