Induction of ovulation in rabbit does using purified nerve growth factor and camel seminal plasma

The presence of an ovulation-inducing factor (OIF) in the seminal plasma (SP) of several species with spontaneous and induced ovulation, including the rabbit, has been documented. Recent studies have demonstrated that the OIF in the SP of camels (SPCAM) is a nerve growth factor (β-NGF). The aim of this study was to determine if purified β-NGF from mouse submandibular glands or SPCAM could provoke ovulation induction in the rabbit doe. A total of 35 females were synchronized with 25 IU of equine chorionic gonadotropin (Serigan, Laboratorios Ovejero, Spain) and allocated into 4 groups. Forty-eight hours later (Day 0), does were given a single dose (IM) of 1 mL of saline solution (SS; n = 8); 1 mL of gonadorelin (GnRH; Inducel, Laboratorios Ovejero, Spain; n = 9); 24 µg of β-NGF (2.5S-NGF; Promega, USA; n = 10); or 1 mL of centrifuged raw camel SP (SPCAM; 127 pg mL–1 NGF; n = 8). After treatment, an empty catheter was introduced through the vagina to simulate the nervous/mechanical stimulus of coitus (4 animals per group). Plasma LH concentrations were determined in blood samples taken 30 min before treatment and at 0, 30, 60, 90, and 120 min after injection. Progesterone concentrations were assessed at 0 and 120 min and every 2 days until Day 6 after treatment. Concentrations of β-NGF in camel SP and hormone determinations were made by enzyme immunoassay. Ovulation rate (OR) was determined after euthanasia on Day 7.

Analysis of the operator action and the single failure criteria in a SGTR sequence using best estimate assumptions with TRACE 5.0

Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) sequences in Pressurized Water Reactors are known to be one of the most demanding transients for the operating crew. SGTR are a special kind of transient as they could lead to radiological releases without core damage or containment failure, as they can constitute a direct path from the reactor coolant system to the environment. The first methodology used to perform the Deterministic Safety Analysis (DSA) of a SGTR did not credit the operator action for the first 30 min of the transient, assuming that the operating crew was able to stop the primary to secondary leakage within that period of time. However, the different real SGTR accident cases happened in the USA and over the world demonstrated that the operators usually take more than 30 min to stop the leakage in actual sequences. Some methodologies were raised to overcome that fact, considering operator actions from the beginning of the transient, as it is done in Probabilistic Safety Analysis. This paper presents the results of comparing different assumptions regarding the single failure criteria and the operator action taken from the most common methodologies included in the different Deterministic Safety Analysis. One single failure criteria that has not been analysed previously in the literature is proposed and analysed in this paper too. The comparison is done with a PWR Westinghouse three loop model in TRACE code (Almaraz NPP) with best estimate assumptions but including deterministic hypothesis such as single failure criteria or loss of offsite power. The behaviour of the reactor is quite diverse depending on the different assumptions made regarding the operator actions. On the other hand, although there are high conservatisms included in the hypothesis, as the single failure criteria, all the results are quite far from the regulatory limits. In addition, some improvements to the Emergency Operating Procedures to minimize the offsite release from the damaged SG in case of a SGTR are outlined taking into account the offsite dose sensitivity results.