Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria
Data(s) |
20/03/2009
20/03/2009
01/02/2009
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Resumo |
We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of (0-1) normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule and discuss related criteria. |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
en |
Publicador |
Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques |
Relação |
Cahier de recherche #2009-02 |
Palavras-Chave | #preference aggregation #lotteries #relative egalitarianism #D63 #D71 |
Tipo |
Article |