Analytical models for capacity estimation of IEEE 802.11 WLANs using DCF for internet applications

We provide analytical models for capacity evaluation of an infrastructure IEEE 802.11 based network carrying TCP controlled file downloads or full-duplex packet telephone calls. In each case the analytical models utilize the attempt probabilities from a well known fixed-point based saturation analysis. For TCP controlled file downloads, following Bruno et al. (In Networking '04, LNCS 2042, pp. 626-637), we model the number of wireless stations (STAs) with ACKs as a Markov renewal process embedded at packet success instants. In our work, analysis of the evolution between the embedded instants is done by using saturation analysis to provide state dependent attempt probabilities. We show that in spite of its simplicity, our model works well, by comparing various simulated quantities, such as collision probability, with values predicted from our model. Next we consider N constant bit rate VoIP calls terminating at N STAs. We model the number of STAs that have an up-link voice packet as a Markov renewal process embedded at so called channel slot boundaries. Analysis of the evolution over a channel slot is done using saturation analysis as before. We find that again the AP is the bottleneck, and the system can support (in the sense of a bound on the probability of delay exceeding a given value) a number of calls less than that at which the arrival rate into the AP exceeds the average service rate applied to the AP. Finally, we extend the analytical model for VoIP calls to determine the call capacity of an 802.11b WLAN in a situation where VoIP calls originate from two different types of coders. We consider N-1 calls originating from Type 1 codecs and N-2 calls originating from Type 2 codecs. For G711 and G729 voice coders, we show that the analytical model again provides accurate results in comparison with simulations.

Nonneutral network and the role of bargaining power in side payments

Representatives of several Internet access providers have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the �network neutrality� principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the internaut�s behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the content providers, and the monetary flow that involves the internauts, the ISP and content provider, and in particular, the content provider�s revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibrium; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the service and content providers determine how much they will charge the internauts) with a cooperative one - the content provider and the service provider bargain with each other over payments to one another. We include in our model a possible asymmetric bargaining power which is represented by a parameter (that varies between zero to one). We then extend our model to study the case of several content providers. We also provide a very brief study of the equilibria that arise when one of the content providers enters into an exclusive contract with the ISP.

The Case for Non-Cooperative Multihoming of Users to Access Points in IEEE 802.11 WLANs

In many cases, a mobile user has the option of connecting to one of several IEEE 802.11 access points (APs),each using an independent channel. User throughput in each AP is determined by the number of other users as well as the frame size and physical rate being used. We consider the scenario where users could multihome, i.e., split their traffic amongst all the available APs, based on the throughput they obtain and the price charged. Thus, they are involved in a non-cooperative game with each other. We convert the problem into a fluid model and show that under a pricing scheme, which we call the cost price mechanism, the total system throughput is maximized,i.e., the system suffers no loss of efficiency due to selfish dynamics. We also study the case where the Internet Service Provider (ISP) could charge prices greater than that of the cost price mechanism. We show that even in this case multihoming outperforms unihoming, both in terms of throughput as well as profit to the ISP.

Provider-Customer Coalitional Games

Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.

Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks

This paper studies the impact of exclusive contracts between a content provider (CP) and an internet service provider (ISP) in a nonneutral network. We consider a simple linear demand function for the CPs. We studywhen an exclusive contract is benefcial to the colluding pair and evaluate its impact on the noncolluding players at equilibrium. For the case of two CPs and one ISP we show that collusion may not always be benefcial. We derive an explicit condition in terms of the advertisement revenues of the CPs that tells when a collusion is proftable to the colluding entities.

Probabilistic Prediction based Scheduling for Delay Sensitive Traffic in Internet of Things

This paper proposes a probabilistic prediction based approach for providing Quality of Service (QoS) to delay sensitive traffic for Internet of Things (IoT). A joint packet scheduling and dynamic bandwidth allocation scheme is proposed to provide service differentiation and preferential treatment to delay sensitive traffic. The scheduler focuses on reducing the waiting time of high priority delay sensitive services in the queue and simultaneously keeping the waiting time of other services within tolerable limits. The scheme uses the difference in probability of average queue length of high priority packets at previous cycle and current cycle to determine the probability of average weight required in the current cycle. This offers optimized bandwidth allocation to all the services by avoiding distribution of excess resources for high priority services and yet guaranteeing the services for it. The performance of the algorithm is investigated using MPEG-4 traffic traces under different system loading. The results show the improved performance with respect to waiting time for scheduling high priority packets and simultaneously keeping tolerable limits for waiting time and packet loss for other services. Crown Copyright (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.