Purchasing power parity versus fixed exchange rate rules: A stability and welfare analysis


Autoria(s): Shin, Jong Kook; Subramanian, Chetan
Data(s)

01/06/2012

Resumo

This paper evaluates the desirability of PPP rules vis-á-vis fixed exchange rates both in terms of welfare and stability properties. The analysis is conducted within a small open-economy New Keynesian framework extended to include a cost channel. In terms of stability, we find that while the equilibrium is always unique under fixed exchange rates its uniqueness critically depends upon the presence/absence of the cost channel under a PPP rule. Overall, then, in terms of welfare a fixed exchange rate always outperforms a PPP rule.

Identificador

http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/purchasing-power-parity-versus-fixed-exchange-rate-rules-a-stability-and-welfare-analysis(45fa1b6d-460d-4a0d-abcc-75318112cb95).html

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02244.x

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess

Fonte

Shin , J K & Subramanian , C 2012 , ' Purchasing power parity versus fixed exchange rate rules: A stability and welfare analysis ' Manchester School , vol 80 , no. 3 , pp. 321-354 . DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02244.x

Palavras-Chave #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002 #Economics and Econometrics
Tipo

article