Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games
| Data(s) |
01/07/2011
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|---|---|
| Resumo |
In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved, |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
| Fonte |
Chakrabarti , S & Tangsangasaksri , S 2011 , ' Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games ' Mathematical Social Sciences , vol 62 , no. 1 , pp. 55-64 . DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.04.007 |
| Palavras-Chave | #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1800/1804 #Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3200 #Psychology(all) #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300 #Social Sciences(all) #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3312 #Sociology and Political Science |
| Tipo |
article |
