Equine influenza in Australia

Letter to the editor.

Positive results in a real-time PCR for type A influenza associated with the use of an inactivated vaccine.

A real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR) test for the matrix gene of type A influenza viruses was used during the 2007 Australian equine influenza (EI) outbreak in order to confirm diagnosis and, later, eradication of the virus. During the EI outbreak, horses being exported required vaccination and individual proof of freedom from EI. At the end of the outbreak, positive results were obtained from four horses destined for export, because of contamination of the samples with the vaccine. This report highlights the need for EI testing and vaccination to occur on separate days and with the collection of swabs for testing to precede vaccination.

The first five days: field and laboratory investigations during the early stages of the equine influenza outbreak in Australia, 2007.

Until August 2007, Australia was one of only three countries internationally recognised to be free of equine influenza (EI). This report documents the diagnosis of the first cases of EI in Australian horses and summarises the investigations that took place over the next 5 days. During that time, a multifocal outbreak was identified across eastern New South Wales and south-eastern Queensland. The use of an influenza type A pan-reactive real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction allowed rapid confirmation of suspect cases of EI.

The August 2007 equine influenza response management framework.

This section outlines the most important issues addressed in the management of the response in the two infected states, New South Wales and Queensland. There were differences in the management of the response between the states for logistic, geographic and organisation structural reasons. Issues included the use of control centres, information centres, the problems associated with the lack of trained staff to undertake all the roles, legislative issues, controls of horse movements, the availability of resources for adequate surveillance, the challenges of communication between disparate groups and tracing the movements of both humans and horses.

High-level coordination and strategy in the 2007 equine influenza outbreak response.

The equine influenza (EI) outbreak presented many challenges that required high-level coordination and decision making, as well as the development of new approaches for satisfactory and consistent resolution. This paper outlines the elements of the national coordination arrangements, preparatory arrangements in place prior to the outbreak that facilitated national coordination, and some of the issues faced and resolved in the response.

Significant features of the epidemiology of equine influenza in Queensland, Australia, 2007.

An outbreak of equine influenza (EI) caused by influenza A H3N8 subtype virus occurred in the Australian states of Queensland and New South Wales in August 2007. Infection in the Australian horse population was associated with the introduction of infection by horses from overseas. The first case of EI in Queensland was detected on 25 August 2007 at an equestrian sporting event. Infection subsequently spread locally and to other clusters through horse movements prior to the implementation of an official standstill. There were five main clusters of infected properties during this outbreak and several outliers, which were investigated to find the potential mechanism of disease spread. To contain the outbreak, Queensland was divided into infection status zones, with different movement controls applied to each zone. Vaccination was implemented strategically in infected areas and within horse subpopulations. Control and eventual eradication of EI from Queensland was achieved through a combination of quarantine, biosecurity measures, movement control, rapid diagnostic testing and vaccination.

Risk-based surveillance for avian influenza control along poultry market chains in South China: The value of social network analysis.

Over the past two decades, the poultry sector in China went through a phase of tremendous growth as well as rapid intensification and concentration. Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) subtype H5N1 was first detected in 1996 in Guangdong province, South China and started spreading throughout Asia in early 2004. Since then, control of the disease in China has relied heavily on wide-scale preventive vaccination combined with movement control, quarantine and stamping out. This strategy has been successful in drastically reducing the number of outbreaks during the past 5 years. However, HPAIV H5N1 is still circulating and is regularly isolated in traditional live bird markets (LBMs) where viral infection can persist, which represent a public health hazard for people visiting them. The use of social network analysis in combination with epidemiological surveillance in South China has identified areas where the success of current strategies for HPAI control in the poultry production sector may benefit from better knowledge of poultry trading patterns and the LBM network configuration as well as their capacity for maintaining HPAIV H5N1 infection. We produced a set of LBM network maps and estimated the associated risk of HPAIV H5N1 within LBMs and along poultry market chains, providing new insights into how live poultry trade and infection are intertwined. More specifically, our study provides evidence that several biosecurity factors such as daily cage cleaning, daily cage disinfection or manure processing contribute to a reduction in HPAIV H5N1 presence in LBMs. Of significant importance is that the results of our study also show the association between social network indicators and the presence of HPAIV H5N1 in specific network configurations such as the one represented by the counties of origin of the birds traded in LBMs. This new information could be used to develop more targeted and effective control interventions.