Greetings: 50 years of Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission–Radiation Effects Research Foundation studies

The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission was established in Hiroshima in 1947 and in Nagasaki in 1948 under the auspices of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences to initiate a long-term and comprehensive epidemiological and genetic study of the atomic bomb survivors. It was replaced in 1975 by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation which is a nonprofit Japanese foundation binationally managed and supported with equal funding by the governments of Japan and the United States. Thanks to the cooperation of the survivors and the contributions of a multitude of scientists, these studies flourish to this day in what must be the most successful long-term research collaboration between the two countries. Although these studies are necessarily limited to the effects of acute, whole-body, mixed gamma-neutron radiation from the atom bombs, their comprehensiveness and duration make them the most definitive descriptions of the late effects of radiation in humans. For this reason, the entire world relies heavily on these data to set radiation standards. As vital as the study results are, they still represent primarily the effects of radiation on older survivors. Another decade or two should correct this deficiency and allow us to measure definitively the human risk of heritable mutation from radiation. We look to the worldwide radiation and risk community as well as to the survivors who have contributed so much to what has been done already to accomplish this goal.

The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in retrospect

For 50 years, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) and its successor, the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), have conducted epidemiological and genetic studies of the survivors of the atomic bombs and of their children. This research program has provided the primary basis for radiation health standards. Both ABCC (1947–1975) and RERF (1975 to date) have been a joint enterprise of the United States (through the National Academy of Sciences) and of Japan. ABCC began in devastated, occupied Japan. Its mission had to be defined and refined. Early research revealed the urgent need for long term study. In 1946, a Directive of President Truman enjoined the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences to develop the program. By 1950, ABCC staff exceeded 1,000, and clinical and genetic studies were underway. Budgetary difficulties and other problems almost forced closure in 1953. In 1955, the Francis Report led to a unified epidemiological study. Much progress was made in the next decade, but changing times required founding of a binational nonprofit organization (RERF) with equal participation by Japan and the United States. New programs have been developed and existing ones have been extended in what is the longest continuing health survey ever undertaken.

The challenge of contracting for technological information

Contracting to provide technological information (TI) is a significant challenge. TI is an unusual commodity in five ways. (i) TI is difficult to count and value; conventional indicators, such as patents and citations, hardly indicate value. TI is often sold at different prices to different parties. (ii) To value TI, it may be necessary to “give away the secret.” This danger, despite nondisclosure agreements, inhibits efforts to market TI. (iii) To prove its value, TI is often bundled into complete products, such as a computer chip or pharmaceutical product. Efficient exchange, by contrast, would involve merely the raw information. (iv) Sellers’ superior knowledge about TI’s value make buyers wary of overpaying. (v) Inefficient contracts are often designed to secure rents from TI. For example, licensing agreements charge more than marginal cost. These contracting difficulties affect the way TI is produced, encouraging self-reliance. This should be an advantage to large firms. However, small research and development firms spend more per employee than large firms, and nonprofit universities are major producers. Networks of organizational relationships, particularly between universities and industry, are critical in transmitting TI. Implicit barter—money for guidance—is common. Property rights for TI are hard to establish. Patents, quite suitable for better mousetraps, are inadequate for an era when we design better mice. Much TI is not patented, and what is patented sets fuzzy demarcations. New organizational forms are a promising approach to contracting difficulties for TI. Webs of relationships, formal and informal, involving universities, start-up firms, corporate giants, and venture capitalists play a major role in facilitating the production and spread of TI.