A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignaling an the GED
Data(s) |
13/05/2008
13/05/2008
01/07/2004
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Resumo |
We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is that countersignaling is more expected to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low non-cognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages. Additionally, it suggests modifications that would make the GED a more signal. |
Identificador |
01048910 |
Idioma(s) |
en_US |
Publicador |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
Relação |
Ensaios Econômicos;553 |
Palavras-Chave | #Economia #Capital humano #Escolaridade |
Tipo |
Working Paper |