A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignaling an the GED


Autoria(s): Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto Ataíde; Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
Data(s)

13/05/2008

13/05/2008

01/07/2004

Resumo

We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is that countersignaling is more expected to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low non-cognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages. Additionally, it suggests modifications that would make the GED a more signal.

Identificador

01048910

http://hdl.handle.net/10438/595

Idioma(s)

en_US

Publicador

Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV

Relação

Ensaios Econômicos;553

Palavras-Chave #Economia #Capital humano #Escolaridade
Tipo

Working Paper